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Introduction 
 
Road Pricing: Is It Needed, Is It Possible,  
Is It Inevitable? 
 
André de Palma 1, Edoardo Marcucci 2•, 
Esko Niskanen 3, Bernhard Wieland 4 
 
 
1 Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées and Institut Universitaire de France (FR) and adpC (BE) 
2 Department of Economics, University of Urbino, Italy 
3 STAResearch, Finland 
4 Institute for Transport and Economics, Dresden Technical University 
 
 
The introduction of cordon charges in large European cities such as London and the 
pressing budget constraints for infrastructure construction and maintenance (e.g., in 
Germany) have spurred a renewed interest in the issue of transport pricing. Recent 
special issues or collection of papers can be found in Schade and Schlag (2003), in 
Santos (2004), in Transport Policy vol. 15, issue 5 (2005) and vol. 13, issue 2 (2006) or 
in de Palma, Lindsey and Proost (forthcoming), inter alia. 
This special issue contains a selection papers presented at the 2nd Kuhmo conference 
in July 2005, which was held in Kuhmo, Finland. 
What is the contribution of this issue to the on-going debate on road pricing? The 
papers can be subdivided into two categories: a) theoretical papers and b) policy and 
applied research papers. 
A striking characteristic of the literature on road pricing is that the degree of 
consensus among economist on its beneficial social effects seems to be inversely 
proportional to its acceptance among the general public and the politicians. Social 
efficiency and political acceptability instead of going hand-in-hand appear to be moving 
in opposite directions. Three papers - by Amihai Glazer and Esko Niskanen (2006), 
Andreas Kopp (2006) and Edoardo Marcucci, Marco Marini, and Davide Ticchi (2006) 
– discuss, at a theoretical level, the reasons why this might occur. The first two papers 
add the concept of “fairness”, a term including both the concepts of “equity” and 
“justice”, to the concept of social efficiency, while the third paper deals with the issue 
of political acceptability of road pricing policies. 
Amihai Glazer and Esko Niskanen explain the opposition to road pricing schemes 
through the interpretation road users might have when a congestion toll is perceived as a 
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punishment for the damage a user causes on others. In this sense, road pricing is 
perceived by the road user as “unfair” or “unjust”. The argument assumes that when a 
user suffers from congestion, he believes that he has already undergone some 
punishment and thus considers unfair or unjust the payment of an additional toll. 
Consequently, a person views a congestion toll as unjust if the toll exceeds the 
difference between the congestion externality a road user generates on others and the 
uncompensated externality he suffers from others. (Some users may also miss-
understand or ignore the concept of externality or user-pay principle). By exploring the 
implications of such a view and by illustrating how to determine the toll satisfying this 
criterion of justice it is shown that the socially optimal toll violates this criterion. The 
authors illustrate how the fair or “just” toll varies with the parameters of the model and 
discuss the implications of alternative definitions of justice as well as potential 
extensions of the basic model considered.  
Andreas Kopp studies the conflict between allocative efficiency and fairness arising 
from an optimal decentralized provision of infrastructure services. The author discusses 
the most prominent principles of fairness, arguing that the reward principle could be 
considered as the most relevant fairness principle for the discussion of distributional 
effects of pricing rules. Applying this fairness notion, no conflict of compatibility 
between allocative efficiency arises in a benchmark case with strong congestion and 
optimal marginal cost prices, whereas a genuine distributional conflict results in the 
case of relatively low levels of congestion and heterogeneous users, with the implication 
of the non-coverage of fixed costs and revenues deriving from imposition of efficient 
prices.  
The paper by Edoardo Marcucci, Marco Marini, and Davide Ticchi use the citizen-
candidate game framework to analyse the issue of the political acceptability of road 
pricing policies. The paper asserts that road pricing policies are never applied when 
there is no redistribution of the resources generated in favour of other modes of 
transport (public transport) or when the congestion of these types of transport is 
relatively high. The results suggest that the efficiency of the redistribution of resources 
from road to the alternative types of transport (public transport) as well as the fraction 
of the population that uses the road transport provide key factors in explaining the 
adoption of road pricing schemes 
The opening paper of the applied and policy oriented group of papers is written by 
Robin Lindsey. It provides an up-to-date survey of the recent developments and current 
policy issues in road pricing in the US and Canada. This contribution complements the 
mostly European perspective of the remaining papers. Although it is difficult to make a 
comparison between the two continents, it is the author’s opinion that the US and 
Canada are in a relative delay with respect to Europe and Singapore as for the practical 
implementation of road pricing schemes. At the same time, however, both countries 
have demonstrated quite a sustained interest in road pricing considering it an 
appropriate instrument both for reducing congestion as well as for generating revenues. 
The interest in road pricing schemes is testified for the US by the funding of the Value 
Pricing Pilot Program aimed at pricing demonstration projects and for Canada by the 
undergoing examinations of road charging in order to finance both the construction of 
new roads as well as the maintenance of old ones.  
The paper by André de Palma, Kiarash Motamedi, Nathalie Picard, and Paul 
Waddell follows the strong and growing interest in the development and use of large-
scale planning models. It describes the first step of a project aiming at the integration of 
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UrbanSim, a dynamic micro-simulation land use model, and METROPOLIS, a dynamic 
traffic model. Such integration, novel in many respects, allows for the treatment of two 
type of endogeneity in residential location choices: the interdependency between 
residential location and housing prices as well as the interdependency between 
residential location and travel times for work and other purposes trips. Such modelling 
effort allows a more comprehensive long-run (as well as short-run) evaluation of the 
impact of the road pricing policies since the distribution of commercial and residential 
activities are treated as endogenous.  
Stef Proost, Saskia Van der Loo, André de Palma, and Robin Lindsey approach the 
issue of road pricing at a more micro level. For this purpose, they analyse a proposal to 
build a new tunnel under the Scheldt river, near the centre of Antwerp in order to relieve 
traffic congestion on the ring road and in an existing tunnel. They use a new CBA-
economic model, MOLINO, which is briefly summarized. Three tolling schemes on the 
new infrastructure are compared with the tolling of the existing tunnel without building 
a new infrastructure. The comparison among the different options is carried out using 
the MOLINO model, recently developed as part of the European-Union funded 
REVENUE project. The two tunnels are regarded as imperfect substitutes in a multi-
year accounting framework where emissions, accidents, noise externalities, and road 
damage, revenues accruing to the national and regional governments from existing 
transport user charges are considered along with the salvage value of the new tunnel.  
Pricing measures provide an important tool to influence user behaviour. The available 
ones are numerous and very diversified. The pricing design depends on the objectives 
pursued and it is therefore important to predict the most likely responses induced by 
these forms of intervention. Different people have different options to change transport 
behaviour and this implies different reactions to different pricing schemes. The extant 
literature on this aspect is somewhat scarce.  
Barry Ubbels and Erik Verhoef carried out an empirical research though a 
questionnaire among Dutch car owners on the impact of road pricing on road users’ 
behaviour. The results indicate that road pricing may have considerable effects, and that 
much depends on the design of the measure. In terms of trips adjusted, the effectiveness 
of the measures is in the range of 6% to 15% for all purposes. The effect in terms of 
kilometres is somewhat smaller. There are considerable differences between trip 
purposes, with commuting generally being least sensitive when the charge is time 
independent. The effect of revenue use is obvious in most cases, the measures with 
revenues allocated to lower income users have generally more impact. Although the 
decision whether or not to implement a price measure remains a political one, it is clear 
that the effects depend very much on the type and structure of the measure proposed. 
The paper by Bernhard Wieland describes a recent and important innovation in 
European pricing measures: the use of a satellite based tolling system for heavy goods 
vehicles (HGVs) in Germany. The Author describes the political and economic 
background of the introduction of the HGV-toll by sketching the history of the 
implementation process, describing the major structural elements of the toll, and 
discussing current problems and possible future developments. It is interesting that the 
major reason for the HGV-toll acceptance seems to have been the existence of a “grand 
coalition” of actors supporting it including politicians, truckers, environmentalists, the 
general public, and especially car owners. Each actor had his own motivation in mind 
while the media concentrated their reporting more on the technical and managerial 
problems of Toll Collect, the company in charge of the system, rather than on the 
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economic and social issues linked to it. In conclusion, the author argues in favour of the 
need to find a binding political mechanisms with respect to the use of the revenues of 
the toll. Even if it is known from the economic theory of second best that allocating 
these revenues to road building must not necessarily be the first best option, acceptance 
might however increase if citizens can be convinced that the toll is not “just another 
tax.” 
Finally, Alessandra Libardo, Silvio Nocera, and Dario Trabucco discuss the merits of 
pricing for a peculiar purpose: tackling the problems posed and the damages provoked 
in the lagoon of Venice by the waves originating from boat traffic. Given that most of 
the traffic is freight transportation the authors concentrate on suggestions pertaining to 
the re-organization of freight operations and distribution in Venice. The innovative 
aspect of this paper consists in the adaptation of the road pricing logic to a particularly 
complex environment where mobility through water canals determines specific forms of 
externality requiring complex control systems. The pricing has the objective of 
modifying the status quo of the organization of the freight movement in the lagoon, 
with the aim of introducing the pressure of competition between the operators, who 
nowadays actually operate in a rather captive market system characterised by little 
efficiency. 
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When users of congested roads  
may view tolls as unjust 
 
Amihai Glazer 1, Esko Niskanen 2∗ 
 
 
 
1 Department of Economics, University of California, 
Irvine, CA 92697, USA 
2 STAResearch, Finland 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Though congestion tolls can increase social welfare, the public often opposes them. One explanation 
for the opposition is that a road user views a congestion toll as punishment for the damage he causes 
others. Since a user suffers from congestion, he believes that he has already suffered some punishment 
and therefore it is unfair or unjust to impose a toll in addition. We assume that a person views a 
congestion toll as unjust if the toll exceeds the difference between the congestion externality a road user 
generates on others and the uncompensated externality he suffers from others. We explore the 
implications of such a view. We illustrate how to determine the toll that satisfies this criterion of justice 
and how the socially optimal toll violates the criterion. We examine how the just toll varies with the 
parameters of the model. We discuss the implications of alternative definitions of justice and possible 
extensions of the basic model considered. 
 
Keywords: Congestion tolls; Unjust tolls; Social optimum. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Though congestion tolls can increase social welfare, the public often opposes them. A 
common explanation in the literature for political opposition to congestion tolls is that 
users of the road suffer a loss of utility. A well-known policy implication of this 
literature is that redistribution of the toll revenue to users (for example, through 
reducing other taxes or through investments in capacity) would increase political 
support for congestion tolls. 
The public may also object to road pricing when they view a congestion toll as a 
punishment or as a penalty. The so-called double-payment argument reflects the view. 
This view was well summarized in a report to the European Commission: “Road users 
are the true victims of congestion and have to pay for it by longer and longer 
commuting times. Why should they pay twice for being stuck in queues?” (Harsman, et 
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al., 2000). The double-payment argument or view appears to explain much political 
opposition to congestion tolls. Though inconsistent with determination of the toll that 
would maximize social welfare (as it is presented in economic literature), it provides a 
powerful argument for political debate (capable of affecting people’s emotions and of 
echoing their views about fairness, etc). If, however, the externality an individual road 
user generates were much larger than the congestion he suffers, even road users and 
their representatives might see the double-payment argument as having little moral 
force, and the public might find it fair to charge some toll. The literature has not 
evaluated this possibility or hypothesis. We do. 
We thus explore implications of assuming that a road user views a congestion toll as a 
punishment or as a penalty. This leads us to consider such issues as fairness, equity and 
justice. (We use, following the literature, “fairness” as a general term that covers both 
“equity” and “justice.”) The formulation of justice discussed in this paper reflects 
justice as viewed by consumers rather than by government as a social optimizer (or by 
the authors of this paper). That is, we focus on positive statements, aiming to explore 
the implications of certain attitudes of consumers, rather than making normative 
statements suggesting a just toll as an optimal policy. 
The paper can be seen as consisting of two parts. First, Sections 3-6 review literature 
which deals with these issues, discuss the concepts of equity and justice as defined in 
this paper, and summarize behavioural assumptions. Second, Sections 7-12 illustrate the 
concepts in terms of a simple economic model of road congestion, derive a just toll and 
compare it to the socially optimal toll, explore how the just toll may depend on different 
parameters of the model and on alternative ways of defining justice, and discuss 
extensions of the model and analysis. 
 
 
2. Literature 
 
Considerations of fairness appear in all ethnographically or historically recorded 
societies (Brown, 1999). Biological evidence that people care about fairness is provided 
by Camerer (2003): subjects whose brains were imaged while presented with an unfair 
offer showed greater activity in the bilateral anterior insula of the brain, revealing that 
such an offer created negative emotions. Experimental studies by economists also 
suggest that fairness considerations are important determinants of human behaviour (see 
the survey by Fehr and Schmidt, 2003). Even monkeys appear to react with anger to 
inequitable reward distributions (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003).  
Considerations of justice explain some attitudes of the public toward reforms and 
toward compensation. The psychologists Baron and Jurney (1993) report that some 
subjects opposed reforms that they recognized would improve matters. Subjects 
justified such resistance by noting that the reform would harm some group (despite 
helping many others), that a choice would be taken away, or that costs and benefits 
would be distributed unfairly. In a study on attitudes toward penalties and compensation 
in tort law, Baron and Ritov (1993) find that penalties were independent of their 
deterrent effect on behaviour, that penalties were greater when paid directly to the 
victim than when paid to the government, and that many people assign compensation 
not in terms of the injury but, in terms of setting the balance right between the injurer 
and the victim. For a recent discussion of equity as applied to transportation, including a 
survey of the literature, see Raux and Souche (2004).  
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3. Three kinds of justice 
 
The examination of the issues related to fairness, equity and justice goes back to 
Aristotle, who distinguished three kinds of justice:  
 
1. Compensatory justice, which concerns compensating the victims of wrongdoing;  
2. Distributive justice, which concerns assigning benefits and burdens; and 
3. Retributive justice, which concerns punishing of crimes or harm caused others.  
 
All three approaches are relevant when considering congestion tolls. In the context of 
congestion pricing, compensatory justice and distributive justice (equity) have been 
extensively studied by economists; retributive justice has not. 
In principle, we can consider these justice issues from the viewpoint of a social 
optimizer (social-welfare maximizing government) or from the viewpoint of a road user. 
In this paper, we focus on the user; that is, we explore how a person’s views on these 
issues affect his behaviour and choices and the implications of all this.  
 
 
4. Consumer’s evaluation of a congestion toll 
 
The findings reported in Sections 2 and 3 are consistent with the idea that in 
evaluating a policy, people look not only at the effects of the policy on their own utility, 
but also whether it is consistent with their views about fairness – both in terms of its 
effects on different people (distributive justice) and as a punishment or penalty 
(retributive justice). 
We assume that a person, when evaluating (or voting for) a policy, here a congestion 
toll, is influenced by (at least) three kinds of issues or factors:  
 
1. Utility maximization, through comparing a consumer’s own position before and 
after a policy or toll is introduced; 
2. Equity, which reflects a person’s concern of how a policy or toll differentially 
affects different people; and 
3. Justice, which involves comparing the penalty a person pays to the damage he 
causes and has suffered. 
 
These three factors, or behavioural drivers, broadly correspond to the three kinds of 
justice identified in Section 3. (Consequently, we henceforth also call distributive 
justice as equity, and retributive justice simply as justice.) These factors typically work 
in parallel, and thus a consumer’s overall evaluation results from their joint impact. 
Which argument has most weight in any particular case is an empirical question.  
It may be natural to assume that when deciding whether to drive, a person typically 
cares only about his own utility. That is, a person does not normally make equity and 
justice related considerations or comparisons on a daily basis when deciding whether to 
drive (and so ignores the externality he creates). In this paper we consider those 
occasions (which are less common) when a person is evaluating (considering whether to 
vote for) a toll. Also in this context, we can assume that each road user knows that the 
toll reduces his utility (assuming the revenues are not returned to users), and that he 
cares about this. (The economics literature widely discusses how the utility of road users 
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declines if the toll revenue is not returned to them.) Therefore, if the toll revenue is not 
returned to a user, a utility-maximizing user would prefer (vote for) a zero toll. 
However, when evaluating a congestion toll, people may also care about fairness 
(social) aspects more generally, both in terms of distributive justice or equity and in 
terms of retributive justice. 
 
 
5. Justice compared to equity 
 
Equity, or distributive justice, concerns how a policy, here a road toll, differentially 
affects different people. One definition would call an allocation equitable if continuing 
users of the road enjoy at least as high a utility as when the toll is zero, or if their 
reduction of utility is within certain “acceptable” limits. As the term equity suggests, 
particular attention is paid to the effects of the toll on different consumers.  
Justice, or retributive justice, concerns penalizing or punishing people who harm 
others. In the case of road travel, the harm is the congestion externality that road users 
cause each other. In normal situations considered in this paper, a road user both 
generates an externality on other users (increasing their travel time) and suffers an 
uncompensated externality generated by other users. (In Section 12, however, we briefly 
discuss asymmetric externalities.) We then define justice in terms of the damage a 
person causes others compared the damage he suffers from others: a just toll equals the 
difference between these two. Our conception of justice thus compares the toll to the 
congestion externality a road user generates on others and to the uncompensated 
externality he suffers from others.1 
Equity thus assumes that a person may be concerned not only with his own utility (or 
with the utility of his own group), but also with the effect of a toll on the utility of other 
groups. Consideration of equity leads to a cost-benefit type of comparison of the pre-toll 
and after-toll situations.  
Essential to justice – and in contrast to equity as we define these two terms – is that a 
just toll and just allocation is based not on comparisons of utility, but on comparisons of 
damages caused and suffered, independently of the comparison of the pre-toll and after-
toll situations. (However, in Section 10 we discuss implications of expanding our basic 
definition of justice to allow for utility comparison.)  
The rest of this paper focuses on retributive justice, and the implications of people’s 
concern about this. While for equity considerations it would be necessary to assume 
different types of people using a road, for our considerations of retributive justice we 
can assume that all users are identical. However, in Section 12 we discuss situations 
where different road users are involved. 
 
                                                 
1 A related consideration may affect the views of consumers toward taxes which control externalities. 
A person may oppose such a tax because he dislikes the reminder that he hurt others. In contrast, taxes not 
aimed at controlling what is viewed as bad behaviour may be subject to less opposition. A voter may 
prefer a tax on labour over a tax on pollution because working is not considered evil. Similarly, a property 
tax is not viewed as a punishing wrongdoing (there is nothing wrong with owning property), and so a 
voter may have no emotional objection to a property tax. Nor is a parking fee associated with punishment. 
This reasoning suggests that since going to work is viewed as good behaviour, taxes on commuters will 
be viewed more favourably than are taxes on other types of trips.  
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6. Consumers and retributive justice 
 
To summarize the discussion above, the key assumptions behind our conception of 
(retributive) justice are that:  
 
1. A person who views a toll as a punishment or penalty may ask whether the 
punishment is fair or just. 2  
2. A person recognizes that his travel can increase the congestion others suffer, and 
thus in principle can view some toll that aims to correct that damage as just. 
3. A person compares the damage he causes others with the damage others cause him. 
4. A person views a toll that equals the difference between the damage he causes and 
the damage he suffers from other as just and hence acceptable. 
 
Thus, while our conception of justice has an individual viewing a congestion toll as 
penalizing a person (including himself) for the damage he causes others, the individual 
may within certain limits see the punishment as just. More particularly, he thinks that 
the amount of the penalty should be reduced by the damage the person himself already 
suffered. When viewing a congestion toll as punishment, a person may, depending on 
the conditions, regard the punishment as just or unjust, and hence acceptable or 
unacceptable. 
 
 
7. Model of road congestion 
 
Following the standard analysis of congestion, let a road user both suffer a congestion 
externality from others, and create one on others. Let q be the number of road users and 
let the cost of travel per person be C(q). The marginal social cost of a person’s travel is 
d[C(q)q]/dq=C(q)+qC'(q),3 that is, the sum of the cost he incurs or pays, C(q), and the 
externality he generates, qC'(q). Denoting the cost of travel when no-one else travels by 
C(0), a user’s damage from congestion is C(q)-C(0). For the moment, we simplify by 
letting C(0)=0. 
Denote by D(q) the marginal willingness to pay for a trip, and let t be the congestion 
toll. Then in equilibrium D(q)=C(q)+t. Figure 1 illustrates the situation. The social 
optimum number of trips is qopt; this would be the equilibrium if each person fully 
allowed for the externality he generates qopt. Alternatively, qopt can be supported as an 
equilibrium by the socially optimal toll topt. And, qf is the equilibrium number of users 
when a person ignores the externality he creates and when the toll is zero. 
 
                                                 
2 Of course, consumers may have different views of what is the penalty. One view is that the penalty 
consists of the decline in consumer surplus. If, however, each user makes only one trip, then the decline 
in consumer surplus is the same as the increase in the consumer's cost of travel. Accordingly, another 
view is that the penalty consists of the increase in the user's cost of travel following imposition of the toll. 
3 Our analysis ignores people who respond to the toll by ceasing to make the trip. These people cause 
no congestion, and thus should not be punished. But yet they suffer from the congestion, equal to the 
consumer surplus they would enjoy were traffic free-flowing. Consideration of these people would make 
a toll which is just even smaller. One way of extending the model to consider such people is to look at the 
aggregate externality users generate, and compare that to the aggregate loss of utility of users from 
imposition of the toll. 
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C(q) + qC’(q) = marginal social cost 
qC’(q) = damage user causes 
C(q) – C(0) = a user’s suffering 
D(q) 
$ 
0 qopt qjust q 
topt 
tjust 
qf 
topt = socially optimal toll 
tjust = just toll 
topt = qC’(q) evaluated at qopt i.e. where C(q) +qC’(q) = D(q) 
tjust = qC’(q)-C(q) evaluated at qjust i.e. where qC’(q) = D(q) 
 
Figure 1: The socially optimal toll and the just toll. 
 
 
8. Just congestion toll 
 
Since the analysis is interesting only if the toll is positive, we assume the damage a 
user causes exceeds the damage he suffers. Given the assumptions of our model (in 
Sections 6 and 7), the damage a user causes exceeds the damage he suffers if 
qC'(q)>C(q), or if C'(q)>C(q)/q. For a convex function, which gets steeper as we move 
to the right, the inequality is satisfied. Since we can assume that the average cost curve 
is convex, this means that in normal cases a positive just toll can be determined. In 
Figure 1, the convexity property of the cost function is assumed to hold for all q>0. 
Here we can view qjust as a just solution, and as an equilibrium which is supported by 
toll tjust, i.e. the maximum just toll. 
We can also think that, in principle, qjust could be realized as an equilibrium if a 
consumer, as a behavioural assumption when deciding whether to drive, cared about the 
difference between the damage he generates on others and the damage he suffers from 
others. That is, rather than fully allowing for the externality he generates (fully 
internalizing this in his behaviour), which would lead to the social optimum qopt as the 
equilibrium, a person may care only about the difference between the externality he 
generates and the damage he himself suffers from others.  
Figure 1 shows that, under the conditions stated above, the just toll is always smaller 
than the toll which maximizes social welfare. Also, given that revenues from the toll are 
not returned to a consumer, a user’s utility under the just toll is greater than under the 
socially optimal toll. 
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9. Effect of free-flow speed 
 
We defined in Section 7 the damage that a user suffers from others as C(q)-C(0), 
where C(0) is travel time under free-flow conditions. In many practical cases free-flow 
speed will be determined by a speed limit: the lower the speed limit the higher is travel 
time C(0). This suggests that the lower is the speed limit, the smaller is the damage a 
person suffers from others. This would mean, other things equal, that under a wider set 
of conditions the damage a person suffers is smaller than the damage he causes. (In 
Figure 1, the larger is C(0), the smaller is C(q)-C(0) for any q>0. For q=0 the difference 
is nil anyway.) This in turn would mean that a given toll could more likely be viewed as 
just. (In London the speed limit may have been low, and therefore the congestion toll 
may have been viewed as just.) 
 
 
10. Effect of alternative definitions of justice 
 
Since a toll reduces travel, thereby reducing congestion and travel time, the increase 
in a user’s cost (cost including the toll) is less than the level of the toll. This raises the 
question whether a user would allow this reduction in costs in his criterion for justice, 
and what would be the implications of this. A user who did consider the reduction in 
travel time would be willing to accept a higher toll as a just toll the higher his cost of 
travel would be in the absence of the toll. Indeed, the model of Section 7, when 
appropriately incorporating the comparison between utility before and after the toll, 
implies that the toll viewed as just would be higher when a user recognizes the 
reduction in travel time induced by a toll than when he does not.  
 
 
11. Justice and quantitative restraints on travel 
 
The conception of justice as defined here applies to a policy that aims to correct a 
person’s behaviour i.e. in our case reduce the congestion externality his behaviour 
generates. More specifically, it only applies to pricing policy with tolls or fees as 
relevant instruments. In particular, justice issues as considered here do not arise in the 
context of quantitative restraints on travel. This may partly explain why quantitative 
restraints are more often implemented than road tolls. 
 
 
12. Extensions 
 
So far we considered situations where all road users are identical. The analysis argued 
that a primary consideration in acceptance of congestion tolls is whether the generators 
of the externality are also its victims. When they are, as in the analysis above, a 
corrective tax can be viewed as adding insult to injury. But if users differ, in the sense 
that one group causes more damage than the other, then even those who generate the 
damage may view a corrective tax as just.  
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12.1 Multi-passenger vehicles 
 
The externality generated by a vehicle is independent of the number of passengers in 
the vehicle. The standard (economic) approach to congestion tolls would therefore give 
no discount to car pools. In contrast, the justice approach would consider that the 
congestion externality per vehicle is higher the more passengers in it, and so would call 
for a discount, that is a smaller congestion toll, on vehicles with multiple occupants. 
Here a large group (single-occupant cars) generates damage to a small group (car 
pools). 
 
 
12.2 Controlling other externalities 
 
Other examples of asymmetric externalities can occur with cigarette smokers, with 
electric utilities generating pollution transported elsewhere, with upstream cities which 
pollute downstream cities, and with trucks which slow down other vehicles because 
trucks poorly negotiate urban roads or steep inclines. In these cases, typically, a small 
group hurts a large group (while the large group little hurts the small group). 
 
 
13. Conclusion 
 
The practice of economics can be frustrating: economists offer well-founded advice, 
which policymakers ignore. The advice might be ignored for many reasons: voters and 
policymakers don’t understand the analysis; special interests oppose the proposal; the 
policy would redistribute income in undesirable ways; government is too busy with 
other issues; the policy has effects which the economist ignored; voters and 
policymakers use considerations other than the effects of policy on the profits of firms 
or on the utility of consumers. This paper considered the last explanation. 
Considerations of morality or of justice often enter political discourse. Prohibitions on 
torture, prostitution, or abortion clearly fall into this category. So do some “sin taxes,” 
such as those on alcohol. We believe that voters and elected officials may view 
congestion tolls in a similar way: they are designed not only to affect behaviour, but 
also to punish people for inflicting damage. The interesting complication is that the 
people who cause the damage are also the people who suffer the damage, and so road 
users may believe that they already bear some punishment. We formalized this 
argument, describing the congestion toll that meets a reasonable criterion of fairness or 
of justice. This toll, though positive, is less than the standard socially optimal toll. 
Considerations of justice do not therefore preclude the imposition of a congestion toll, 
but they do cause the public to oppose the high tolls that standard economic analysis 
recommends.  
And considerations of justice can suggest the design of tolls which will make them 
more acceptable. The general principle is that the toll should be lower the greater the 
damage a person suffers from congestion: inner-city residents living near congested 
areas should be charged a lower toll than are commuters; the toll on a car with multiple 
passengers should be lower than on a single-occupant car; trucks, which are inherently 
slow-moving even with no congestion, should be charged a higher toll than are fast-
moving cars. 
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Notation 
 
C(q) - Cost of travel time to each user 
D(q) - Marginal value of trip 
t - Congestion toll 
q - Number of users  
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We are grateful for comments by the referee and participants at the seminar "On 
current issues of policy implementation and evaluation" held in Kuhmo, Finland, July 
14-15, 2004. 
 
 
References 
 
Baron, J. and Jurney, J. (1993) “Norms against voting for coerced reform.” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 64: pp. 347-355. 
Baron, J. and Ritov, I. (1993) "Intuitions about penalties and compensation in the context of tort law." 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 7: pp. 17-33. 
Brosnan, S. F. and de Waal, F. B. M. (2003) "Monkeys reject unequal pay." Nature, 425: pp. 297-299.  
Brown, D. (1999) "Human universals." In: Wilson, R. A and Keil, F. C. (eds.) The MIT Encyclopedia of 
the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Camerer, C. F. (2003) "Strategizing in the brain." Science, 300: pp. 1673-1675.  
Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. (2003) "Theories of fairness and reciprocity. Evidence and economic 
applications." In: Dewatripont, M. et al. (eds) Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Vol. 1. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Harsman, B. et al. (2000) "Ways and means to increase the acceptance of urban road pricing." Final 
Report of Project PRIMA. 
Raux, C. and Souch, S. (2004) "The acceptability of urban road pricing: A theoretical analysis applied to 
experience in Lyon." Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 38(2): pp. 191-216. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 31 (2005): 15-27 
 15
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fairness, efficiency and the 
simultaneity of pricing and infrastructure 
capacity choice 
 
Andreas Kopp 1∗ 
 
1 OECD/ECMT Transport Research Centre 
2, rue André Pascal 
75016 Paris 
FRANCE 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The primary objective of infrastructure pricing in normative economics and policy discussions is 
economic efficiency This focus has led to the proposal that charges for infrastructure use should be based 
on all internal and external marginal costs associated with the use of infrastructure services. Distributional 
considerations, of the “fairness” of infrastructure pricing often played a supplementary role to help the 
acceptance of infrastructure charging. 
This paper sets out a simple framework for a quasi-market for infrastructure services with the 
perspective of simultaneously determining efficient prices and levels of infrastructure investment. It is 
shown that, depending on the intensity of infrastructure use, revenues generated by efficient prices do not 
in all cases cover the full costs of the services. Efficient cost recovery requires an additional fixed charge. 
Such a combination of a fixed charge and an efficient price per unit of service implies a distributional 
conflict if users differ substantially in their demand for infrastructure services. It is shown that methods to 
allocate fixed costs resolve this conflict applying standard norms of distributional justice and being 
compatible with a bargaining equilibrium among heterogeneous infrastructure users. 
 
Keywords: Infrastructure pricing; Infrastructure investment; Cost recovery; Fairness. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper discusses the conflict between allocative efficiency and “fairness” that 
arises from an optimal decentralized provision of infrastructure services. Pricing of 
infrastructure services and the notion of “fairness” is narrower than in current policy 
discussions (Commission of the European Communities, 1998). The paper starts out by 
focussing on the problem of efficiently providing infrastructure services for high levels 
of congestion and a homogeneous population of prospective users (Starrett, 1988, for 
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example). It will be shown that with high levels of congestion, optimal prices for 
infrastructure services cover full costs. Congestion costs are represented as a disutility 
due to crowding. This contrasts with the standard literature on pricing and infrastructure 
investment, where congestion costs are included in a generalised cost function, making 
strong assumptions about its functional form (Mohring and Harwitz, 1962; Small, 1992; 
see the review in Verhoef, forthcoming). In contrast, with no or relatively low levels of 
congestion, optimal prices imply deficits in the provision of these services. 
To pin down ideas on fairness, prominent principles of fairness will be discussed (for 
a review, see Moulin, 2003). One of these principles, the reward principle, will be 
argued to be the most important fairness principle in the discussion of the distributional 
effects of pricing rules. Applying the fairness notion of the reward principle, no conflict 
of compatibility between allocative efficiency and distributive justice arises in the 
benchmark case with strong congestion and optimal marginal cost prices. A genuine 
distributional conflict results in the cases of relatively low levels of congestion, with the 
implication of the non-coverage of fixed costs by the revenues from efficient prices, and 
heterogeneous users with respect to their demands for infrastructure services. 
The paper concludes with a characterization of the allocation of fixed costs that 
satisfies widely supported axioms of fairness (Mirman and Taubman, 1982), and which 
can be interpreted as the outcome of an n-person cooperative bargaining game 
(Harsanyi, 1979) as well as an application of the Rawlsian theory of justice (Rawls, 
1988). 
 
2. The basic framework 
 
In accordance with the public finance characterization of transport infrastructure 
goods, we focus on the fact that transport infrastructure in general and highways in 
particular have high fixed costs and relatively low costs that vary with the level of 
usage. Moreover, due to the indivisibility of infrastructure goods there is an under-
utilization of the good and crowding at high levels of usage. Considering construction, 
maintenance and congestion costs due to crowding, the collection of users is confronted 
with decreasing average costs for low levels of usage due to the dominance of the fixed 
costs and with increasing costs per user for high levels of usage due to the dominance of 
the congestion costs. Due to the invisibility there is also a very low elasticity of 
substitution with other infrastructure objects, if this exists at all. These characteristics 
imply that private markets do not in general lead to optimal allocations, or that 
government interventions have the potential to lead to a higher degree of welfare for the 
collective of users. In implementing reforms of the provision of transport infrastructure 
services, income distribution effects seem to have had at least as strong a resonance 
politically as arguments concerning the efficiency of the transport sector. One of the 
reasons why infrastructure pricing is perceived to be unjust lies in the disconnection 
between the provision of services and payment brought about by tax financing. Some of 
the users seem to have interpreted this as receiving a free good. 
To set out the analytical framework for the analysis of the distribution effects of 
highway pricing, we start with a very simple framework where income distribution is 
not an issue. A population of n users all have the same preferences for the consumption 
of infrastructure services and a private consumption good. 
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We start by defining the following variables: 
 
c ≡ consumption good (actual consumption minus initial endowment), the consumption 
good is perfectly divisible 
 
η ≡ individual use of the transport infrastructure good 
 
n ≡ number of individuals, treated as a continuous variable 
 
U ≡ utility of individual (all equal) 
 
Γ ≡ costs of infrastructure provision 
 
n*η ≡ G, total use of the public consumption good 
 
The identity of the preferences is expressed by assuming that all users have the same 
utility function. 
We disregard the production sector: All individuals are equipped with a certain 
amount of consumption goods and decide on how much of private consumption they 
would like to give up for using the infrastructure. This disregard of the production 
sector for the private good means that we implicitly assume that the private sector is 
perfectly competitive.1 Focussing on the allocation aspects in this section, all 
individuals are equal in terms of the initial endowment with the private consumption 
good c . 
 
 
2.1 Utility 
 
Given that individuals are assumed to be homogeneous, all have the same utility 
function: 
 ( ) ( )
0,0,0
,,,,
≤≥≥
==
Gc UUU
GcUncUU
η
ηηη
 (1) 
 
All consumers, or the representative consumer, have binary preference orderings 
which are complete, transitive and continuous. The utility function is then a continuous, 
real-value function. It increases digressively with the private consumption good, and 
with the individual use of infrastructure, which might be the number of trips or the 
number of kilometres travelled. G denotes the total use of the infrastructure. The higher 
the total use the more individuals suffer from congestion costs. That is, an increase of G 
reduces utility. The second row of 1 denotes first derivatives of the utility function. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Otherwise the pricing of infrastructure services might have to consider second best pricing, taking 
account of the degree of monopoly in the private sector. 
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2.2 Costs 
 
Costs of the facility increase with its total use, the “capacity”. We assume that costs 
increase with the capacity. At this stage it is not necessary to restrict admissible forms 
of the function, i.e. decreasing, constant or increasing average costs. 
 ( ) ( )
0≥Γ
Γ=Γ=Γ
G
Gnη
 (2) 
 
3. The planner's problem with homogeneous users 
 
The planner seeks to maximize the utility of the individuals. As all individuals are 
identical, this amounts to maximizing the utility of a “representative agent”. With 
perfect knowledge of the preferences of the infrastructure users, he will simultaneously 
optimise the supply of services and cost recovery through the revenues generated by 
pricing. The constraint he faces is the total availability of resources. The planner cannot 
spend more on infrastructure than the total amount of consumption goods the 
individuals do not want to use for private consumption. He or she then faces the 
following budget constraint: 
 ( ) ( ) 0=Γ−− ηnccn  (3) 
 
To find out how much of the endowments should go into private consumption and 
how much should be used for infrastructure, the planner solves a constrained 
optimization problem. She or he maximizes individual utility under the budget 
constraint: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ηληηη nccnncULnc Γ−−+= ,,max,,  (4) 
 
That is, the planner determines the optimal level of consumption, the optimal number 
of users of the facility and the optimal number of trips. 
 
4. Optimal solutions for pricing and capacity 
 
First-order conditions for the optimal solution: 
 
0=−∂
∂=∂
∂ n
c
U
c
L λ , (5) 
 
which implies 
 
c
U
n ∂
∂= 1λ  (6) 
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λ  indicates what the social availability of one more unit of the consumption good 
means to the welfare of all users. 
 
0=∂
Γ∂−∂
∂+∂
∂=∂
∂ n
GG
UnUL ληη  (7) 
The first term on the right-hand side shows the increase in utility of having one more 
use of the infrastructure. The second term indicates the disutility of all the other 
members of society doing the same, with the consequence of increasing congestion. The 
sum of these effects should be equal to the marginal costs of all of the (equal) 
individuals taking the same decision, multiplied by the factor that transforms costs in 
terms of the consumption good into terms of utility. 
 
Dividing by the expression for λ  and n we obtain from (7): 
 
0
/
/
/
/ =∂
Γ∂−∂∂
∂∂+∂∂
∂∂
GcU
GUn
cU
U η , or (8) 
 
???????
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/
/
/
ba
cU
GUn
GcU
U
∂∂
∂∂−∂
Γ∂=∂∂
∂∂ η  (9) 
The absolute value of (a) is identical to the Marginal Rate of Substitution between 
private consumption and use of the infrastructure facility. It indicates how much of 
private consumption individuals are prepared to give up to have one more unit of 
infrastructure use in equilibrium. It is equivalent to the willingness to pay for a unit of 
infrastructure use and is in a well-defined sense the "efficiency price". (b) is negative 
and indicates an individual's utility loss due to congestion if another individual increases 
the use of the facility by one unit: (-n) times this expression is then what the latter 
should pay to compensate all the other users for the increase in congestion. The first 
term on the right-hand side of (9) is the marginal cost of operating the facility due to the 
increase in infrastructure use by one unit. 
Marginal operation costs plus the compensations for the disutility of increased 
congestion add up to the efficiency price. 
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Figure 1: Marginal cost pricing with congestion. 
That this just covers the total costs of the facility can be seen from the planner's 
answer to the question of how many users should be admitted to the facility. Given that 
he knows already the optimal quantity of demand per user, this amounts to determining 
the capacity. 
 
Differentiating (4) with respect to n, we have 
 
( ) 0=∂
Γ∂−−−∂
∂=∂
∂ ηλλη
G
cc
G
U
n
L . (10) 
 
Dividing by the expression for λ  according to equation (6) we obtain 
 
( ) 0
/
/ =∂
Γ∂−−−∂∂
∂∂ ηη
G
cc
cU
GUn  (11) 
 
Multiplying both sides of the equation by n leads to 
 
( ) 0
/
/ =∂
Γ∂−−−∂∂
∂∂ G
G
nccG
cU
GUn  (12) 
 
Minus ( )ccn −  is equal toΓ . That is 
 
0
/
/
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=∂
Γ∂+∂∂
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GUn  (13) 
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C
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The right-hand side of (13) shows the total payments by the users of the 
infrastructure. (c) is the total payment by all users for causing congestion, (d) is the total 
payment for the marginal operation costs of all users. The right-hand side of (13) is 
exactly equal to the efficiency price of using one more unit (trip, hour of driving), which 
is equal to the right-hand side of (9), times the total use of the infrastructure G. It also 
shows that if congestion is sufficiently strong, transport infrastructure can be offered 
like a private good. Dividing (13) by G, we have the optimality condition that the 
marginal congestion costs plus the marginal infrastructure costs add up to the average 
infrastructure costs, i.e. the costs per unit of service. This is illustrated in Figure 1, with 
the slope of the ray from the origin representing the average costs. As this ray is tangent 
to the social cost curve, it represents the social marginal costs as well. Without 
congestion (c) in (13) is negligible, and the optimality conditions will always be 
violated with the usual assumptions about the cost function of infrastructure. With 
constant marginal costs and fixed costs, average costs will be decreasing throughout the 
relevant levels of usage. 
The optimality conditions can be restored by fixed transfers to the infrastructure 
sector. These transfers are either financed by taxes or by fixed charges. In any case, they 
have to be unrelated to the use of the infrastructure as well as to the characteristics of 
the users so as not to violate the optimality conditions. It is this required independence 
that leads to distributional problems in the case of the heterogeneity of agents. 
 
5. User heterogeneity, optimality and perceptions of distributional justice 
 
To cast the problem of distribution effects and pricing in the simplest form, we 
assume that two groups exist that are still identical but for their endowment with initial 
income. We assume that the first group has n1 members, all equipped with an initial 
income of 1c , the second group has n2 members with an income of 2c . To avoid any 
discussion of the comparability of utilities, we assume that all individuals have the same 
utility function. 
 
The total use of the infrastructure has then to be redefined to 
 
2211 ηη nnG += , (14) 
 
and the cost function to 
 
1 1 2 2( )n nη ηΓ = Γ +  (15) 
 
The planner's problem is then changed to 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]22111111112211 ,,,,max ηηληη nnccnccnGcUGcUL +Γ−−+−++=  (16) 
 
By the same analytical steps as in the case of homogeneous users, we arrive at two 
optimality conditions, one for each group 
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and 
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The first term on the left-hand side of both equations indicates the willingness to pay 
of the user group members for an additional unit of infrastructure services. Despite the 
differences in income, these are equal because 
 
λ
1
// 2
2
1
1 =∂∂=∂∂ cU
n
cU
n  (19) 
 
as follows from the optimal values for the consumption of the private good. 
That is, the optimal social organization of infrastructure provision implies the pricing 
of individual units of infrastructure use according to the social marginal costs of the 
services. If congestion is strong enough that the social marginal cost of infrastructure 
increases with an increasing number of users and/or an increasing number of kilometres 
travelled, the infrastructure is self-financing 
 
 
6. Principles of distributive fairness 
 
Notions of “fairness” are not, of course, universal. They refer to underlying principles 
which are more or less able to claim universal support. Fairness naturally, and following 
Aristotelian philosophy, entails the equal treatment of equals. If two persons have 
identical characteristics in all dimensions relevant to an allocation problem at hand, they 
should receive the same treatment, i.e. the same share of income, voting power or costs 
of a service which is commonly enjoyed. 
The unequal treatment of unequals is, in contrast, a vague concept, which is open to 
interpretation. That is, the difficulties with the notion of “unequal treatment of 
unequals” result from the heterogeneity of the population that the fair distribution of 
surplus or costs is designed for. Four different principles are central to the discussion 
 
(1) exogenous rights, 
(2) fitness, 
(3) compensation, 
(4) reward. 
 
These principles will be briefly discussed to argue that the potential conflict with the 
Pareto principle -- that allocations should be such that no reallocation of resources could 
improve the position of one party without worsening the position of another -- implies 
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that only the reward principle is important for the discussion of infrastructure pricing 
and distributive fairness. 
The notion of fairness concerning exogenous rights is independent of the consumption 
of the relevant resources or the responsibility of the consumers in their production. A 
paramount instance of exogenous rights is the fairness principle of equality in the 
allocation of certain basic rights such as political rights, the freedom of speech, etc. The 
right to vote, for example, is equal for all voters regardless of their desire to vote or the 
rationality of the voters. Equal exogenous rights postulate equality ex ante in the sense 
of an equal claim to resources, regardless of the way they affect our welfare and that of 
others. For the provision of infrastructure services, this would imply an equal (and free) 
access to infrastructure that is financed by a lump sum tax, regardless of the 
endowments of the user or differences in individual demand. 
The fitness principle postulates that resources must go to whoever potentially makes 
the best use of them. The fitness principle justifies an unequal allocation of resources, 
independently of needs, merit or rights. 
Both the exogenous rights and the fitness principle are in sharp contrast to the 
compensation principle. The compensation principle is based on the idea that certain 
differences in individual characteristics are involuntary, morally unjustified and affect 
the distribution of a higher order characteristic that is to be equalized. This justifies 
unequal shares of resources in order to compensate for the involuntary difference in the 
primary characteristics. The compensation principle aims at an equal degree of 
satisfaction of consumers' needs ex post. For the consumption of infrastructure services, 
equality according to the compensation principle would require an equal sacrifice in 
utility terms for all users of the transport system. The compensation principle is relevant 
to the discussion of the fairness of pricing rules only to the extent that fiscal 
redistribution mechanisms are unable to correct a socially undesirable distribution of 
incomes or abilities. The unequal distribution of characteristics which induce undesired 
inequalities of higher order characteristics should focus on the correction of the unequal 
distribution of primary characteristics. More specifically, if the income distribution of a 
society is perceived to be too unequal, the unequal income distribution should be 
corrected by fiscal measures and not the consequent unequal distribution of 
opportunities to travel. 
The most important principle of fairness for the discussion of infrastructure pricing 
roles and distributional fairness is the reward principle. According to the reward 
principle, individual characteristics are morally relevant when they are viewed as 
voluntary and consumers are held responsible for them. They justify unequal treatment. 
Due to the fact that individual demands do not lead to variations in total costs of 
infrastructure but might reduce the per capita costs for all consumers, the application of 
the reward principle is not straightforward. 
 
 
7. Distributional conflict of fixed fee and optimal pricing 
 
If infrastructure users are unequal, a distributional conflict might be introduced as a 
result of different demands by the users of the infrastructure. More specifically, the 
different interests of unequal users may manifest themselves in differences in the 
preferred pricing rule. Assume that the users have a choice between different pricing 
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rules to cover the full costs of infrastructure. A first option could be to postulate that the 
per-km user charges should cover the full costs of the infrastructure. The optimisation of 
the social planner, set out in section (2), would then have to be extended by a restriction 
that prices have to cover the costs of the infrastructure. Such an optimisation exercise 
would lead to a Ramsey price of p0. The consumers might be offered the choice of 
paying a price (p0 − t) which is lower by the amount t. The alternative expenditure 
functions would then be (cf. Willig 1978) 
 ( ) η00 *, pnpE = , and (20) 
 ( ) ( )ηγ tptnpE −+= 0*,  (21) 
 
The user will prefer the pricing rule that will imply the higher indirect utility, denoted 
by V. She or he would prefer a two-part tariff to a Ramsey price if 
 ( ) ( )cpVtctpV ,, 00 ≥−− γ  (22) 
 
For small t, starting from full cost prices, the consumer prefers a two-part tariff if 
 
( ) 0
0
>−∂
∂=∂
∂−∂−=
=
γηγ
c
V
c
V
dp
V
dt
dV
t
 (23) 
 
As the marginal indirect utility with respect to real income is always positive, the 
preference for a two-part tariff follows from ( )γη −  being positive. The higher the 
equilibrium demand for infrastructure services, the more the user will prefer a two-part 
tariff. The smaller the equilibrium demand, the more they will prefer Ramsey pricing. 
To implement full cost pricing to satisfy the political demands of the low demand group 
would lead to an aggregate welfare loss. If marginal costs were zero, as assumed in 
Figure 2, the triangle BCD would represent the loss of consumer rent which would 
result from full cost pricing. 
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Figure 2: Marginal vs. average cost pricing and consumer welfare. 
 
 
8. Solution of the distributional conflict 
 
The solution of the conflict between equity and efficiency proposed here relies on the 
well-known model of allocating the costs of a jointly used resource according to the 
cooperative game theory concept of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953, Shubik, 1962). 
In terms of the general principles stated in section (6), the solution concept rests almost 
entirely on the reward principle, posing the question of a fair level of contribution to the 
joint costs in order to deserve the service enjoyed in equilibrium. 
With marginal cost pricing, the cost allocation game is about access charges for 
different users whose demands add in different ways to the total costs of the 
infrastructure. This is a standard mechanism for joint fixed cost allocation mechanisms 
(Young, 1994; Sharkey, 1995). They have also been applied in transport economics, as 
a solution to charging in cases where there are only fixed costs and price inelastic 
demand (Littlechild and Thomson, 1977). The cost allocation method has even been 
proposed as a way to calculate full cost prices for infrastructure use (Doll, 2005). 
However, it has not been discussed as a solution to the distributional problem of two-
part tariffs. To introduce the idea of the solution concept, consider the following 
example. There are three classes of vehicles A, B and D requiring different 
infrastructure designs, leading to different fixed, annual stand-alone costs: 
 
60})({ =iC , for i = A, B, D  (24) 
p 
AC 
 p
B
C D
infrastructure use
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 ( ) ( ) 120== ADCABC  (25) 
 ( ) 60=BDC   (26) 
 ( ) 120=ABDC   (27) 
 
The capital C indicates fixed annual costs for the different coalitions, assuming 
technical efficiency. To compute a fair allocation, a generalised principle of 
marginalism is applied. Adding, for example, vehicle class B to A, or D to A, or both B 
and D to A leads to additional demands for the infrastructure, implying additional costs 
of 60. 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 60=−=−=−= ACABDCACADCACABCAC  (28) 
 
The solution mechanism now orders the vehicle classes to randomly identify the 
expected additional fixed costs, for which the individual vehicle classes are responsible. 
For the coalition formation process B, A, D we obtain, for example, the following 
values xi, with i = A, B, D: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 60,60)(,60 =−==−=== ACABDCxBCABCxBCx DAB  (29) 
 
This process is repeated for all possible sequences to form the “coalition” of all 
vehicle classes. This leads to the following orderings and additional fixed costs: 
 
Ordering Class A Class B Class D 
ABD 60 60 0 
ADB 60 60 0 
BAD 60 60 0 
BDA 60 60 0 
DAB 0 60 60 
DBA 60 0 60 
Sharpley value 50 50 20 
 
That is, the fair allocation as defined by the Shapley value assigns the average of the 
marginal contributions to total costs in the process of the formation of the all-player 
coalition to the individual vehicle types. This model of a random formation of the all-
player coalition mimics, in a sense, the notion of the Rawlsian theory of justice that 
fairness considerations are based on the expectation that the individual might end up in 
a socially disadvantaged position. Furthermore, it has been shown by Harsanyi that the 
cost allocation solution presented above generalizes the two persons bargaining game of 
Nash to an arbitrary number of players. That is, the notion of fairness presented here 
does not depend on a \public interest" view of politics, where a benevolent dictator 
decides on the assignment of costs following a universally accepted principle of 
fairness. Rather, the solution concept can be interpreted as the anticipated outcome of a 
bargaining process between all parties involved. 
An often-raised counterargument against the Shapley value is the high level of 
information requirements, either for planners or bargaining partners. In the specific 
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context of infrastructure provision there is, however, a way of identifying types of 
consumers by vehicle types. In many countries, an approximate solution could be 
implemented by designing or re-designing a vehicle tax according to the presented cost 
allocation mechanism. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
The paper has discussed the conflict between efficient pricing and fairness. It has been 
shown that the conflict arises in cases where marginal congestion costs are too low to 
allow for coverage of full costs by marginal cost pricing. Conventional solutions to 
solve the distributional problem would entail efficiency losses. The paper proposes an 
allocation mechanism for the fixed costs that would resolve the conflict between 
efficiency and distributional equity. 
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Abstract 
 
We construct a political economy model to analyze the political acceptability of road pricing policies. 
We use a citizen-candidate framework with a population composed by three groups differing for their 
income level. We show that road pricing policies are never applied when there is no redistribution of the 
resources in favour of other modes of transport or when the congestion of these types of transport is 
relatively high. The results suggest that the efficiency of the redistribution of resources from road to the 
alternative types of transport as well as the fraction of the population that uses the road transport are key 
factors in explaining the adoption of road pricing schemes. 
 
Keywords: Road pricing; Political acceptability; Citizen-candidate. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper studies the political acceptability of a road pricing policy in a context 
characterized by heterogeneous agents choosing between two distinct congestible 
infrastructures producing differentiated transport services. One service is fast and 
expensive (e.g., auto) while the other slow and not expensive (e.g., public transport). By 
assumption, public transport is slower than private transport, regardless of the modal 
split. The heterogeneity of agents is accounted for by assuming the existence of three 
groups. People are homogeneous within each group and the three groups differ for the 
level of income of the agents. For this reason, we call these groups rich, middle class 
and poor. No one group has the absolute majority of votes which, therefore, requires the 
combination of any pair of groups. At the same time, we assume that initially (i.e. at the 
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European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 31 (2005): 28-45 
 29
status quo) both modes of transport are always used by at least by one income group. 
For the political competition, we use a citizen-candidate framework (see Osborne and 
Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997) in which there is neither uncertainty nor 
commitment. This in turn means that the elected candidate implements its preferred 
policy.  
The model assumes that a road pricing can be imposed on the private mode of 
transport by any elected citizen-candidate with or without redistribution in favor of the 
public transport mode. Redistribution of revenues to car drivers is ruled out. Under 
these assumptions, the model provides the following results. Road pricing policies on 
the private mode are never imposed when there is no redistribution of raised revenues 
towards the public mode of transport. When such redistribution is made, it is possible to 
obtain equilibria with the adoption of road pricing schemes. In particular, this is the case 
when the congestion of the alternative mode of transport is relatively low or when the 
resources from road pricing allow to improve substantially the quality of the alternative 
mode of transport. Finally, the acceptability of road pricing policies appears to be high 
when a large fraction of the population does not use road transport in the status quo. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature. Section 3 
defines the basic setup of the problem. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium of the 
model when there is no redistribution of the road pricing revenues while Section 5 
determines the properties of the equilibrium when such redistribution (in favor of public 
transport) is allowed. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
 
This paper combines a recent stream of literature on integrated urban road pricing 
policies (see, for instance, Glazer and Niskanen, 2000 and Armelius, 2005) with a rather 
standard version of a citizen-candidate game (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and 
Coate, 1997). The novelty of this approach relates to the analysis of the interaction 
between the level of the tariff proposed, the eligibility of the candidate proposing it and 
its political acceptability, given the income distribution and the modes of transport used 
by the community. 
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In order to locate our contribution, we can conveniently divide the literature on road 
pricing in three different streams, as suggested in a recent book by Arnott, Rave and 
Schöb (2005). In the first stream of literature, urban congestion pricing theory was 
developed in a first-best transport and capacity perspective. A second stream has began 
with the literature on second-best pricing and capacity with the aim of making 
congestion pricing more politically acceptable. Finally a third one, characterized by a 
more applied attitude, examines in detail all the relevant aspects at a micro level that can 
foster or hinder the adoption of a pricing scheme. Given the above framework of 
references on road pricing, one might locate this paper in an embryonic part of the third 
phase of Arnott's et al. schematization of road pricing literature. In fact, even if, among 
other weaknesses, the setup proposed is very aggregated with respect to agents 
heterogeneity (a much more advanced work, under this respect, is de Palma and 
Lindsey, 2004) and the analytical treatment of the two transport modes (private and 
public) is rather rough, nonetheless, the paper attempts to provide some new insights 
concerning the political acceptability of road pricing policies. Previous research has 
looked into the issue of political acceptability enquiring various issues such as those 
reported below, but has never interpreted the problem in a citizen-candidate framework. 
The politico-economic and fairness considerations of adopting road pricing have 
recently been addressed in a paper by Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann (2002) 
where the lack of citizens' support for road pricing initiatives is attributed to two factors 
which are the general lack of will to adopt the price system as an allocation mechanism 
for scarce resources (Hahn, 1989; Frey et al., 1985) and the difficulty with which the 
latent support for road pricing schemes translates into actual policy making (Small, 
1992). This way of explaining the low practical implementation of road pricing dwells 
on research interpreting the scarce adoption of road pricing schemes as due to its low 
political acceptability (see reviews by Jones, 1995; Schlag and Teubel, 1997). 
Individuals might not accept road pricing due to a misperception of the negative effects 
as being caused by others rather than by oneself (Sheldon et al., 1993) thus contributing 
to a feeling of unfairness either perceived or real (Emmerink et al., 1995). Research by 
Baron and Jurney (1993) and Baron (1995) has shown that people are opposed to 
coerced reforms even though they sympathize with the intended purpose. The most 
important reasons for opposing road pricing have been attributed to social or moral 
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norms of fairness and freedom of choice. These considerations had already been raised 
by Borins as late as 1988 (Borins, 1988). Other issues concerning the acceptability of 
road pricing policies that have progressively received greater attention have to do with 
misunderstanding, complexity, equity/fairness, privacy issues or tax resistance 
(Giuliano, 1994; Goodwin, 1989; Jones, 1998; May, 1992) as well as individual specific 
uncertainty (Marcucci and Marini, 2003). 
Implementation hinges on a political question: will it be politically feasible to impose 
a road pricing scheme? As it is now strongly remarked in the current literature, this 
question can hardly be answered in abstract and general terms (Santos and Fraser, 
2005). 
 
3. Setup 
 
We consider a population living in a given area composed of three homogeneous 
groups { } 1,2,3k kG =  only differing in their income level. We denote by ky  the income 
level of every agent belonging to a k-th income group. Hence, we assume that 
1 2 3y y y> > , with i hk ky y=  for every { }, ki h G∈ 1. Every group has mass kµ , with 
1k kµ =∑  and 0.5kµ < . Therefore, it follows that 0.5g lµ µ+ >  for every { }, 1,2,3g l = . 
In other words, group 1, 2 and 3 correspond to the rich, the middle class and the poor 
respectively, and the absolute majority of votes requires the combination of any pair of 
groups. 
We also assume that each individual consumes one unit of transport. We denote with t 
the time spent for the journey and assume that this is positively related to the number (or 
mass) of agents [ ]0,1µ∈  using that mode of transport, i.e. 0dt
dµ > . Hence, we denote 
by ( ( ))k j jv t µ  the value of a journey made by an agent of group k when using a given   
j-th congestible mode of transport. The journey requires travel time jt  which depends 
positively on the mass jµ  of the people using the mode of transport j. The willingness 
to pay of the individuals is decreasing in the time spent for the journey and, therefore, 
                                                 
1 We make no restrictive hypotheses concerning the income differences between the three groups. 
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0kdv
dt
<  for every individual in kG . Moreover, due to the different income of the 
individuals of the three groups, we can simply assume that for every thj  mode of 
transport and for every level of congestion jµ :2  
 
(1) 1 2 3( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) 0j j j j j jv t v t v tµ µ µ> > ≥ . 
 
The optimization problem of an individual belonging to a given group k is:  
 
(2) max  ( ( ), ) max  ( ( ))k j j j k j j jj jt p v t pσ µ µ = −   
where ( ( ), )k j j jt pσ µ  denotes the net surplus of each consumer in group k using 
the thj  transport mode at its price jp . Thus, by choosing one unit of a given transport 
mode over a number of alternatives, all individuals aim at maximizing their own net 
surplus, equal to the difference between their willingness to pay for the time spent in the 
transport mode and its unitary price. To keep things simple, we suppose that in the area 
under consideration, only two substitute systems of transport exist for a given journey, a 
fast one (auto) j=f, and a slow one (public transport) j=s, with 0 f st t< <  and 
0f sp p> > . Therefore, at the optimal choice, every ki G∈  will select mode j if and 
only if:  
(3)    
( ( ), ) ( ( ), )
and ( ( ), ) 0
k j j j k h h h
k j j j
t p t p
t p
σ µ σ µ
σ µ
≥ ≥
 
for h j≠ . At the status quo, we expect that, when affordable, rich people ( )1i G∈  will 
always choose auto for any congestion level and poor people ( )3i G∈  public transport. 
Therefore: 
(4)    1 1
3 3
( ( ), ) ( ( ), ),
( ( ), ) ( ( ), ).
f f f s s s
f f f s s s
t p t p
t p t p
σ µ σ µ
σ µ σ µ
≥ ≤
 
                                                 
2 The intuition behind this assumption is that for any given time spent in transport, the higher income 
individuals have a higher willingness to pay for the trip which originates from the higher opportunity cost 
of time. 
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As far as the people of middle class are concerned ( )2i G∈ , two status quo are 
conceivable. In a first one, they all prefer to use auto, and this requires that, at the given 
prices fp  and sp :  
(5)    2 2
2
( ( ), ) ( ( ), ),
and ( ( ), ) 0.
f f f s s s
f f f
t p t p
t p
σ µ σ µ
σ µ
≥ ≥
 
In the second status quo, the sign of the first expression above is reversed, and 
initially the people of the middle class will, at the given prices, find optimal to select the 
private mode of transport. 
Using the setup described above, we now consider a simple citizen-candidate game in 
which a road pricing scheme on the auto (with a given distribution of the raised 
revenues) is decided by a leader elected directly by the people of the area through a 
majority voting process among the menu of citizen-candidates participating to the 
election. The menu of candidates is endogenous and one individual runs for office if and 
only if, in equilibrium, the net gain of doing so - the surplus he gets if he does run, plus 
an exogenous benefit b - exceeds a given cost c of running for office.3 We assume the 
absence of any form of commitment so that the elected candidate implements its 
preferred policy. We also assume that voting is sincere.4 
In order to determine the political outcome of the game, we first determine the 
preferred road pricing policy that a candidate of group kG  would select once elected. 
Then, we determine which agent will be elected and the policy implemented. We 
analyze two possible situations. The first is when the road pricing revenues are not 
redistributed, while in a second situation the revenues from road pricing are 
redistributed in favor of the public mode of transport. 
 
                                                 
3 The existence of an exogenous benefit b of winning the election and of a fixed cost c to run for it, with 
b>c, implies that no candidate will run for an election when there is no probability of winning. When this 
probability is positive, running for the election provides positive utility. 
4 This assumption can be justified by noting that each individual regards himself as an atomistic subject. 
Therefore, he considers his vote irrelevant in conditioning the outcome of the elections. Osborne and 
Slivinsky (1996) assume that voting is sincere while individuals are strategic in Besley and Coate (1997). 
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4. Road pricing in absence of redistribution 
 
We now consider the benchmark case in which none of the revenues raised by the 
road pricing are redistributed.5 We first analyze the case in which at the status quo all 
population of the middle class ( )2i G∈ initially uses the fast mode (i.e. the road). We 
denote by kτ?  the road pricing under no redistribution decided by a candidate belonging 
to a group kG  when elected. In what follows we illustrate in detail the level of road 
pricing set by the running candidate of each group under the no distribution scenario. 
The optimal policy of the rich 1( )i G∈ . A rich candidate would ideally tax positively 
the auto only if the gain in surplus obtained by excluding the middle class, and thus 
reducing congestion, exceeds the cost of being tolled. In this case, the tax 1τ?  will be just 
equal to the difference between the surplus of one middle class member when using the 
auto together with the rich class and the surplus obtained by using the public mode of 
transport with both the middle and the poor class.6  
Therefore, if 
 
(6)    1 1 1 1 2 1( ( )) ( ( )) 0f fv t v tµ µ µ τ− + − >?  
 
it follows that 
 
(7)    1 2 1 2 2 3( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0.f f s st p t pτ σ µ σ µ µ= − + >?  
If, on the other hand, there is no gain for the rich class individuals from the switch, i.e.  
 
(8)    1 1 1 1 2 1( ( )) ( ( )) 0f fv t v tµ µ µ τ− + − ≤?  
                                                 
5 Such an absence of redistribution can also represent the case in which the taxation system is so 
inefficient that no money is offered back in any form to the tax payers. 
6 Note that here the toll makes every middle class individual indifferent between auto and public transit, 
according to a standard Wardrop’s (1952) concept of equilibrium. In network analysis it has been 
standard to assume that (a) travellers behave selfishly, and (b) individual travellers are atomless, i.e. have 
zero mass or measure. Accordingly, the equilibrium can be conceived as a situation stable against 
individual deviations.  
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every rich candidate will optimally impose a zero road pricing ( 1 0τ =? ). 
The optimal policy of the middle class 2( )i G∈ . When there is no redistribution of the 
revenues, there is no reason for the agents of the middle class to impose a positive road 
pricing as they have already optimally chosen the use of the private mode of transport 
( 2 0τ =? ). 
The optimal policy of the poor 3( )i G∈ . It is clear that also for the poor there is no 
incentive to impose a positive road pricing given that they would obtain no advantage 
from it ( 3 0τ =? ). 
It is easy to see that, at the second status quo, in which initially all 2i G∈  use public 
transport, the proposed road pricing schemes is 1 2 3 0τ τ τ= = =? ? ? . 
The next proposition makes clear that, in absence of redistribution, the political 
equilibrium implies a zero road pricing scheme. 
 
Proposition 1. Under no redistribution of the road pricing revenues, the political 
equilibrium of the citizen-candidate game implies a zero road pricing scheme (i.e. 
0* =τ ) under both status quo considered. 
 
Proof. When the game starts with the first status quo ( 1 2fµ µ µ= +  and 3sµ µ= ) and 
there is no redistribution of the road pricing revenues, the proposed 1τ?  will either be 
positive or equal to zero (depending on the effect of congestion on rich class's surplus), 
while both middle and poor citizen-candidates will prefer to impose a zero road pricing, 
since, in absence of redistribution, they both lose from the switch of the middle class. 
So, for the case in which 1 0τ >? , no rich candidate will run for office as he would be 
defeated by a poor or middle class candidate. In equilibrium, a middle class or a poor 
candidate will run for office and win the elections. The choice on which of the two will 
run only depends on the relative weight of the mass 2µ  and 3µ : in fact, when the policy 
of different citizen candidates (belonging to different groups) coincides, the voters will 
always vote for their own candidate. In this case, whoever is the winner, the political 
equilibrium will always imply a zero road pricing 0* =τ . Similarly, when 1 0τ =? , the 
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only candidate running for the election will belong to the class with greater mass kµ , 
and will decide an equilibrium road pricing 0* =τ . Starting with the second status quo 
( 1fµ µ=  and 2 3sµ µ µ= + ), all citizen-candidates will propose 0kτ =? , so that the 
political equilibrium with a 0* =τ  will, again, be trivially satisfied. 
Although the above result is not surprising, it helps to understand the reasons why 
road pricing policies, without an appropriate scheme of redistribution of the revenues 
obtained towards public transport, is likely not to be implemented in modern cities. In 
fact, without an appropriate use of the funds raised, only rich citizens may (sometimes) 
gain from road pricing. This occurs when the gain from the reduced congestion more 
than offset the increased price of road transport. All other citizens have no interest, 
without redistribution, to impose a toll. This in turn implies that no road pricing is the 
preferred policy of the majority of the population and of the elected politicians. The 
following section shows that the result can be different when simple forms of 
redistribution of the resources obtained from road pricing are implemented. 
 
5. Road pricing in presence of redistribution 
 
We now briefly consider a framework where all revenues raised by a road pricing 
scheme are redistributed in favor of the public transport through a reduction of its price 
ps .7 At the status quo at which the middle class uses the auto ( 1 2fµ µ µ= +  and 
3sµ µ= ), a road pricing scheme on the auto decided by an elected candidate of group 
Gk , here denoted ˆkτ , will be as follows. 
The optimal policy of the rich 1( )i G∈ . Similarly to the previous section, every rich 
candidate ( 1i G∈ ) would ideally tax positively road users only when the gain from 
excluding the whole middle class from this mode of transport - in terms of reduced 
congestion - exceeds its increased price as due to such a pricing scheme. In this case, the 
                                                 
7 The effect on sp  is analogous (and provides a reduced form) to the redistribution of road pricing funds 
in favour of public transport, which can either reduce its price or increase its quality (in turn rising the 
willingness to pay of its users), hence increasing their surplus. 
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tax 1ˆτ  will be just equal to the difference between every middle class member's surplus 
from being in the private mode with the rich class and the surplus by being in the public 
mode with the poor and the middle class, at the reduced price 



+−= 132
11 τˆµµ
µ
ss pp , 
including the redistribution. Note that now such a marginal condition is more easily 
satisfied as before, because in this case the redistribution constitutes an extra incentive 
for the middle class to switch to the public mode of transport. Therefore, if 
 
(9)    1 1 1 1 2 1ˆ( ( )) ( ( )) 0f fv t v tµ µ µ τ ′− + − >  
    
 
then 
 
(10)    11 2 1 2 2 3ˆ ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0,f f s st p t pτ σ µ σ µ µ′ = − + >  
 
where 



+−= 132
11 τˆµµ
µ
ss pp  denotes the reduced price of public transport after 
redistribution. However, if condition (9) is not satisfied, then the rich will find optimal 
to impose a zero road pricing, i.e. 1ˆ 0τ ′′ = . 
The optimal policy of the middle class 2( )i G∈ . A candidate of the middle class has 
no interest to impose a positive tax on the auto, except when a positive gain can be 
made tolling the rich class and joining the poor class in the use of public transport at the 
reduced price generated by the redistribution of resources. Therefore, if  
 
(11)   12 1 2 2 3 2
2 3
ˆ( ( )) ( ( )) ,f f s sv t p v t p
µµ µ µ τµ µ ′− < + − + +  
 
we have 
(12)   22 1 1 1 2 3ˆ ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0,f f s st p t pτ σ µ σ µ µ′ = − + >  
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where 2 1 2
2 3
ˆs sp p
µ τµ µ
 ′= − + 
 denotes the price of public transport after redistribution. 
However, if condition (11) does not hold, the middle class candidate will impose a zero 
road pricing 2ˆ 0τ ′′ = . 
The optimal policy of the poor 3( )i G∈ . A poor citizen-candidate has two possible 
choices. The first is to impose a very high tax on the private mode of transport (call it 
3ˆτ ′ ) up to the point where only the rich class use the auto. This happens if the gain in 
surplus is so high to exceed the over-congestion in public transport determined by the 
switch of the middle class from the auto to public transport. Notice that in this case the 
optimal policy of the poor is exactly the same of the middle class (when the latter wants 
to impose a positive road pricing), i.e. 3 2ˆ ˆτ τ′ ′= . The second possibility for the poor class 
candidate is to tax all auto users up to the point at which none of the middle class 
members switch from auto, its status quo, to public transport. We denote such a tax as 
3ˆτ ′′  and it is clear that 3 3ˆ ˆτ τ′′ ′< .  
Formally, if the following condition is satisfied 
 
(13)   1 1 23 2 3 3 3 3 3
2 3 3
ˆ ˆ( ( )) ( ( ))s sv t v t
µ µ µµ µ τ µ τµ µ µ
+′ ′′+ + > ++  
 
thus 
 
(14)   33 1 1 1 2 3ˆ ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0f f s st p t pτ σ µ σ µ µ ′′ = − + >  
 
with 1
2 3
3
3ˆ( )s sp p
µ
µ µ τ′ + ′= − . When, instead, (13) does not hold, we have 
(15)   33 2 1 2 2 3ˆ ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0f f s st p t pτ σ µ µ σ µ ′′′′ = + − >  
 
with 1 2
3
3
3ˆ( )s sp p
µ µ
µ τ′′ + ′′= − . 
In the framework considered, various equilibria may emerge depending on the 
combination of the optimal policies of the three groups. To discuss what we consider 
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the most relevant cases, it may be convenient to consider two possible scenarios arising 
from the first status quo and one arising from the second status quo. 
 
 
5.1 Case 1: congestion does not hurt much the poor class 
 
Let us first assume that the congestion of public transport is not a big problem for the 
poor. This means that, when possible, they would always prefer to impose a road 
pricing at its maximum level 3ˆτ ′ . This road taxation will be implemented whenever the 
middle class has the same optimal tax policy 2 3ˆ ˆτ τ′ ′= . Clearly, as before, the citizen-
candidate running for office and winning the election will depend on the relative size of 
these two classes. Here, the preferences of the rich are irrelevant. If, instead, the middle 
class finds optimal a zero road pricing (i.e. 2ˆ 0τ ′′ = ), the preferences of the rich become 
important for determining the equilibrium. As long as also the rich does not want a road 
pricing ( 1ˆ 0τ ′′= ), this will be the policy implemented as there are two classes (middle 
class and rich) which prefer it. If the rich would instead prefer a positive road pricing 
( 1ˆ 0τ ′ > ), because the gains from the reduction in the congestion of the road generated by 
the switch of the middle class to public transport more than compensate them for the tax 
paid, then an equilibrium may not necessarily exist.8 
Therefore, when the middle class uses the auto at the status quo, the implementation 
of road pricing requires that the congestion of public transport is not too costly from the 
point of view of the poor and the middle class. It is clear that a positive road pricing is 
more likely to have the support of the population when the possibility of increasing the 
quality (or reducing the price) of public transport through the revenues of road pricing is 
substantial. We can summarize some of the above results with the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. When the road pricing income is entirely redistributed in favor of the 
public mode of transport and at the status quo the middle class uses the road transport, 
the political equilibrium of the citizen-candidate game will imply two cases: 
                                                 
8 This may happen when, in a two-candidate context, there is no group that always wins. 
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(a) For a very low sensitivity of the poor class to congestion, if 
1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 3( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )f f s s f f s st p t p t p t pµ σ µ σ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ − + > − +   
   then * 2 3ˆ ˆ 0τ τ τ′ ′= = > . 
(b) If, instead 
1 1 1 2 3 2 3 2 1 2 2 3( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )f f f f s sv t v t t p t pµ µ µ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ − + < + − +   
   and 
1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 3( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ),f f s s f f s st p t p t p t pµ σ µ σ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ − + < − +   
     then * 1 2ˆ ˆ 0τ τ τ′′ ′′= = = . 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
 
5.2 Case 2: congestion hurts the poor class 
 
Under an alternative scenario, the congestion of public transport can constitute a 
problem for the poor class. Hence, they should prefer a low road pricing (i.e. they prefer 
3ˆτ ′′ ) that is not enough to induce the middle class’ agents to change their mode of 
transport. As we have seen above, the middle class may have two different optimal 
policies. However, if congestion is so costly for the poor that they prefer to give up a 
large redistribution of resources from the private mode to the public one, then it is 
reasonable to expect that the middle class' optimal policy is to use the auto without 
imposing a road pricing ( 2ˆ 0τ ′′ = ). Under these conditions, the policy implemented is no 
road pricing ( 0τ ∗ = ) independently on the preferences of the rich. In fact, if the rich 
prefers no road pricing ( 1ˆ 0τ ′′= ), this policy is optimal for two classes and the winner 
will be a rich or a middle class candidate depending on the relative size of their class. 
When the rich prefers a positive road pricing ( 1ˆ 0τ ′ > ) in order to exclude the middle 
class from the use of the auto, the elected candidate will be the agent of the middle class 
as he will get the votes also of the poor. In fact, the poor prefer (by assumption) no road 
pricing with the middle class using the road to the alternative where public transport is 
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subsidized but it is congested also by the middle class. This is summarized in the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. When the road pricing income is entirely redistributed in favor of 
public transport and at the status quo the middle class uses auto, for a very high 
sensitivity of the poor class to congestion, the political equilibrium of the citizen-
candidate game will imply a zero road pricing. In particular, if: 
 
3 3 3 2 3 2 1 2 2 3
1 1 1 1 2 3
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )
( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ,
s s f f s s
f f s s
v t v t t p t p
t p t p
µ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ
µ σ µ σ µ µ
 − + ≥ − + ≥ 
 ≥ − + 
 
 
then 2ˆ 0.τ τ∗ ′′= =   
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
 
5.3 Case 3: the middle class uses the public transport at the status quo 
 
Finally, we can examine the case in which the middle class uses public transport at the 
status quo. In this case, the poor and the middle class have the same preferences. They 
both want to impose a high taxation on the use of auto since this is used by the rich class 
only (recall that 3 2ˆ ˆτ τ′ ′= ). Therefore, a rich citizen-candidate will never be elected as he 
would be defeated by a middle class or a poor candidate. In equilibrium, the candidate 
running for office will be from the largest class between middle class and poor and the 
road pricing policy implemented will involve a tax rate 2 3ˆ ˆτ τ τ∗ ′ ′= = . The adoption of a 
road pricing scheme in this scenario arises by the desire of the majority of agents (not 
using the auto) to raise revenues in order to improve their mode of transport. 
The insight provided by the latter result is that a positive road pricing is likely to be 
implemented when a large fraction of the population uses alternative modes of transport 
as these individuals have the incentive to tax the use of road in order to improve the 
alternative types of transport. 
The following proposition summarizes this result. It is so easy to grasp that does 
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not require a formal proof. 
 
Proposition 4. When at the status quo the middle class uses public transport, the only 
political equilibrium of the citizen-candidate game will imply * 2 3ˆ ˆ 0τ τ τ′ ′= = > . 
 
Finally, notice that, in general, many elements appear to be crucial for the result of an 
election. First, the price ratio of transport modes when compared to the speed or quality 
preferences of all three classes. Second, the sensitivity to congestion of the two 
alternative modes of transport, reflecting a number of structural features of the whole 
transport network. Third, the way in which the redistribution of a road pricing is 
assumed to affect people’s wealth. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we have proposed a simple framework to explain the reasons why road 
pricing schemes are not so diffused around the world. We have focused on the political 
acceptability of such policies using a political economy model where the electoral 
competition takes place with citizen-candidates. We have found that the redistribution 
of resources obtained through road pricing policies towards other modes of transport 
along with less congestion is necessary (even though not sufficient) to make this policy 
acceptable to the majority of the population. The analysis has also highlighted that road 
pricing policies are more likely to be accepted by a winning coalition when the 
redistribution of resources obtained with this form of taxation going to the advantage of 
other modes of transport allows to increase substantially their quality (or, more 
generally, the surplus of the agents that use them) or when at the status quo a large 
fraction of the population does not use the auto. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
Rearranging expressions (11) and (12) we can rewrite expression (11) as  
(A1)     1 1 1 2 3 2 3 2 1 2 2 3( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )f f f f s sv t v t t p t pµ µ µ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ − + > + − +   
which is the condition implying 2ˆ 0τ ′ > . Using instead (9) and (10), we can rewrite (9) as  
(A2) 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 3( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ).f f s s f f s st p t p t p t pµ σ µ σ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ − + > − +   
which is the condition implying 1ˆ 0.τ ′ > Finally, using expressions (13)-(15) we obtain  
(A3) 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 2 3( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( )) ( ( ))f f s s s st p t p v t v tµ σ µ σ µ µ µ µ µ − + > − +   
where (A3) exactly represents the condition implying 3ˆτ ′  0> . Note that for a relatively 
low sensitivity of the poor citizens to congestion, when (A1) holds, also (A3) is 
satisfied. Therefore, when (A1) holds the equilibrium toll is * 2 3ˆ ˆ 0τ τ τ′ ′= = > . When, 
instead, neither (A1) nor (A2) hold, the equilibrium toll will be * 1 2ˆ ˆ 0τ τ τ′′ ′′= = = . 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.  
By rearranging conditions (11)-(12) and (13)-(15) we have that 2ˆ 0τ ′′ =  and 3ˆ 0τ ′′ >  are 
selected for 
2 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 3( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )f f s s f f s st p t p t p t pσ µ σ µ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ   − + ≥ − +     
and  
3 3 3 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 3( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )s s f f s sv t v t t p t pµ µ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ − + ≥ − +   
respectively. Note that, whatever the choice of the rich citizen-candidate, the following 
condition  
[ ]3 3 3 2 3 2 1 2 2 3( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )s s f f s sv t v t t p t pµ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ − + ≥ − +   
directly implies 
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3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 1 2 2 3 1ˆ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) .s s f f s sv t v t t p t pµ µ µ µ µ σ µ σ µ µ τ ′ − + ≥ + − + =   
The last expression clearly shows that each poor class candidate will prefer to keep 
congestion low in the public transport rather than receiving a positive toll 1ˆτ ′  as 
redistributed income. Therefore, all members of the poor class will vote for the middle 
class candidate, and, again, the political outcome will imply a zero road pricing, 
*
2ˆ 0τ τ ′′= = . 
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Abstract 
 
The United States and Canada lag Europe and Singapore in implementing road pricing on a large scale. 
But the two countries have shown interest in tolling roads as a way to curb congestion and to generate 
revenues. The US is funding congestion pricing demonstration projects through its Value Pricing Pilot 
Program, and Canada has examined new ways to charge for road use and to finance road construction and 
maintenance. This paper reviews the current state of road pricing and funding in the two countries. The 
prospects for extensive road pricing appear to be brighter in the US than in Canada. 
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1. Introduction  
For over a decade the European Union has been studying the application of marginal-
cost-based pricing in transportation, and has issued Green and White Papers as well as 
sponsored a series of research projects. The United States and Canada have not made a 
comparable effort. Nevertheless, the two countries are acutely aware of flaws in the way 
that transportation is currently priced and funded, and they have shown interest in policy 
reform. As far as pricing roads the US has been funding congestion pricing 
demonstration projects through its Value Pricing Pilot Program since 1998. And in 
2001, Canada completed a thorough review of the Canada Transportation Act that 
addressed the case for new ways to charge for road use and to finance road construction 
and maintenance. 
The purpose of this paper is to summarise these and other developments, and to 
identify both the challenges and the prospects for wide-scale implementation of road 
pricing in the two countries. Europe is chosen as the main reference for comparison 
since many readers of this journal will be Europeans, and because there are interesting 
similarities and differences between the two continents. The US and Canada have 
standards of living and systems of government that are similar to the EU. As in the EU, 
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financing, regulation and operation of transportation facilities are divided between 
multiple levels of government: federal, state (US) or provincial (Canada), regional and 
municipal. And the political and acceptability barriers to road pricing are broadly 
similar. There are also some differences. Despite heavy subsidies to North American 
urban transit systems, the automobile is more dominant than in Europe. Urban sprawl is 
greater, and traffic congestion is less concentrated in urban centres. Particularly in the 
US, there is less trust in government and more reliance on the private sector generally. 
Yet private-sector involvement in road pricing has been much less than in the EU. And 
neither the US nor Canada has yet established either networks of interurban toll roads or 
large-scale urban road pricing schemes such as those found in Europe. 
The US and Canada differ in some respects. There is a stronger commitment to public 
funding of transport in Canada, evident also in other sectors such as education and 
health care. But the US federal government is more active in funding urban transport 
projects, and in using transport investments to pursue economic development and 
national security goals. The US also earmarks a majority of federal fuel tax revenues to 
roads, whereas Canada does not. Finally, whereas the US has not ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol, Canada has done so and has an onus to reduce consumption of carbon-based 
fuels. 
The next section reviews in some detail the current state of policy and practice of road 
pricing in the US. Section 3 provides a parallel, but briefer, summary for Canada. 
Section 4 addresses some of the major issues concerning the evolution of road pricing in 
the two countries. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Road pricing in the United States 
 
Toll roads have a long and checkered history in the US going back to the late 1700s.1 
Private roads were widespread in the 1800s, but they rarely made money and 
disappeared as canals and railroads came to dominate long-distance traffic. From time 
to time, state and local governments found toll financing of roads attractive as a way to 
accelerate road construction, as a supplementary source of funding during periods of 
financial stringency2, and as a way to raise money from immediate beneficiaries, 
including non-resident travelers who were not subject to local taxes. 
Currently the US has several hundred tolled facilities. As of January 1, 2003, there 
were 8,440 km of toll roads, bridges and tunnels, of which 8,097 km comprised tolled 
sections of roads inside the US (about 9% of total highway mileage). Electronic toll 
collection was used on 229 facilities.3 Some facilities differentiate tolls by vehicle and 
other characteristics, some offer alternative means of payment, and a modest fraction 
feature time-of-day toll variations. 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Klein and Fielding (1992) and Levinson (2002, Chap. 2). 
2 According to Shoup (2005, p.553, fn 56), financial stringency may also have been a motivating factor in 
installing parking meters during the Great Depression. 
3 US Department of Transportation (2003). The numbers reported in the text are derived by counting each 
section or location of road as a separate facility if it is listed separately in the US DOT (2003) tables. 
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Growing support for road pricing 
For a number of reasons support for road pricing has been growing in the US. 
 
Increasing severity of congestion. According to the Texas Transportation Institute 
(2005), in 2003 the cost of congestion-induced time delays and extra fuel consumption 
amounted to $63.1 billion in 85 major US urban areas. In Los Angeles, the most 
congested city, the annual delay per traveler was 93 hours, and average travel time 
during peak periods was 75% longer than travel time under free-flow conditions.4 These 
figures have grown relatively steadily since at least 1982. 
 
Improved tolling technology. Conventional tollbooths have high administration costs 
and can impose long waits on drivers. But with electronic toll collection and smartcards 
now commonplace, and Global Position System (GPS) technology coming in, there are 
no significant technical barriers to direct and differentiated charges for road use. 
 
Limitations of traditional supply and demand policies. Building new roads is 
constrained by tight public budgets, lack of space and environmental concerns. Public 
transport systems are very expensive, and ill-suited to the decentralised urban structure 
and diverse trip patterns that characterise most US cities. And travel-demand 
management strategies, though numerous, have a limited potential to control automobile 
use (Meyer, 1999). 
 
Limitations of existing funding mechanisms. Road construction and maintenance in 
the US is funded primarily by indirect user charges rather than tolls. All 50 states have 
gasoline taxes. Federal funding is provided through the Highway Trust Fund (HTF), 
which was established in 1956 to finance the federal share of the Interstate highway 
network and to support other federal-aid highway projects. Revenues for the HTF are 
derived from taxes on fuel, tires, truck sales and heavy-vehicle use. The HTF and the 
primary reliance for funding on fuel and other indirect taxes have come under attack on 
several scores5: 
 
1. Although tax rates are linked to vehicle characteristics, a Highway Cost Allocation 
study (US DOT, 1997, 2000) concluded that heavy combination trucks pay only 
about 80% of their costs, whereas automobiles and other light vehicles cover 110%. 
The system therefore does not adhere to the user pays principle as far as major user 
groups. 
2. Although the HTF was established as an earmarked fund for roads, only a portion 
(roughly 65%-75%) of the money is now actually spent on road projects. 
3. Money in the HTF is allocated according to geographical distribution formulas that 
guarantee states revenues regardless of whether the revenues can be put to good use, 
and that inflate demand for spending. 
4. Despite the popularity of fuel-inefficient Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs), the 
average fuel efficiency of the vehicle fleet in the US will probably improve in the 
future. Coupled with the growth of alternative-fuel vehicles, this will dampen 
gasoline consumption. State and federal fuel tax rates are difficult to increase, and 
the recent hike in world oil prices is likely to make it all the harder. Maintenance 
                                                 
4 Texas Transportation Institute (2005, Table 1). 
5 See, for example, Orski (2005) and Roth (2005). 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 31 (2005): 46-66 
 49
expenditures, meanwhile, are rising as the Interstate Highway system ages and rising 
traffic levels impose more wear and tear on roads of all types. 
 
Due to these and other problems, the HTF is increasingly seen as both inappropriate 
and inadequate to continue as the primary highway funding mechanism. 
 
 
Value Pricing Pilot Program projects 
 
During the 1970s the US federal government attempted unsuccessfully to initiate 
congestion pricing demonstration projects in several cities. Fears of adverse impacts on 
businesses and the poor, and insufficient efforts to gain constituency support, were 
largely responsible for the failure (Elliott, 1986; Higgins, 1986). But road pricing has 
since gained momentum thanks to two breakthrough pieces of federal legislation: the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991, and the 
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) of 1998. TEA-21 authorised 
the Value Pricing Pilot Program (VPPP)6 to fund innovative road and parking pricing 
measures for alleviating congestion, and permitted limited tolling on Interstate 
highways. Table 1 lists the projects that have been funded to date. 
 
Table 1: US Value Pricing Pilot Program projects in operation and under development. 
Project category Operational Under development 
1 New lanes 2  HOT lanes 6  HOT lanes 
2  managed lanes 
1  queue jump 
2 Previously toll-free roads 4  HOT lanes 4  conversion HOV to HOT lanes 
4  FAIR lanes 
1  cordon toll 
3 Existing or new toll roads, 
bridges and tunnels 
4  variable tolls 4  variable tolls 
1  variable pricing 
1  discount truck tolls 
4 Parking and vehicle use 1 car sharing 
1 cash-out of free 
parking 
1 cash out of cars 
1  mileage-based insurance 
1  variabilisation of fixed auto costs 
1  financing infrastructure 
1  GPS-based pricing 
Total 13 28 
Sources: DeCorla-Souza (2004), Value Pricing Pilot Program (2005) and Congestion Pricing Listserv. 
 
 
All of the operational projects in the first two categories feature High-Occupancy Toll 
(HOT) lanes. HOT lanes are a variant of High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes that 
allow vehicles carrying fewer people than the HOV occupancy requirement (usually 2 
or 3 people) to use the lanes if they pay a toll (or a surcharge over the existing HOV 
fee). General-purpose toll-free lanes run parallel to the HOT lanes. 
 
                                                 
6 Value Pricing Pilot Program (2005). See also Transportation Research Board (2003) and DeCorla-Souza 
(2004).  
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Table 2 provides information on the five HOT lane facilities that are currently in 
operation. The HOT lanes on State Route 91 (SR-91) were built in 1995 before the 
VPPP was launched. The lanes were privately operated until 2003 (see Section 4). Tolls 
vary hourly according to a schedule that depends on day of week, with a goal of 
maintaining free-flow conditions on the HOT lanes. A number of studies have examined 
how the tolls affect ridesharing, lane and departure-time choices of users.7 
 
Table 2: Operational High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lane projects. 
Facility Launch 
date 
Location Time variation  Differentiation by 
vehicle & 
occupancy 
Use of 
revenues 
State 
Route 91 
(SR-91) 
1995 Orange County, 
CA 
Variable 
(scheduled) 
Range: $1.05-
$7.75 
HOV3+ free Operations, 
maintenance, 
corridor 
improvements 
Interstate 
15 (I-15) 
1997 San Diego 
County, CA 
Dynamic (6 min. 
changes) 
Range: $0.25-
$8.00 
HOV2+ free Express bus 
service & 
operations 
Interstate 
10 (I-10, 
Katy 
Freeway) 
1998 HOV3+ free 
SOVs prohibited 
on toll lanes 
Northwest 
Freeway 
(US 290) 
 
2000 
Houston, Texas Flat $2 during 
peak 
As I-10, except 
lanes available 
only during 
morning peak 
Operations 
I-394  2005 Minneapolis-
St. Paul 
Dynamic (3 min. 
changes) 
Range: $0.25-
$8.00 
HOV2+ free Capital costs, 
operations, 
improvements, 
bus transit 
Sources: Appiah and Burris (2005), Burris and Stockton (2004), DeCorla-Souza (2004), Munnich and 
Loveland (2005). 
 
 
Interstate 15 (I-15) was the first facility on which pre-existing HOV lanes were 
converted to HOT status. By law, I-15 is required to maintain a level of service of C or 
better on the HOT lanes. This is accomplished by varying tolls “dynamically” as often 
as every six minutes. A schedule is published that shows average toll levels by time of 
day. The normal maximum toll is $4, but tolls may be raised up to $8 in the event of 
severe traffic congestion. Drivers who plan to use the HOT lanes therefore face 
uncertainty about how much they will pay, but they are (nearly) guaranteed a 
congestion-free trip. By contrast, on SR-91 the toll paid is predictable but travel time 
can vary with unexpected demand or capacity fluctuations. 
The two HOT lane projects in Houston, Texas, carry very low traffic volumes 
compared to SR-91 and I-15, and the tolls remain “flat” at $2 rather than varying over 
time. The most recent project, I-394 in Minneapolis, involved a conversion of existing 
HOV lanes to HOT lanes and construction of new tolled lanes, and is therefore tallied in 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Lam and Small (2001) and Brownstone and Small (2005). 
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both Categories 1 and 2 of Table 1. As on I-15, tolls vary dynamically with the goal of 
maintaining free-flow conditions on the tolled lanes. 
Category 1 in Table 1 also includes managed lanes and queue jumps. The term 
managed lanes refers to demand management, and the concept encompasses various 
facility types: HOV lanes, HOT lanes, Single Occupancy Vehicle (SOV) express lanes, 
special use lanes and truck lanes. Queue jumps are elevated roads that allow drivers to 
avoid congested intersections by “jumping” over them. Being relatively cheap, queue 
jumps are affordable for areas with small populations. 
Fast And Intertwined Regular (FAIR) lanes in Category 2 entail conversion of some 
freeway lanes to toll lanes, while leaving other lanes free (Decorla-Souza, 2004). Toll-
lane revenues are used to give drivers on the free lanes credits that can be used either for 
future trips on the toll lanes or other purposes (transit, parking, etc.). FAIR lanes are 
designed to enhance acceptability by allocating toll revenues directly to users of the 
freeway in a revenue-neutral way. 
One project in Category 2 features a cordon toll around Fort Myers Beach, Florida: an 
island community where additional roadways are not practical and where the limited 
number of access points makes cordon pricing viable. A cordon toll was proposed for 
New York City by the mayor, Michael Bloomberg, but withdrawn in the face of 
opposition.8  
The third project category in Table 1 covers toll roads, bridges and tunnels. Unlike 
with HOT lanes, all lanes on these facilities are tolled. A majority involve variable (i.e. 
time-varying) tolls.9 The fourth and final category in Table 1 encompasses a wide range 
of usage and area-based pricing schemes. A common motivation underlying these 
schemes is that the existing system of transport prices in the US is biased in favour of 
auto travel in two ways. First, auto usage is underpriced or unpriced on average. For 
example, fuel taxes do not cover environmental and other external costs of driving. 
Also, 91% of commuters drive to work and 95% of auto commuters park free at work.10 
Second, a large fraction of the total costs of driving are fixed charges (vehicle 
depreciation, insurance, registration, licensing fees, etc.) that do not vary with usage and 
contribute to the underpricing of driving at the margin. 
The project on cashing-out free parking in Category 4 offers commuters cash, transit 
passes or another alternative to free parking with comparable value.11 Mileage-based 
insurance is being studied in the form of Pay As You Drive (PAYD) insurance 
premiums that are paid in proportion to distance travelled. PAYD insurance is a form of 
road pricing because it charges for road use. The per-kilometre premium rate can be 
conditioned on driver characteristics that are used for pricing insurance today, such as 
age, sex, and safety record. PAYD insurance is superior to “pay at the pump” insurance 
                                                 
8 A new proposal for a peak-period charge in Manhattan was made in November, 2005, by the city's 
major business association (http://nytimes.com/2005/11/11/nyregion/11traffic.html). In an attempt to 
forestall further opposition, several roadways would remain free. 
9 For details see DeCorla-Souza (2004, pp.295-301). 
10 Shoup (2005, p.267 and Appendix B). The supply of parking in the US is also artificially inflated by 
minimum parking requirements, which according to Shoup (2005) are often arbitrary, vary greatly from 
city to city, and can be extremely onerous on developers. 
11 The advantages of cashing-out free parking (especially in the US) are explained by Shoup (2005, 
pp.262-266). Shoup also describes (pp. 383-390) high-technology parking meters that can adjust parking 
rates by time of day and expected parking occupancy rates in the neighbourhood. Such meters have been 
installed in a few US cities, but they are far more prevalent in European cities where parking space is 
scarcer, and the need for efficient rationing more pressing. 
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proposals under which costs would vary (inappropriately for insurance purposes) with 
vehicle fuel efficiency, but would be independent of driver characteristics.12  
Arguably the most ambitious of the VPPP projects is Oregon’s GPS- and distance-
based pricing proposal. The long run plan is to charge for all driving within the state, 
with charges proportional to distance traveled and varying by type of road and time of 
day. Travel would be monitored by GPS and payments would be paid at the pump when 
the vehicle is refuelled.13 State fuel taxes would be refunded. The project faces a 
number of stumbling blocks including the cost of installing fuel-pump infrastructure and 
on-board vehicle equipment, the need for a long transition period to deal with vehicles 
that lack GPS or odometer-based devices and that would be too costly to retrofit, the 
shift of burden away from fuel-inefficient vehicles, lack of agreement on whether 
revenues should be spent on highways or other modes, and privacy concerns related to 
GPS. 
 
 
Summary of US developments 
 
The HOT lane projects have been the biggest success of the VPPP so far. A number 
of reasons can be offered. First, the projects have relatively small set-up and operating 
costs. Second, three of the projects (SR-91, I-15 and I-394) are designed to minimise 
congestion. This goal is readily explained and motivated to politicians and the public. It 
can be verified by examining loop-detector data on traffic flows and speeds, and the 
benefits are readily visible both to users of the lanes and those who drive on the parallel 
toll-free lanes just a few metres away. Third, availability of the toll-free lanes enhances 
acceptability by giving drivers a choice whether to pay for an essentially identical trip in 
terms of route. Contrary to the view that toll lanes will be used only by the rich as 
“Lexus Lanes”, lower-income and unemployed individuals and off-peak commuters 
occasionally use them when they are especially pressed for time. Fourth, revenues are 
earmarked, either for operations or public transport alternatives. Fifth, environmentalists 
have come to see congestion pricing generally, and HOT lanes in particular, as a way to 
improve air quality by keeping traffic moving smoothly.14 
It is of some interest that the five existing HOT lane projects differ in terms of 
whether the lanes are new or converted from HOV lanes, vehicle occupancy 
requirements, the extent of time variation of tolls, and the allocation of revenues (cf. 
Table 2). This suggests either that there is some flexibility in the design of successful 
schemes or, alternatively, that the design needs to be tailored to the particular 
circumstances of the facility in question. A number of other HOT lane projects are 
                                                 
12 Two recent theoretical studies have come out in favour of variabilisation. Edlin (2003) has determined 
that, by pricing congestion through a percentage tax on per-mile premiums, sizeable (and comparable) 
benefits would result from reductions in congestion and accident costs. Greenberg (2003) proposes a 10% 
federal subsidy to states, insurance companies and other companies for converting taxes and other fixed 
auto costs to a per-kilometre basis. He finds that the subsidy compares well with most existing policies in 
terms of cost-effectiveness for improving air quality and reducing traffic fatalities. 
13 For details see Forkenbrock (2004) and Whitty et al. (2005). 
14 A sixth possible benefit of HOT lanes is that by maintaining free-flowing conditions they actually 
support higher traffic throughput per lane than toll-free lanes. This has been confirmed from traffic counts 
on SR-91 (Poole and Orski, 2003, p.6) but the idea that congestion pricing can increase throughput in 
general is controversial. See, for example, postings to the Congestion Pricing Forum listserv between 
September 28 and October 12, 2005. 
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under development, and new projects are frequently being announced. One factor 
working in favour of HOV-to-HOT lane conversion projects is that most HOV lanes are 
underutilised in the US and can accommodate a large percentage increase in vehicle 
loads before speeds begin to deteriorate.15 Most other countries do not have this “slack”, 
and therefore cannot expect to replicate US success with HOT lanes. 
The HOT lane and other VPPP projects provide several lessons that may carry over to 
other road-pricing initiatives. One is that new tolls are politically feasible if the 
locations and designs of the schemes are chosen carefully. A second is that variable and 
even dynamic pricing is acceptable. Focus groups were strongly opposed to dynamic 
pricing on I-15 before it began operation (Godbe Research & Analysis, 1997). But 
dynamic pricing is now accepted, and it has achieved a better balance between peak and 
off-peak periods. Indeed, Sullivan (2002, p.3) remarks that “There appear to be no 
differences in consumers' acceptance or ability to comprehend any of these current 
systems, regardless of their complexity.” In part, drivers may accept dynamic pricing 
because they value highly reliable travel times. A third lesson is that effective marketing 
of new schemes to the public is vital. As Berg (2003, p.38) notes: 
 
“If value pricing is to be implemented, it has to be seen as the logical solution 
arrived at through public participation, not something that has been developed in 
isolation by ‘experts’. Just as new products are introduced with marketing 
campaigns, new public policies need to be ‘marketed’ to the public.” 
 
This lesson is echoed by European experience (e.g. Schade and Schlag, 2003). 
The new life imparted to road pricing by the ISTEA and TEA-21 legislation has been 
extended with passage, in August 2005, of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU)16 which authorises the 
Federal highway and transit programs for 2005-2009. In addition to continuing the 
VPPP, SAFETEA-LU includes existing or new programs that permit tolls to be 
collected for the purpose of constructing, reconstructing or rehabilitating Interstate 
highways. It includes a new Express Lanes Demonstration Program to permit tolling for 
congestion relief, emissions reductions, and building new Interstate lanes to reduce 
congestion. The Act also creates two commissions to assess the adequacy of the 
Highway Trust Fund to provide long-term transportation funding, and to consider 
supplementary or alternative revenue sources besides the fuel tax.17 
 
 
3. Road pricing in Canada 
 
The history of toll roads in Canada broadly resembles that in the US: early 
enthusiasm, followed by retrenchment and sporadic implementation thereafter. During 
the nineteenth century many toll bridges, roads, and ferries were owned and operated by 
municipalities and private companies (Bryan, 1972). Most were subsequently abolished 
                                                 
15 Safirova et al. (2004) convincingly demonstrate this using a simulation model for Washington, D.C. 
16 See US Department of Transport (2005). 
17 See http://trb.org/news/blurb_detail.asp?id=4795, accessed October 30, 2005. 
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by provincial governments. Currently, there are only 19 operational tolled facilities 
comprising 385 km of toll roads in Canada, compared to over 8,000 km in the US.18 
Ownership, operations and institutional structures of the facilities vary considerably. 
A majority are bridges or tunnels linking Ontario and the US. The prevalence of tolling 
at border crossings is consistent with the use of tolls to extract revenues from 
nonresidents. Three large facilities have been built by diverse mechanisms. The 
Coquihalla highway, which opened in 1986 and traverses 115 km of mountainous 
terrain between Hope and Merritt in British Columbia, is public. By contrast, Highway 
407 in Toronto was publicly funded, but it is now owned and operated by a consortium, 
Highway 407 International. The Confederation Bridge which links Prince Edward 
Island to the mainland was financed, designed, built and operated privately. Tolls are 
levied, but most of the debt is being repaid from government subsidies rather than toll 
revenues. 
Of the 19 tolled facilities, electronic tolls are collected on only five (Nix, 2002). All 
facilities differentiate charges by vehicle type and size.19 But in contrast to the VPPP 
projects, only Highway 407 charges by time of day. Freedom of mobility is respected in 
that, except for non-local trucks on Highway 104 in Nova Scotia, no user is forced to 
take a toll road.20 Highway 407 is by far the most heavily used facility. When it began 
operating as a toll road in 1997, it was the world’s first all-electronic open access toll 
highway.21 Tolling was facilitated politically by proximity to Highway 401: a toll-free 
and heavily congested alternative running roughly in parallel a few kilometres to the 
south. 
Tolling roads in Canada has been spurred by factors similar to those in the US, 
although the impetus is not as strong for several reasons. First, there is a greater 
commitment to public funding in Canada, not only for roads but also for public 
transport. Second, traffic volumes and congestion are lower. And third, because of the 
size of Canada’s provinces and their “linear” configuration from east-to-west, the 
provinces are generally better able than are US states to tax non-resident users while 
they are in transit, and correspondingly less reliant on tolls for revenue. 
Roads in Canada are mostly paid for with general tax revenues and property taxes. 
Road users in aggregate approximately pay their way22, whereas transit and other modes 
are heavily subsidised. The extent of user-pays varies by province as a function of 
                                                 
18 A major bridge across the Fraser River in Vancouver is scheduled to open in 2008. Tolls will be 
collected electronically, and will vary by vehicle type and method of payment, but not time of day. See 
http://www.translink.bc.ca/goldenearsbridge/project_information/funding.asp, accessed November 19, 
2005. 
19 An axle-based system was introduced on the Confederation Bridge on January 1, 2006. Prior to this, 
tolls were based on rates for the ferry service that the bridge replaced. See 
http://www.confederationbridge.com/images/New_Toll_Structure.pdf, accessed November 18, 2005. 
20 Canadian policy has generally supported the availability of toll-free alternatives. According to Bryan 
(1972, p.47), during the brief revival of tolling in the 1950s “… it was generally accepted in principle that 
there ought to be an alternative to any toll route”. Legislation passed in Québec permits toll facilities 
where an alternative un-tolled route exists (Nix 2001, p.9). And British Columbia’s guidelines for tolling 
stipulate that “Tolls will be implemented only if a reasonable untolled alternative is available.” See 
British Columbia Ministry of Transport (2003, para. 2.3).  
21 Mylvaganam and Borins (2004) provide an insightful history of the toll road. 
22 According to Transport Canada (2004, Table 3-5) for 2003/2004 spending by all levels of government 
on roads amounted to CDN 13,647 million, equal to 69.4% of total spending on transport. Revenues from 
road users were CDN 13,989 million. In the three previous years, spending exceeded revenues by small 
margins. 
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traffic volumes and road construction costs (Nix, 2001, p.5). Canada lacks formal 
mechanisms for road funding on a scale comparable to the US Highway Trust Fund, and 
no legislation similar to ISTEA, TEA-21 or SAFETEA-LU has been passed. Only about 
7% of federal fuel tax revenues are spent on roads and highways. And until recently the 
federal government provided almost no funds for urban transport. But under the New 
Deal for Cities and Communities, the government has allocated $5 billion in federal 
gasoline excise tax funding to cities over a five-year period.23 
 
 
Federal policy recommendations 
 
Transportation policy in Canada has been reviewed by three major federal studies in 
the last 15 years: the 1992 Royal Commission on National Passenger Transportation, 
the 1993 National Transportation Act Review Commission, and the Canada 
Transportation Act Review (CTAR) of 2001. In general these studies supported the 
subsidiarity principle, the user pays principle, and recognition of environmental costs in 
transport pricing. In addition to toll roads, the CTAR Panel investigated road funds and 
urban transportation agencies as financing arrangements for roads. All ten Canadian 
provinces have at some time employed earmarked taxes. But currently most fuel tax 
revenues and other user charges are added to the general account. There have been 
attempts to create provincial road funds. But these funds were either short-lived, or 
failed to be fully self-financing from user charges.24 The federal government has 
recently created several infrastructure funds, but the amounts are modest and none of 
the funds are earmarked specifically for roads. Urban transportation agencies have been 
established in Montreal and Vancouver, the second and third largest cities in Canada.25 
These agencies have mandates that include public transit as well as roads, and powers to 
raise revenues through new charges on motorists. This gives them multiple objectives, 
as well as multiple instruments to assemble policy packages. 
 
 
Climate change 
Climate change is a factor that distinguishes Canada from the US. Only Canada has 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and Canada could be affected more strongly by global 
warming because of its northern latitudes. It is an open question whether the two 
countries will adhere to their current positions, and if so whether greener policies will 
be pursued more vigorously north of the 49th parallel. If Canada does follow through 
with its Kyoto commitment, there may be a concerted attempt to reduce consumption of 
fossil fuels for transport. The implications for road pricing are ambiguous. Because 
greenhouse gas emissions can be effectively targeted with a carbon tax, tolls or other 
usage-based charges do not appear to be required on this score. Moreover, with global 
warming there may be less damage to roads from the freeze-thaw cycle, and 
correspondingly less expenditure on road maintenance. However, reductions in fuel 
                                                 
23 http://www.infrastructure.gc.ca/ndcc/index_e.shtml, accessed November 20, 2005. 
24 See Nix (2001, p.14, Section 5) and CTAR (2001a, p.186). 
25 The two agencies are L’Agence métropolitaine de transport (http://www.amt.qc.ca) created in 1996, 
and TransLink (http://www.translink.bc.ca) created in 1998. Both agencies were created before the CTAR 
was conducted. 
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consumption will reduce the base for fuel taxes, and consequently increase the need for 
other revenue sources.  
 
 
4. Some questions about road pricing in the US and Canada 
 
A number of questions and issues regarding road pricing have come to the fore in 
recent years. Attention is limited here to a few questions of concern to the US and 
Canada. 
 
 
Design of road pricing schemes 
An overarching question that has been addressed in European-Union funded 
research26, and is currently under debate in the UK, is how to phase in road pricing over 
time. An implementation path has several dimensions: the numbers of steps or phases, 
the design at each step, the speed of progression from step to step, and the ultimate form 
and extent of road pricing. Since road pricing in the US and Canada has not yet 
progressed very far, discussion is focused here on the design of schemes rather than on 
the time dimension of implementation. 
Road pricing schemes can be categorised as facility-based, area-based or network-
based. Facility-based schemes include HOT lanes and individual highways. Toll 
cordons, area licenses and urban parking-fee structures are types of area-based schemes. 
Network-based schemes include highway networks, and systems that encompass all 
road travel such as GPS-based distance pricing. As Section 2 explains, most of the 
VPPP projects are facility-based. The prospects for area-based and network-based 
schemes in the US and Canada are briefly assessed here.  
 
Area-based schemes 
 
Fort Myers Beach in Florida is the only urban area in the US or Canada with a cordon 
toll, and no area charges have been implemented or initiated anywhere. To be sure, 
several schemes have recently been proposed. As noted in Section 2, a cordon toll was 
proposed for New York City and withdrawn, and a revised scheme has been put 
forward. The San Francisco County Transportation Authority has applied for a federal 
grant to study an area charge similar to that in London.27 A toll for driving into 
downtown Boston during the morning peak was recommended by a city councillor.28 
                                                 
26 See in particular the MC-ICAM project (http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/rtd/5/index_ 
en.htm) accessed November 19, 2005. 
27 http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/06/04/CONGESTION.TMP. Accessed 
November 19, 2005. 
28 http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/04/01/blocking_traffic/ 
Accessed November 19, 2005. 
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And TransLink, Vancouver’s urban transportation agency, drew up a plan for tolls in 
2004 but abandoned it after the New Deal for Cities and Communities was announced.29  
These and other area-based road-pricing proposals have met various criticisms: 
• travel patterns are dispersed in most North American cities. Congestion is not 
concentrated in city centres, and any charge schemes for downtown areas would 
have limited effectiveness30; 
• motorists will divert around charge areas, resulting in displacement rather than 
suppression of congestion; 
• public transport capacity is inadequate to accommodate a significant modal shift 
away from driving; 
• business and commercial activity would be displaced to toll-free locations; 
• those who would pay the charge (viz. suburban residents who work in the city) 
outnumber those who would benefit (viz. city-centre residents); and 
• state or provincial legislation would be required, and various horizontal or vertical 
agreements between government departments would have to be made.  
 
London’s area charge appears to have been successful because these difficulties were 
avoided (Litman, 2005). Few cities in North America seem as well-suited. This is not to 
say that area charges will not work anywhere, but one should not assume that positive 
experiences in one jurisdiction will necessarily be repeated elsewhere. 
 
Network-based schemes 
 
Four types of toll-road networks have recently been approved or recommended for the 
US. One, proposed by Poole and Orski (2003), are urban networks of HOT lanes and 
Bus Rapid Transit. These networks would comprise interconnected limited-access 
freeway lanes that are converted from HOV lanes and designed for relatively long-haul 
travel. Dynamic tolls would be levied on all vehicles except buses, and the revenues 
would be used to fund network construction on an incremental basis. 
A second type of toll-road network for intercity travel has been launched in Texas. 
The Trans-Texas Corridor project (http://www.texastollways.com) already comprises 
more than 20 ventures. The long-range plan calls for 1,560 lane-km of new toll lanes on 
existing or new expressways. Construction of the lanes would be financed by private 
investors, who would be repaid from toll revenues. To exploit scale economies and 
revenue opportunities new highway corridors would be built that are wide enough to 
accommodate railway tracks as well as gas lines and other utilities. 
A third type of toll-road network for trucks has been proposed by Samuel et al. 
(2002). Toll truckways would be established along Interstate rights-of-way in lanes 
separated from other traffic to enhance safety. The truckways could be owned and 
operated either privately or by the states. Tolls would be based on distance and 
conditioned on truck characteristics such as axle loads. To avoid double taxation, state 
and federal fuel taxes would be rebated. Size and weight regulations would also be 
                                                 
29 http://www.tricitynews.com/portals-code/listcgi?paper=74&cat=23&id=502071&more, article dated 
October 2, 2005. 
30 According to Richardson and Bae (2004) differences between the US and Europe in land-use and travel 
patterns have been diminishing over time. 
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relaxed to permit trucking companies to use larger, more economical, vehicles. Samuel 
et al. (2002) claim that toll truckways would be self-financing under a wide range of 
scenarios, and that states would gain more from reductions in construction and 
maintenance costs than they would lose in fuel tax revenues. To take full advantage of 
the technology it would need to be harmonised with Canada and Mexico, as required 
under the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement. Harmonisation would be 
especially desirable for Canada given the large volume of cross-border trucking traffic 
between Canada and the US.31 
The fourth type of road-pricing scheme, credit-based congestion pricing (CBCP), has 
been proposed by Kockelman and Kalmanje (2005). CBCP adds revenue neutrality to 
congestion pricing by giving each resident of a prescribed area a monthly allowance of 
travel credits equal to the average amount spent on tolls by residents (after deducting 
administrative costs) in the previous month. Individuals who drive less than average can 
either save the credit for future travel or exchange it for cash. Only those who travel 
more than average incur an out-of-pocket expense. Kalmanje and Kockelman (2004) 
conducted simulations of CBCP on the Austin, Texas, road network and found that it 
greatly increased the proportion of residents who benefit from pricing. 
Networks of toll roads have some attractive properties. They embody scale economies 
for users similar to airline and public transit networks in that travel is possible between 
many origins and destinations. There are also likely to be scale economies in toll 
collection costs for both users and operators. And political approval might even be 
easier to gain than for single facilities insofar as spatial equity is promoted by providing 
a common type of service across multiple regions. Nevertheless, toll-road networks face 
design challenges and obstacles. 
One issue is how to set tolls. Differences between links in construction costs and 
congestion levels would appear to call for differences in tolls to satisfy the user pays 
and efficient pricing principles. If tolls are set dynamically – as Poole and Orski (2003) 
recommend for urban networks – toll differences might be accepted. However, there are 
advantages in the Japanese Revenue Pooling System, established in 1972, whereby all 
routes have the same tolls regardless of construction costs and traffic levels.32 The 
rationale offered for this system is that it minimises confusion for drivers and is seen to 
be fair. Furthermore, full cost recovery from toll revenues is unlikely to be possible for 
especially costly links that are nevertheless vital parts of the network. A system of 
common tolls may also forestall local governments from exploiting tolls as a cash cow – 
a danger that Heaver and Waters (2005, p.796) warn about in the Canadian context. 
A second concern about toll-road networks that also arises with facility-based tolling 
is route diversion. This is perceived to be a problem, or potential problem, for small 
states that can be circumvented by using highways in neighbouring states. Levying tolls 
on Interstate highways or major urban arterials may also induce traffic to divert onto 
two-lane roads or residential streets, and exacerbate congestion as well as compromise 
safety. 
Toll-road networks will face regulatory hurdles. In the case of toll truckways several 
policy changes would be required (Samuel et al., 2002): (i) further relaxation of 
prohibitions on tolls on Interstate highways, (ii) provision of truck rights-of-way along 
                                                 
31 According to Transport Canada (2004, p.61), in 2003 approximately 63% of Canada-US trade was 
transported by truck. 
32 See World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/transport/roads/toll_rds.htm) Annex 9, accessed 
November 20, 2005. Cross-financing of intercity concession motorways is also practiced in France. 
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existing corridors “on the federal-aid system”, (iii) relaxation of truck size and weight 
regulations, and (iv) procedures to issue rebates on federal and state truck user taxes. In 
this regard Samuel et al. (2002) comment favourably on Canadian regulatory policy, 
and note (p.12) that, in contrast to the US: 
 
“Canadian trucking has benefited from its federal government acting as a facilitator 
rather than as a decisionmaker about truck sizes and weights. Provincial 
governments take final responsibility for the difficult trade-off decisions about 
which roads are designated for what class of heavy vehicles…” 
 
Two points are worth noting. One is that both the subsidiarity principle and 
harmonisation – central concepts in European Union transport policy reform – also 
matter in North America. As far as subsidiarity there are advantages in having a number 
of jurisdictions (e.g. states in the US, or provinces in Canada) experimenting 
independently with ways to provide roads, particularly in light of rapid technological 
change. The second point is that to make toll truckways possible, let alone to realise 
their full potential, multiple regulatory changes are required that go well beyond pricing. 
 
 
Scheme complexity 
 
The difficulties of designing second-best policies in the real world of myriad 
economic distortions are well known, and opinions differ on what approach to take. 
Delucchi (2000) maintains that getting the price right may be impractical or impossible 
because of difficulties in estimating demand elasticities, externality costs, etc. But in a 
comment on Delucchi (2000), Litman and Greenberg (2000) argue that, besides road 
congestion and non-market externalities, various other price distortions apply to auto 
travel that are larger in total: unpaid parking, infrastructure costs and the heavy reliance 
on fixed costs that leave automobile travel severely underpriced at the margin (recall 
Section 2). Estimates from US studies cited by Litman and Greenberg (2000) indicate 
that efficient pricing would increase variable vehicle expenses by 200-500% over 
current levels. With respect to the implications for pricing policy they remark (p.7): 
 
“The conceptual test of additional vehicle use charges need not be the theoretical 
ideal based on Marginal Social Cost, but rather, it simply needs to be better than 
existing taxes and fees. This is a far easier standard to meet.” 
 
In their view, politics in the US are such that auto usage will always be underpriced, 
so that there is little risk in taking initial steps towards raising prices by whatever 
means. This assessment is almost surely more accurate for the US than for European 
countries, particularly those with lower levels of auto ownership and/or high fuel taxes 
such as Britain. 
 
 
Earmarking of toll revenues 
A longstanding question that goes beyond transportation is whether revenues from 
user charges should be earmarked for specific purposes. Practice varies widely. As 
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noted in Section 2, earmarking is the rule for VPPP projects, and the US Highway Trust 
Fund is earmarked in principle if not in practice. Earmarking is less common in Canada. 
Simple economic theory suggests that use of revenues should be kept flexible because 
the relative merits of different spending patterns change over time in ways that cannot 
be foreseen. However, earmarking can also be defended as a means of compensating 
losers, as well as a way to prevent politicians from misallocating funds. 
Many recent studies of road pricing support earmarking as necessary to gain political 
or public approval. But earmarking has been opposed by some authoritative sources. 
The National Research Council committee on congestion pricing disagreed with the 
spending constraints written into the ISTEA legislation that enabled the VPPP. The US 
National Research Council Committee noted that voters might approve spending 
revenues for other purposes, and local governments should have the latitude to comply 
with their wishes.33 Similarly, the Canada Transportation Act Review (CTAR) Panel 
recommended that congestion and other road charges should not be allocated to road 
investments if expenditures on other transport modes would yield a higher return.34 
However, Heaver and Waters (2005, p.795) recommend that revenues from the 
Canadian federal fuel tax should be dedicated to transport as a whole. Amongst other 
reasons they point out the pressing need for funds to rehabilitate road infrastructure, and 
the fact that the fuel tax is inconsistent with harmonisation of tax rates across economic 
sectors. 
 
 
Policy towards environmental costs of driving 
It is generally, but not universally, argued that drivers should pay for the 
environmental externalities they generate, but also that environmental charges should be 
levied on all economic sectors rather than just transportation. Fuel taxes are potentially 
effective for internalising climate change costs, but rather crude for addressing the 
health and other costs of local emissions. Tolls are being touted in the US primarily as a 
tool for pricing congestion rather than environmental externalities. One question that 
looms in the future is how to tackle environmental costs through fiscal measures if road 
pricing becomes widespread as either a supplement or a replacement for fuel taxes. One 
concern with Oregon’s proposed distance-based toll, which would replace fuel taxes, is 
that it would penalise fuel-efficient vehicles unless toll rates are conditioned on vehicle 
characteristics. 
Another, more immediate problem, is how to treat vehicles with non-conventional 
fuels that are rapidly gaining in popularity. Some states and cities already provide 
incentives in the form of tax credits, exemptions from emissions-testing and even free 
parking. And with passage of the SAFETEA-LU Act, states can now grant free access 
to HOV and HOT lanes not only to electric and alternative-powered vehicles, but also to 
hybrid vehicles. These privileges have raised objections from owners of regular 
vehicles, and are also opposed on efficiency grounds since they undermine the primary 
goal of HOV and HOT lanes to combat congestion. 
 
                                                 
33 Transportation Research Board (1994, p.73). 
34 CTAR (2001b, Recommendation 12.3). This recommendation applies both in the short term with 
respect to fuel tax revenues, and in the longer term with respect to any road funds that might be 
established. 
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Scope for private-sector involvement 
The private sector plays a leading role in toll-road development in Europe, Australia 
and other parts of the world, in part because this is facilitated by government policy 
(Orski, 2005). Relatively speaking, the private sector has had a low profile in the US 
and Canada. Nevertheless, more than 50 urban toll roads have been developed in the 
US, most of them in the last 30 years (Poole, 2005a). Prominent examples include State 
Route 91, the Dulles Greenway in North Virginia, and the Chicago Skyway. In addition 
to Texas, where public-private partnerships (PPPs) are blooming, laws enabling PPPs in 
transportation projects have been passed in over 20 other states. And the federal 
government is encouraging private-sector involvement through its Special Experimental 
Project initiative (SEP-15). Amongst various projects under consideration are a series of 
new HOT lanes on the Capital Beltway in Washington, D.C. In Canada, Highway 407 is 
the only privately operated urban road – albeit a very profitable one with over 300,000 
average daily trips on workdays. 
From a public-sector perspective the main goal in harnessing the private sector is to 
attract private funding and/or operation of tolled facilities while avoiding both heavy 
subsidisation and exploitation of monopoly power. One challenge is that start-up 
projects are inherently risky because costs are high, highway infrastructure is sunk and 
long-lived, and willingness to pay is uncertain (Poole, 2005a). A public financing option 
was chosen for Highway 407 because Canadian companies were seen to be risk averse, 
and would demand a provincial guarantee (Mylvaganam and Borins, 2004, p.39). 
Proposals to build a corridor from Lewis County in Washington State to Canada, and a 
system of express toll lanes for Minneapolis-St. Paul, were cancelled after studies 
concluded that they could not be self-financing from user fees. 
To reduce risks, governments have granted protection against competition.35 A “non-
compete” clause was included in the contract for SR-91which precluded capacity 
improvements to the freeway until 2030. But rapid traffic growth in the corridor led to 
severe congestion on the untolled lanes, and in 2003 the Orange County Transportation 
Authority took over the highway. According to Poole (2005b), the California 
Department of Transport (Caltrans) agreed to the non-compete clause because there was 
no precedent for SR-91 in the US, and it was not realised that some commuters are 
willing to pay appreciable tolls to save travel time. Current practice is less generous 
with respect to protection from competition. 
To contain monopoly power, two regulatory models have been employed in North 
America. One form is rate-of-return regulation, which was applied to SR-91. This 
model allows operators to implement time-of-day pricing relatively freely. The second 
model is toll regulation, with maximum tolls determined by traffic levels and an 
inflation index. This model, which is applied on Highway 407, is designed to provide 
users with more assurance about future toll levels. The regulations for Highway 407 
stipulate that tolls can be raised only if a minimum36 traffic level is met, and capacity 
expansion is required if flow exceeds 1,700 vehicles per lane-hour for more than 125 
hours in a calendar year. 
                                                 
35 Private highways generally face less competition in European countries than in North America because 
a larger fraction of public highways is tolled. 
36 See Mylvaganam and Borins (2004, pp.95-96). Interestingly, this policy contrasts with Interstate 15 (a 
public operated facility), which is required by law to maintain level of service C and is therefore 
constrained (on a real time basis) by a ceiling on traffic volume. 
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Besides competition clauses and regulations, another design question in privatising 
roads is whether to grant concessions only for individual roads or for networks. Both 
approaches are taken internationally (Estache et al., 2000). One consideration is the 
trade off between the disadvantage of networks in conveying greater monopoly power, 
and the advantage that the operator will internalise the complementarity in demand 
between links. The Ontario provincial government may be at a bargaining disadvantage 
vis à vis the incumbent operator, Highway 407 International, if Highway 407 is ever 
extended because the new segment would be less valuable to a new contractor than to 
the incumbent.37 
Yet another consideration is foreign involvement. Most toll-road projects in the US 
and Canada involve large foreign partners because of their experience and ability to 
absorb risks (Orski, 2005). One potential drawback is illustrated by an ongoing dispute 
over toll regulations between Highway 407 International and the Ontario government. A 
Spanish firm holds an interest in the consortium, and the Spanish government 
threatened to disrupt free-trade negotiations unless the problem was resolved.38 
On balance, the future for private-sector engagement in highway financing and 
operation appears to be relatively bright in the US. The picture is not as clear for 
Canada. According to Nix (2001, p.58) recent enthusiasm for a commercial approach to 
roads in Canada is driven by fiscal restraints and “does not appear to have been driven 
by any reliance on economic principles or regard to the recommendations of 
Commissions.” There appears to be a reluctance in Canada to part from a tradition of 
publicly operated and toll-free roads. In 2003, the British Columbia provincial 
government formulated a plan to privatise the Coquihalla highway on a 55-year lease. 
But it backed down in the face of massive opposition. As another example, a PPP 
contract to Design, Build, Finance and Operate part of a ring road in Edmonton, 
Alberta, was recently signed that “does not allow tolls or advertising to generate 
revenue”.39 
 
 
5. Long-run prospects for road pricing 
 
A number of experts have predicted that road pricing will never be widespread in the 
US.40 Arnott (2005) also sounds a cautionary note, identifying as his main concerns that 
congestion pricing may not reduce congestion very much, that tolling may exacerbate 
other distortions, and that implementation will be impeded by political barriers and high 
infrastructure and administration costs. 
 
The brief review of evidence in this article indicates that the prospects for extensive 
road pricing in Canada in the near future are slim. Strong preferences for public funding 
are one factor. Another is that traffic volumes on most Canadian roads are insufficient 
to justify tolls, at least for the purpose of congestion pricing. Recent experience with the 
Value Pricing Pilot Program suggests, however, a more positive assessment for the US. 
                                                 
37 Mylvaganam and Borins (2004, p.125). 
38 Mylvaganam and Borins (2004, p.96 ff). 
39 Alberta Infrastructure (2005, p.41). 
40 See for example Giuliano (1992), Gillen (1997), Small and Gómez-Ibáñez (1999), Meyer (1999) and 
Downs (2004). 
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Several VPPP projects have been surprisingly successful, and public support for road 
pricing has gained momentum. A strength of the VPPP, which it shares with the 
American economy at large, is its experimental and varied approach that facilitates 
identification of winning (and losing) strategies at relatively low cost. One of the 
lessons is that resistance to road pricing can be overcome by careful design of schemes 
and extensive marketing campaigns that engage the public. Another is that sophisticated 
dynamic congestion pricing is technologically feasible and politically acceptable. A 
third encouraging trend in the US is growth in private-sector involvement with road 
pricing. 
It has been argued that congestion is less localised in North America than in Europe, 
and that consequently road pricing is less cost effective on the western side of the 
Atlantic. However, to the extent that auto travel is underpriced in North America 
compared to Europe, the case for road pricing may actually be stronger. A cautiously 
optimistic view is that road pricing may eventually be applied on much of the US road 
network, although implementation is likely to be punctuated by setbacks, and to be 
influenced by economic factors such as the business cycle and budgetary pressures on 
governments. In 1994 the National Research Council-sponsored congestion pricing 
study panel wrote41 
 
“The risks associated with congestion pricing and the nature of policy development 
in a pluralistic society imply that this policy will progress in small steps. Given that 
congestion pricing represents a substantial change from the current operation of the 
road system, such small steps are appropriate. If individual projects succeed, they 
will help convince policy makers and the public of the benefits of congestion 
pricing. This process will take time, however; thus it may be many more years 
before congestion pricing would be applied throughout a metropolitan area in this 
country. Whether congestion pricing will evolve to this level will depend on how it 
is implemented, how well it works, and how much motorists and voters come to 
accept it. Only time, experimentation, and careful evaluation will tell.” 
 
Although these words were written over a decade ago, they still sum up rather well 
the state of road pricing today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Alberta Infrastructure (2005) “Alberta Infrastructure and Transportation Annual Report 2004-2005”, 
Alberta Infrastructure and Transportation. 
Appiah, J. and Burris, M. W. (2005) “QuickRide User Response to Different HOT Lane Operating 
Scenarios", 84th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, Washington, DC. 
Arnott, R. A. (2005) “City Tolls — One Element of an Effective Policy Cocktail”, Dice Report: Journal 
of Institutional Comparisons 3 (3): 5-11, http://www.cesifo-
group.de/portal/page?_pageid=36,34692&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL, accessed November 20, 
2005. 
                                                 
41 Transportation Research Board (1994, p.103). 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 31 (2005): 46-66 
 64
Berg, J. T. (2003) “Listening to the Public: Assessing Public Opinion about Value Pricing”, State and 
Local Government Program, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. 
British Columbia Ministry of Transport (2003) “Guidelines for Tolling”, 
http://www.th.gov.bc.ca/publications/reports_and_studies/tolling/index.htm, accessed November 20, 
2005. 
Brownstone, D. and Small, K. A. (2005) “Valuing Time and Reliability: Assessing the Evidence from 
Road Pricing Demonstrations,” Transportation Research Part A 39(4), pp. 279-293. 
Bryan, N. (1972) “More Taxes and More Traffic”, Canadian Tax Papers, No. 55, Canadian Tax 
Foundation, Toronto. 
Burris, M. W. and Stockton, B. R. (2004) “HOT Lanes in Houston - Six Years of Experience”, Journal of 
Public Transportation 7(3), pp. 1-18. 
Canada Transportation Act Review Panel (2001a) “Vision and Balance,” Canada Transportation Act 
Review: Final Report, Chapter 10: Paying for Roads, pp. 175-198 (http://www.reviewcta-
examenltc.gc.ca/english/pages/final/ch10e.htm), accessed November 20, 2005. 
Canada Transportation Act Review Panel (2001b), “Vision and Balance,” Canada Transportation Act 
Review: Final Report, Chapter 12: The National Interest in Urban Transportation, pp. 215-229 
(http://www.reviewcta-examenltc.gc.ca/english/pages/final/ch12e.htm), accessed November 20, 2005. 
Congestion Pricing Listserv (http://www.hhh.umn.edu/centers/slp/projects/conpric/news/listser.htm). 
Decorla-Souza, P. (2004) “Recent U.S. Experience: Pilot Projects”, In: Santos, G. (ed) Road Pricing: 
Theory and Evidence, Research in Transportation Economics 9, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, pp. 283-
308. 
Delucchi, M. (2000) “Should We Try to Get the Prices Right?,” Access 16, Spring, pp. 14-21. 
Downs, A. (2004) Still Stuck in Traffic: Coping with Peak-Hour Traffic Congestion, Brookings Institution 
Press, Washington, D.C. 
Edlin, A. (2003) “Per-mile Premiums for Auto Insurance”, In: Arnott, R., Greenwald, B., Kanbur, R. and 
Nalebuff, B. (eds) Economics for an Imperfect World: Essays In Honor of Joseph Stiglitz, MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
Elliott, W. (1986) “Fumbling Toward the Edge of History: California's Quest For a Road-Pricing 
Experiment”, Transportation Research A 20A(2), pp. 151-156. 
Estache, A., Romero, M. and Strong, J. (2000) “Toll Roads”, In: Estache, A. and de Rus, G. (eds) 
Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructure: Guidelines for Policymakers and Regulators, 
The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Forkenbrock, D. J. (2004) “Mileage-based Road User Charge Concept”, Transportation Research Record 
1864, pp. 1-8. 
Gillen, D. W. (1997) “Efficient Use and Provision of Transportation Infrastructure with Imperfect 
Pricing: Second Best Rules,” In: Greene, D. L., Jones, D. W. and Delucchi, M. A. (eds), The Full Costs 
and Benefits of Transportation, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp. 193-218. 
Giuliano, G. (1992) “An Assessment of the Political Acceptability of Congestion Pricing”, 
Transportation 19, pp. 335-358. 
Godbe Research & Analysis (1997) “I-15 ExpressPass Focus Groups Conducted for the San Diego 
Association of Governments,” (http://fastrak.sandag.org/pdfs/godbe.pdf), accessed October 31, 2005. 
Greenberg, A. (2003), “Comparing the Benefits of Mileage and Usage Pricing Incentives with other 
Government Transportation Expenditures,” 82nd Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research 
Board, Washington, DC. 
Heaver, T. D. and Waters, W. G. II. (2005) “Transportation Policy in Canada”, In: Button, K. J. and 
Hensher, D. A. (eds), Handbook of Transport Strategy, Policy and Institutions 6, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 
pp. 779-801. 
Higgins, T. J. (1986) “Road Pricing: Attempts in the United States,” Transportation Research A 20A(2), 
pp. 145-150. 
Interstate 15, http://argo.sandag.org/fastrak, accessed October 30, 2005. 
Kalmanje, S. and Kockelman, K. M. (2004) “Credit-based Congestion Pricing: Travel, Land Value, and 
Welfare Impacts", Transportation Research Record 1864, pp. 45-53. 
Klein, D. B. and Fielding, G. J. (1992) “Private Toll Roads: Learning from the Nineteenth Century”, 
Transportation Quarterly 46(3), pp. 321-341. 
Kockelman, K. M. and Kalmanje, S. (2005) “Credit-based Congestion Pricing: A Proposed Policy and the 
Public's Response”, Transportation Research A 39A, pp. 671-690. 
Lam, T. C. and Small, K. A. (2001) “The Value of Time and Reliability: Measurement from a Value 
Pricing Experiment”, Transportation Research E 37E, pp. 231-251. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 31 (2005): 46-66 
 65
Levinson, D. M. (2002) Financing Transportation Networks, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Litman, T. (2005) “London Congestion Pricing – Implications for Other Cities”, Dice Report: Journal of 
Institutional Comparisons 3(3): pp. 17-21, http://www.cesifo-
group.de/portal/page?_pageid=36,34692&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL, accessed November 20, 
2005. 
Litman, T. and Greenberg, A. (2000) “Response to Mark Delucchi’s ‘Should We Try to Get the Prices 
Right?” (http://www.vtpi.org). 
Meyer, M. D. (1999) “Demand Management as an Element of Transportation Policy: Using Carrots and 
Sticks to Influence Travel Behavior,” Transportation Research A 33A, pp. 575-599. 
Munnich, L. W. Jr. and Loveland, J. D. (2005) “Value Pricing and Public Outreach: Minnesota’s Lessons 
Learned”, 84th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, Washington, DC. 
Mylvaganam, C. and Borins, S. (2004) If you Build it ... Business, Government and Ontario’s Electronic 
Toll Highway, University of Toronto Centre for Public Management, Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press. 
Nix, F. P. (2001) “Alternative Road Financing Arrangements,” Research conducted for the Canadian 
Transportation Act Review (http://www.reviewcta-
examenltc.gc.ca/CTAReview/CTAReview/english/reports/nix.pdf ), accessed November 20, 2005. 
Nix, F. P. (2002) “Toll Roads in Canada”, Proceedings of the 37 Annual Conference of the Canadian 
Transportation Research Forum, University of Saskatchewan, pp. 134-148. 
Orski, K. (2005) “Going beyond the Interstate Highway System”, Innovation Briefs 16(2), March/April – 
16(3), May/June. 
Poole, R. W. Jr. (2005a) “The Orange County Toll Roads: Largely successful”, Reason Foundation, 
Policy Brief 38 (http://www.reason.org/pb38.pdf), accessed November 20, 2005. 
Poole, R. W. Jr. (2005b) “Orange County’s 91 Express Lanes: A Transportation and Financial Success, 
Despite Political Problems”, Reason Foundation, Policy Brief 39 (http://www.reason.org/pb39.pdf), 
accessed November 20, 2005. 
Poole, R. W., Jr. and Orski, C. K. (2003) “HOT Networks: A new Plan for Congestion Relief and Better 
Transit”, Reason Public Policy Institute Policy Study No. 305 (http://www.reason.org/ps305.pdf), 
accessed November 20, 2005. 
Richardson, H. W. and Bae, C-H. C. (eds) (2004) Urban Sprawl in Western Europe and the United 
States, Ashgate, Aldershot, England. 
Roth, G. (2005) “Liberating the Roads: Reforming U.S. Highway Policy”, Policy Analysis, Cato Institute, 
March 17, p.538. 
Safirova, E., Gillingham, K., Parry, I. W. H., Nelson, P., Harrington, W. and Mason, D. (2004) “Welfare 
and Distributional Effects of HOT Lanes and Other Road Pricing Policies in Metropolitan Washington 
DC”, In: Santos, G. (ed), Road Pricing: Theory and Evidence, Elsevier Science, pp. 179-206. 
Samuel, P., Poole, R. W. Jr. and Holguin-Veras, J. (2002) “Toll Truckways: A New Path Toward Safer 
and More Efficient Freight Transportation”, Reason Public Policy Institute Policy Study No. 294 
(http://www.reason.org/ps294.pdf), accessed November 20, 2005. 
Schade, J. and Schlag, B. (eds) (2003) Acceptability of Transport Pricing Strategies, Elsevier, 
Amsterdam. 
Shoup, D. C. (2005) The High Cost of Free Parking, APA Planners Press, Chicago, Illinois and 
Washington, D.C. 
Small, K. A. and Gómez-Ibáñez, J. (1999) “Urban Transportation”, In: Cheshire, P. and Mills, E.S. (eds) 
Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics 3, North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 1937-1999. 
State Route 91, http://www.91expresslanes.com, accessed October 30, 2005. 
Sullivan, E. C. (2002) “Implementing Value Pricing for U.S. Roadways,” IMPRINT-EUROPE Seminar 
Two, “Implementing reform on transport pricing,” Brussels, May 14-15. 
Texas Transportation Institute (2005) “The 2005 Urban Mobility Report”, 
(http://tti.tamu.edu/documents/mobility_report_2005.pdf), accessed November 7, 2005. 
Transport Canada (2004), Transportation in Canada 2004: Annual Report, Ottawa 
(http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/report/anre2004/toc_e.htm), accessed November 20, 2005. 
Transportation Research Board (1994) “Special Report 242: Curbing Gridlock Peak-Period Fees to 
Relieve Traffic Congestion”, National Research Council, Washington D.C. 
Transportation Research Board (2003) “Road Value Pricing: Traveler Response to Transport System 
Changes”, Transit Cooperative Research Program Report 95, Transportation Research Board 
(http://gulliver.trb.org/publications/tcrp/tcrp_rpt_95c14.pdf ), accessed November 20, 2005. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 31 (2005): 46-66 
 66
US Department of Transport (2005), Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A 
Legacy for Users, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/safetealu/index.htm, accessed October 30, 2005. 
US Department of Transportation (1997) Federal Highway Cost Allocation Study, Washington, DC: US 
Department of Transportation. 
US Department of Transportation (2000) Addendum to Federal Highway Cost Allocation Study, 
Washington, DC: US Department of Transportation. 
US Department of Transportation (2003) “Toll Facilities in the United States, Bridges - Roads - Tunnels – 
Ferries”, Office of Highway Policy Information, Federal Highway Administration, Publication No: 
FHWA-PL-04-017, Washington, DC. (http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/pdf/Toll03.pdf), accessed 
November 20, 2005. 
Value Pricing Pilot Program (2005) http://www.hhh.umn.edu/centers/slp/projects/conpric/, accessed 
November 20, 2005. 
Whitty, J., Porter, J. D., Svadlenak, J., Kim, D. S., Larsen, N. C., Vergara, H. A., Sexton, C. B. and 
Capps, D. F. (2005) “Development and Performance Evaluation of a Vehicle-Miles-Traveled Revenue 
Collection System”, 84th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, Washington, DC. 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
An earlier version of this paper was prepared for the IMPRINT-EUROPE Fourth 
Seminar “Implementing Pricing Policies in Transport: Phasing and Packaging,” 
Katholik University of Leuven, Belgium, May 13, 2003 (http://www.imprint-
eu.org/public/Papers/IMPRINT4_lindsey-v2.pdf). This version incorporates updated 
material that was presented at the 2nd Kuhmo conference on “Road Pricing: Is it needed? 
Is it possible? Is it inevitable?”, Kuhmo, Finland, July 14, 2005. I would like to thank 
participants at both the Leuven and Kuhmo meetings for insightful questions and 
comments. I am also grateful to Joseph Schulman and an anonymous referee for 
comments and corrections. Finally, thanks for financial support are due to the European 
Commission (project MC-ICAM: Implementation of Marginal Cost Pricing in Transport 
– Integrated Conceptual and Applied Model Analysis) and to the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada (project “Road pricing in urban areas”). 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 31 (2005): 67-82 
 67
 
 
 
 
 
 
A model of residential location choice with endogenous 
housing prices and traffic  
for the Paris region  
 
André de Palma 1∗, Kiarash Motamedi 2, 
Nathalie Picard 2, Paul Waddell 3 
 
1 University of Cergy-Pontoise and Ecole Nationale de Ponts et Chaussées, France. 
2 University of Cergy-Pontoise, France. 
3 University of Washington, USA. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
There is a growing interest in the development and the use of large-scale planning models. In this 
paper, we describe the first step of a project to integrate UrbanSim, a dynamic microsimulation land use 
model, and METROPOLIS, a dynamic traffic model. This is the first attempt, to our knowledge, to 
integrate a dynamic land use model and a dynamic traffic model. We briefly describe the two models and 
propose a unified framework for their integration. Within this integrated framework we develop a model 
of residential location choice, with endogenous housing prices and traffic. The study area for this research 
is the Ile-de-France (Paris region), for which we provide empirical results. 
 
Keywords: Land use; Integrated model; Transportation modelling; Paris area. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In metropolitan regions throughout the world, increasing population and urban 
expansion generate increased transportation congestion and rising housing prices. The 
need to coordinate land use policies with transportation investments has been widely 
recognized, but the task remains difficult for both technical and political reasons. 
Politically, the coordination of transportation and land use is difficult because land use 
decisions are controlled by local governments that by nature have a parochial mandate, 
whereas transportation investments are generally coordinated at a metropolitan level to 
ensure efficient coordination of the regional transportation network. Technically, the 
coordination of land use and transportation is challenging due to the lack of well-
integrated models that provide a coherent behavioural basis to model not only the 
effects of changing patterns of locations of jobs and households and real estate 
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investments on transport flows, but also the effect of changes in the transportation 
system and travel conditions on these location choices.  
Though models that reflect the interaction between land use and transportation have 
been developed and used for at least three decades (Putman, 1983, de la Barra, 1990), 
the models have been characterized by a high degree of aggregation of space, agents, 
and time. Prior land use models have represented geography using a very aggregate 
zone structure, usually with 30 to a few hundred zones. Agents such as households and 
jobs have been aggregated to a small number of categories. But perhaps most 
importantly, chronological time has not been explicitly represented in prior land use 
models, in that they solve for an equilibrium with a given set of inputs, with no path 
dependence, and an assumption that all agents can adjust instantaneously, with no 
transaction cost. This approach requires making the assumption, for example, that the 
effect of building a major transportation facility in a given year will produce all of its 
effects on real estate development, location choices, and travel behaviour in that same 
year. Our approach, by contrast, avoids this assumption by representing the partial 
adjustment of households, firms and developers in annual steps of time, allowing the 
effects of a major shock such as a change in infrastructure to be spread over multiple 
years. 
These restrictions are important constraints, and have led to recent innovations to 
overcome these simplifications to allow more behavioural realism in the modelling. 
This realism is important in making the modelling efforts responsive to current policy 
questions that require considerable behavioural resolution in order to represent the 
dynamic short-term and long-term effects of major transportation investments and their 
interaction with land use policies. Two models exemplify the recent trend towards 
microsimulation and dynamic temporal representation in the land use and transportation 
domain. UrbanSim is a simulation model developed since the late 1990’s to simulate the 
spatial and temporal evolution of household location, job location, and real estate supply 
and prices using microsimulation to allow complete disaggregation in agents, locations, 
and the representation of time (Waddell et al, 2003). This model has been applied to 
numerous cities in the United States and Europe, but until now has been connected to 
traditional four-step travel models that provide static equilibrium traffic assignment, 
usually for only a small number of time periods during the day. METROPOLIS is a 
dynamic traffic assignment model that simulates evolving traffic conditions on large-
scale networks over the course of a day, representing individual travellers (de Palma and 
Marchal, 2002). 
The major innovation developed in this paper, in addition to the operational 
integration for the first time of dynamic microsimulation land use and traffic models, is 
in the treatment of two types of endogeneity in residential location choices. Residential 
location is clearly interdependent with housing prices, and we develop an econometric 
specification and estimation methodology that correctly accounts for this endogeneity. 
We also treat the endogeneity of travel times for work trips with residential location by 
coupling the land use and traffic models. The paper proceeds as follows. In the next 
section, we provide an overview of UrbanSim and METROPOLIS and the proposed 
integrated model architecture. Following this, we describe the region that serves as the 
basis for this application, the data used for model estimation, and the model 
specification and empirical results. We conclude with some interpretation of results and 
discussion of further research. 
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Integrated model system design 
 
In this section we briefly describe the UrbanSim and METROPOLIS models and our 
proposed approach to integrate them.  
 
 
UrbanSim: a path-dependent land use model 
 
UrbanSim is a disaggregate land use model used to simulate the spatial and temporal 
evolution of land use and the locations of households and jobs within metropolitan 
areas. It has been developed at the University of Washington since 1996, and released 
under an Open Source license; see (Waddell et al., 2003). In 2005 a new Open Platform 
for Urban Simulation (OPUS) has been implemented to support further development of 
UrbanSim and incorporation of other simulation models and tools (Waddell et al., 
2005). UrbanSim simulates year-to-year changes in real estate development and in the 
location of households and jobs for each geographical unit. Geography has typically 
been represented using grid cells as small as one hectare, though in the current 
application to the Ile-de-France we use 1300 Communes, or local municipalities.  
 
Figure 1: UrbanSim architecture. 
Adapted from Waddell et al., 2003. 
 
The principal modules in UrbanSim are presented schematically in Figure 1. Models 
of choice processes such as location of households, jobs and new real estate 
development use Discrete Choice Models (Multinomial Logit for standard version).  
UrbanSim is typically interfaced with an external travel model system (normally a 
standard four-step travel model), which generates trip distribution and utility patterns 
used in UrbanSim to measure patterns of accessibility. Accessibility for the home to 
work and possibly other purposes is computed using a variety of alternative measures. 
One such measure uses the composite utility of travel from a particular origin to all 
destinations: 
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where AOi, is the accessibility of cell i as origin and ADi as destination, Pj stands for the 
population that comes to the cell to work there, Ej represents the jobs to which the 
people go and Lij is the logsum which is the surplus of the travellers. 
The choice of agents (households and jobs) to relocate during a given year is 
modelled in the Relocation Choice Model, as a probability that depends on agent 
characteristics. Household age and income are the principal factors to predict 
differences in relocation rates, and employment sector is used to measure differing 
propensities to relocate jobs. New and moving agents choose locations from the existing 
available real estate in the Location Choice Models, using multinomial logit 
specifications.  
Real estate development, or the construction of new housing and non-residential floor 
space, has typically been modelled in UrbanSim as a multinomial logit transition model, 
where we predict the probability that a particular location will experience one of many 
types of real estate development events in a year. This specification has been recently 
changed to reflect the real estate development process as a location choice for a 
developer with specialized projects. 
Real estate prices are important in the model in that they capitalize locational 
amenities such as accessibility, and strongly influence the spatial distribution of 
households in the housing market and firms in the non-residential real estate market. In 
the current research, we use a semi-hedonic regression model that predicts housing 
prices as a function of location characteristics, demand and supply. 
 
 
METROPOLIS: a dynamic transportation model 
 
METROPOLIS is a fully dynamic transportation model that is particularly adapted for 
large networks. It is a mesoscopic event based model and uses a multi-agent 
methodology with a disaggregated representation of travellers. On the other hand, the 
supply system relies on a macroscopic formulation that computes travel time in function 
of the flow condition of the link. It has been developed since the 90’s and its main 
application on the Paris region has been the QUATUOR project (THEMA/TT&R, 98-
02). It models the mode, departure time and route choices. The Logit formula is used for 
these models. The dynamic assignment procedure can be deterministic or stochastic.  
 
The generalized cost function is: 
 
* *( ) ( ) max 0, max 0, , ( )d d a a a d dC t tt t t t t t t t tt tα β γ   = + − + − = +    . 
 
The generalized cost function C(.) includes the schedule delay cost terms in (t*-ta), 
where t* is the desired arrival time. Moreover ta and td denote arrival and departure 
times and tt is the travel time corresponding to the mode (private vehicle or public 
transport). The operator can enter some distributions for α (VOT), β and γ (penalties for 
arrival too late or too early) and t*. These behavioural parameters are the only 
information that is necessary in addition to data required by the classical static traffic 
models, such as network topology, link characteristics and O-D matrices. 
The other transportation modes (mainly public transit) are modelled in an aggregated 
and static way. For any pair of origin and destination zone centroids the travel time 
should be given in a matrix form. The trip cost is the sum of a constant part pPT that 
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represents the ticket fare or constant penalty of using public transport and a linear travel 
time-dependent part, αPT*ttPT. We denote the part of private cars by PPV, the generalized 
cost of private vehicles by GCPV and the mode choice heterogeneity factor by µm. The 
mode choice is described by a binary logit model: 
 [ ]
[ ] [ ]
exp /
,  where   *
exp / exp /
PV m
PV PT PT PT PT
PV m PT m
GC
P C tt p
GC C
µ αµ µ
−= = +− + − . 
 
The output of METROPOLIS that we mainly use in this project is the surplus for any 
traveller’s category and for any O-D pair. As the departure time choice is modelled by a 
continuous Logit model, the surplus is given by:  
 
 
 
where Ckij(t) is the time dependent generalized travel cost between zones i and j and 
where µT denotes the departure time choice heterogeneity parameter (see above), PV 
represents private vehicles and PT represents public transit (see de Palma and Marchal, 
2002 for details). 
 
 
Integrated model architecture 
 
We present in Figure 2 the architecture of the integrated system. The key information 
transferred between the traffic and the land use model is the travellers’ surplus matrix. 
To make a complete loop, we should feed a revised O-D matrix to the traffic model that 
is based on the new geographical distribution of population and jobs. This cycle is 
reproduced by time step that can correspond to one or more years according to the 
evolution of transportation system conditions and projects.  
 
 
Figure 2: Architecture for the integrated model. 
 
UrbanSim assigns locations (l) to jobs Es(τ) and households Ms(τ) generated by the 
macro-economic model in year τ, resulting in Esl(τ) and Msl(τ), which are used as inputs 
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to the travel model. Since the Origin-Destination (O-D) matrix is not directly provided 
by UrbanSim, a three step travel model is needed to build the O-D matrices that 
represent the trips generated by population and activities and their distribution on 
origins and destinations. This module develops an O-D matrix using three steps: 
 
− Trip emissions and attractions (by zone and travel segment), 
− Trip distribution (zone to zone by travel segment), 
− Mode choice: private vehicles and public transport. 
 
We use the specific demand model developed for the Paris region by IAURIF and 
which was calibrated with the last Global Transportation Survey in 2001. 
Data produced by METROPOLIS cannot be used directly by UrbanSim. A data 
preparation module is developed to convert these results to logsums and travel times for 
use by UrbanSim. In previous applications of UrbanSim with four-step travel models, 
the computation time of the travel models has prohibited the coupling of the models, 
usually by running the travel model only once in every 5 simulation years. Travel model 
run times of 18 hours or longer for one simulation year are not uncommon, mostly due 
to the computational burden in the traffic assignment component. Due to the 
computational efficiency of METROPOLIS, however, we interface the models every 
simulation year, providing a significant improvement in the model realism over prior 
integrated model applications. 
 
 
Descriptive analysis of the study area 
 
The Ile-de-France 
 
The Paris area, namely Ile-de-France Region, embraces Paris and its suburbs. The city 
of Paris has about 2 million inhabitants, on a regional total of 11 million. The total 
number of jobs is 5.1 million. It covers 4,610 sq. miles (12,000 sq. km). Ile-de-France 
Region occupies 2% of the surface of France and represents 19% of the population, 
22% of the jobs and 29% of the GDP of the country. There are 3 administrative 
divisions in Ile-de-France: 1 “région”, 8 “départements” (counties) and 1300 
“communes” (municipalities). In addition, we consider the 3 counties around Paris as 
close suburbs or “inner ring” and the 5 counties far away from Paris as far suburbs or 
“outer ring”. 
The land use is composed of built-up areas (30%), green areas (20%) and rural areas 
(50%). The public transportation network consists of: 
 
− A main radial railway network, especially the RER lines (high speed train service 
between Paris and the suburbs), 
− A subway network that provides comprehensive and timely service in the city 
centre, 
− A bus network to complement the rail services. 
 
The road network is organised into a hierarchy that is densely interconnected and 
often congested. The principal road network of the region is composed of 590 km of 
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motorways and 250 km of expressways, with a total of 4,500 lane-km. Road traffic 
flows attain the highest levels known all over the country. Despite the occasional rush-
hour traffic jams, traffic conditions are on the whole remarkably good for a metropolis 
of this size, since the average duration of all car trips is 19 minutes, and commute trips 
by car average 25 minutes (EGT, 2001). The mode market shares for the home based 
work trips (2001) are: 50% private vehicles, 36% public transit and 14% bicycle or 
walk. Over the last twenty years, the public transportation mode share has decreased by 
6% in the region, due principally to ongoing suburbanization of the region. 
 
 
Socio-economic characteristics 
 
Turning to a description of the socio-economic characteristics of the study area, and 
specifically focusing on households that have recently moved, Figure 3 presents the 
number of households according to the year of their last move. The mode is at 1998, the 
year just before the census. It should be noted that this cannot be seen as the distribution 
of how long the people live in housing units, since this duration is truncated here. These 
data confirm that many households remain in their locations for periods of ten years or 
longer, and support the argument that a partial adjustment approach is more plausible 
than a full, instantaneous adjustment to equilibrium. 
 
Figure 3: The distribution of the last move in year for the households living in Paris area in 1999. 
Source: Census 1999. 
 
The principle of multi-cored structure has been adopted for urban organisation to stem 
the rapid expansion of the agglomeration and to decentralize the jobs. So since 1965, the 
outer suburbs were structured around five poles, or “new cities”. Accordingly, 44% of 
the population surplus recorded in Ile-de-France between the 1975 and 1999 censuses, 
settled in these areas.  
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The analysis focuses on “recent movers”: households who settled or moved in the 
region recently, that is during year 1998. Among the 4,510,369 households living in the 
study area in March 1999, 589,355 moved during year 1998. Most of them (71%) are 
male headed. The “poor households” (that is, the 33% households in the region with the 
lowest per capita income, defined as household income divided by the square root of the 
number of persons in the household) are unevenly distributed in the region: only 26% of 
households living in district 78, located west of Paris; are poor, whereas this fraction 
goes up to 41% in district 93, located north-east of Paris. These same two districts 
contain the highest (38% in district 78) and the lowest (21% in district 93) proportions 
of rich households. 
Single-person households are highly concentrated in Paris city (52% of households in 
Paris are single). Between 25 to 30% percent of households of all the counties have two 
members. The larger families are better represented in rural counties in the far suburbs. 
25% percent of households have no working member. Among them, 28% percent live in 
Paris city. Near 50% of the families in far suburbs have two or more workers. Foreign 
households are concentrated in district 93 (19%), and are less represented in the larger 
ring (9%). 25% of households have a young head. They have a bigger share in Paris 
center and in district 92 (31% and 27%) and their part is uniform in other counties 
(23%). 
 
 
Housing prices 
 
Table 1 shows housing price data based on average prices of housing sales 
transactions for 1998 in each commune, using a weighted average of transactions of 
new and existing single-family houses and apartments. The data show important 
differences in average housing prices by district: prices are higher in Paris, intermediate 
in the close suburbs and decline in the more distant suburbs. In addition, prices are 
higher in the western part of the area than in the eastern part. 
Table 1: Prices by district. 
Sub-region District Average  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Paris  75  294,500  165,241  83,939    694,375 
 92 (West)  247,556  205,038  66,966  1,198,950 
 93 (North)  115,709    49,055  47,876    259,163 
Close Suburbs 
(inner ring)  
 94 (South)  144,098    74,603  53,356    373,499 
 78 (West)  135,122    65,714  38,112    373,815 
 91 (South)  114,826    46,740  24,719    332,338 
 95 (North)  104,375    41,670  25,154    241,692 
Far away 
suburbs 
(outer ring) 
 77 (East)   91,539    37,220  18,028    253,827 
Source: Author’s computations from notaries’ database. 
 
 
Accessibility 
 
Figure 4 presents the average travel time in minutes from any city in the region by 
private vehicles and by public transit. The Paris boroughs are at the left of the figure and 
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the cities in the farthest Parisian suburbs are at the right hand side. The correlation 
between private vehicle and public transit average travel times is 0.97. 
Figure 4: The average travel time for people travelling from any city. 
Source: METROPOLIS simulation results. 
 
 
Residential migration patterns 
 
Table 2 and figure 5 present the origin and destination rings and counties for the 
moves during 1998. A majority of the moves has taken place in the same district, 
although households who move to Paris rather come from outside Ile-de-France. The 
most important part of the moves has been into Paris from outside of the region. After 
Paris, the outsiders go mostly to 92 in the close suburb that provides almost the same 
features as Paris. We do not observe out-migration from the Ile-de-France. 
Table 2: The distribution of moves between different rings (origin by destination). 
  Origin district  
Current District   Outside Paris C. S. F. S. 
Total 
Frequency 77.579 67.027 18.192 18.023 180.821 Paris 
Percent 42.9% 37.1% 10.1% 10.0% 30.68% 
Frequency 61.135 22.633 103.205 20.168 207.141 Close Suburbs 
Percent 29.5% 10.9% 49.8% 9.7% 35.15% 
Frequency 49.936 9.299 23.967 118.191 201.393 Far Suburbs 
Percent 24.8% 4.6% 11.9% 58.7% 34.17% 
Frequency 188.650 98.959 145.364 156.382 589.355 Region 
Percent 32.01% 16.79% 24.66% 26.53% 100.00% 
Source: Census, 1999. 
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Figure 5: The distribution of moves between different counties en 1998. 
Source: Census, 1999. 
 
 
Model specification 
 
In this section we develop the specification of the model components that comprise 
the focus of the paper: household residential location choice and housing price. 
 
 
Household residential location choice model. 
 
The commune j, j=1,…,1300 contains Cj dwellings (housing units). We assume that 
all the dwellings i located in commune j have the same observable attributes, and 
therefore the same expected utility h hi jV V=  for household h, h=1,…,N. The total 
number of dwellings in Ile-de-France is denoted by I. 
The probability for household h to choose a dwelling i is given by the Multinomial 
Logit formula:  
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Since all the dwellings located in j have the same expected utility (since we do not 
have information on structural attributes of the housing units), and the same probability 
of being selected, Equation (1) implies that the probability that household h selects 
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Under the IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) assumption, one can obtain 
consistent estimates of β (the preference parameters of hjV ) by selecting a random 
sample of alternatives, with uniform sampling of alternatives, provided the correcting 
term ( )log jC  is added to the likelihood. However, more efficient estimates can be 
obtained with importance sampling of alternatives, that is if the probability that 
alternative j is included in the choice set is proportional to Cj, provided a second 
correcting term ( )log jC−  is added to the likelihood. Since the two terms ( )log jC  and 
( )log jC−  exactly compensate, no correcting factor is necessary to obtain consistent 
estimates of β when importance sampling is used (see Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985 for 
details on this section). 
 
 
Housing price model and endogeneity 
 
One of the major factors affecting location choice is the price, which we predict using a 
semi-hedonic regression on the natural log of total price:  
 
1 2 3ln j j j jP X S Dλ λ λ= + + , 
 
where the demand Dj and supply Sj levels are explicitly taken into account (in log form) 
and in which Xj is the vector of local characteristics. 
Housing price depends on the supply and demand for housing, and demand depends 
on price, so the two models (location choice and price) should be estimated jointly in 
order to correct for the potential bias implied by the endogeneity of prices Pj. The bias is 
tested for and corrected using the method proposed by Blundell and Smith (1989), 
which simply consists of introducing the residuals from the price equation in the 
location choice equation.  
We therefore develop an iterative procedure in which prices depend on estimated 
demand and demand depends on observed price and price residual. We denote by 
h h
i jX X=  the vector of commune attributes (except price), possibly crossed with 
household characteristics, and we assume a linear formulation for expected utility: 
h h
i i j hV X Pβ δ= + , where β denotes a vector of parameters, to be estimated, and δh 
corresponds to the marginal utility of price, which may depend on household 
characteristics. The expected demand for commune j is then: 
1
N h
j jh
D == ∑ P . The vector 
of other commune attributes influencing price is denoted by Zj, and we assume a log-
linear formulation, so that the price equation is of the form: j j j jP Z Dγ λ ε= + + .  
In order to test and correct for the endogeneity of prices, Equation (1) is replaced by:  
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where no correction factor is necessary if importance sampling is used. 
 
 
Empirical results 
 
Application of METROPOLIS to the Paris region 
 
To model the Paris region, we have used the road network coded by IAURIF 
(Institute for urban planning and development of the Paris Ile-de-France region). The 
coded network had 606 zones and 17957 links. The morning peak hour O-D matrix 
includes 970,000 trips. We have multiplied the peak hour O-D matrix by relevant 
factors to cover the whole day. The trips were divided by their purpose: work trips and 
others. 
To obtain the dynamic behavioural parameters a survey, MADDIF, was conducted, 
(Fontan, 2003) in 2000. 4200 individuals were surveyed by telephone. It provided the 
distribution of schedule delay penalties, the Logit heterogeneity parameter proportional 
to VOT (value of time, for which the official value of 12.96 Euros per hour was taken) 
and the distribution of desired arrival time. 
 
Table 3: The Paris Region Transportation Model Predictions. 
Variable Values 
Travel time [min] 32.50 
Free flow travel time [min] 24.34 
Congested delay [min] 8.16 
Early arrival delay [min] 28.28 
Late arrival delay [min] 19.07 
Average velocity [km/h] 28.90 
Early arrivals percentage[%] 47.25 
Late arrival percentage [%] 33.15 
Average cost [€] 9.47 
Free flow travel time cost [€] 5.26 
Waiting time cost [€] 1.76 
Average schedule delay cost [€] 2.45 
Traffic volume [million de veh. x km]  63.70 
Average travelled distance [km] 17.51 
Number of links passed by a traveller 17.61 
Congestion index 28.85 
Source: METROPOLIS simulation results. 
 
 
Housing price 
 
The estimated coefficients for housing price model are presented in table 4. The R² for 
the model is 0.53. We obtain the expected signs for demand and supply but they are not 
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exactly opposed. A purely structural equation (results not reported here, available on 
request) with only supply and demand gives coefficients exactly opposed, which means 
that the price only depends on the supply/demand ratio, and not separately on supply 
and demand. Once covariates are added, however, the coefficients on demand and 
supply are no longer equal in absolute terms, because the covariates are more correlated 
with demand.  
A decrease in average travel time significantly increases the price: 10 minutes less 
travel time to work imply a 2.8% increase in housing price. The price is very sensitive 
to socio-economic structure of the commune: a 10% increase in the proportion of one-
member households causes a 50% increase of the price. A similar 10% increase for the 
proportion of two-member households results in a 19% increase of the price (note that 
effects of households with one or two members should be interpreted with reference to 
the omitted fraction of households with three or more members). Similarly, the fraction 
of households with no or only one working member has a positive effect on the price. 
Strangely enough, the fraction of foreign households has a positive effect on price. We 
should notice however, that the data do not distinguish the nationality of the foreigners, 
and make no difference between OECD countries and third world ones. Finally, we 
notice the negative and highly significant effect of the proportion of low and 
intermediate income families on the price. 
Table 4: housing price estimation results 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 11.02668 0.12800 86.14 <.0001 
Log(Supply) -0.04791 0.02466 -1.94 0.0522 
Log(Demand) 0.09918 0.02244 4.42 <.0001 
Average travel time from j to work (minutes) -0.00280 0.00085119 -3.28 0.0011 
% households with 1 member 5.09136 0.37884 13.44 <.0001 
% households with 2 members 1.87960 0.34135 5.51 <.0001 
% households with no working member 1.25241 0.30954 4.05 <.0001 
% households with 1 working member 0.82300 0.33762 2.44 0.0149 
% poor households  -6.63187 0.50316 -13.18 <.0001 
% households with medium income -4.54311 0.33102 -13.72 <.0001 
% households with a foreign head 1.58406 0.36279 4.37 <.0001 
Source: Authors estimations’ results (using SAS). 
 
Location choice 
 
Table 5 contains the results of the residential location choice model estimation. With a 
pseudo-R² of 22% this model has a moderate explanatory power. This estimation has 
been performed on a 20% sample of total moved households in order to improve the 
computational tractability of the model.  
We notice the very significant role of the “same district as before” variable. This 
shows the strong preference of the households to move in the same district or 
neighbourhood in which they lived before. Testing the effect of the distance from last 
residence may be interesting but it was not possible with our available data. The Paris 
dummy variable has a negative coefficient, indicating that, ceteris paribus, the 
households who live in Paris and decide to move have a slightly higher probability of 
relocating to a district outside Paris than do residents living outside Paris. Note that this 
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is consistent with the intra-metropolitan migration patterns shown in Table 2 and Figure 
5, and with general expectations that households moving into the region, and new 
households formed within the region locate initially within Paris, and may relocate to 
suburban neighbourhoods later. Note, however, that some of the other variables in the 
model, such as better accessibility in Paris, tend to have effects that at least partially 
offset this suburbanization preference, while others, such as housing prices, tend to 
reinforce it.  
As expected, housing price has a negative effect on location preference for a 
commune. This effect increases with the age of the household head and decreases as the 
household income increases. The older heads of households are more sensitive to price 
and the richer households are less sensitive to it. Since price is entered using three 
variables to capture average effects as well as interactions with age and income, the 
combined effects are complex. We note that the average price effect as well as the age 
and income interactions, all have expected signs. However, for a small subset of the 
population, namely very young and very rich households, the net price effect from the 
interaction of these three coefficients would be predicted by this model to show a slight 
positive preference for higher prices in communes where they the neighbouring 
households are in the same socio-economic category and which have more amenities.  
Table 5: residential location choice estimation results 
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value 
Same district as before move 2.5461 0.009353 272.24 <.0001 
Paris -0.2988 0.0267 -11.19 <.0001 
Log(Price) -1.7285 0.1009 -17.14 <.0001 
Log(Price)* (Age-20)/10 -0.0653 0.004695 -13.92 <.0001 
Log(Price)* Log(Income) 0.1783 0.0100 17.78 <.0001 
Number Railway stations -0.0129 0.002838 -4.56 <.0001 
Number Subway stations  0.007070 0.001300 5.44 <.0001 
Average travel time from j, commuting (TC) 0.000561 0.000483 1.16 0.2457 
TC*(Dummy female) -0.006842 0.000697 -9.82 <.0001 
Average travel time from j, by private car (VP) -0.001391 0.000481 -2.89 0.0038 
Distance to highway [km] -0.003392 6.273E-7 -5.41 <.0001 
% households with 1 member * 1 member in h 2.6327 0.0851 30.95 <.0001 
% households with 2 members* 2 members in h 0.9366 0.3060 3.06 0.0022 
% households with 3+ members* 3+ member in h 3.2437 0.0810 40.03 <.0001 
% hh with no working member * no working member 
in h 
6.1790 0.2287 27.02 <.0001 
% hh with 1 working member * 1 working member in 
h 
0.3384 0.1455 2.33 0.0201 
% hh with 2+ working member * 2+ working member 
in h 
0.7132 0.1078 6.61 <.0001 
% hh with a young head -0.0147 0.1335 -0.11 0.9122 
% hh with a young head * young head in h 4.7947 0.1351 35.50 <.0001 
% poor households 0.3853 0.1706 2.26 0.0240 
% households with a foreign head * foreign head in h 6.2094 0.1622 38.28 <.0001 
% households with a foreign head * French head in h -2.7905 0.1007 -27.70 <.0001 
Total employment [/1000] -0.0001349 2.348E-7 -0.57 0.5657 
Density (Population/Surface) [1000 persons/km] -0.004621 1.0479E-6 -4.41 <.0001 
Log(Population) 0.0931 0.005506 16.90 <.0001 
% change in population, 1990 to 1999 0.0931 0.0168 5.54 <.0001 
Source: Authors estimations’ results (using SAS). 
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The relative sensitivity to price is as we would expect, though the potential for a small 
positive preference for higher prices for this specific subpopulation and sample of 
locations is likely to be due to some amenities that are not accounted for in the model, 
rather than an actual preference to may more for housing, ceteris paribus. Increase of the 
average travel time by public transit decreases the utility of households headed by a 
woman, though this effect is insignificant for male-headed households.  
The number of metro stations in a commune increases the probability of location but 
the number of railway stations decreases it, after accounting for transit accessibility and 
other effects. These results may reflect the relative effects of positive and negative 
externalities associated with metro stations and railway stations. Metro stations are more 
likely than railway stations to be located within clusters of shopping and service 
employment or adjacent to major cultural attractions, and railway stations are larger and 
may be more likely to have negative localized externalities on the immediate 
neighbourhood, such as traffic, noise, and possibly petty crime. The average travel time 
by private car and the distance to the highway have a negative effect on the preference 
for a commune, as expected. 
The estimated coefficients corresponding to the socio-economic structure of the 
commune show a general preference of the households to live with the people in the 
same social category. This preference is very strong for households without workers, or 
with a foreign or young head. The households with one worker are less sensitive to the 
concentration of similar households. Households of French origin tend to avoid 
locations in which there are higher concentrations of foreign households. The 
coefficients for the percentage of young head households and the total number of 
employments are insignificant. Households prefer more populated but less dense 
communes. The communes that have absorbed more population during the 90-99 period 
attract still more households. Considering these variables the composition of the 
population with regard to income does not remarkably influence the location choice of 
households. But the density of high, middle and low income families can be studied if 
we don’t take into account the total population, its density and its evolution. 
Adding the residuals of the price equation as an explanatory variable, the estimated 
coefficients change trivially and the coefficient of this new variable is not at all 
significant. This result confirms that housing price is not endogenous with regard to the 
location choice model. In other words, the variables used in these two models fully 
explain the correlation between prices and location choice.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The research on which we report in this paper is from an early phase of a longer-term 
research collaboration to explore the interaction of land use and transportation. Our 
particular emphasis is on issues of dynamics, endogeneity and constraints. We have now 
succeeded in developing and estimating a model of residential location at a commune 
level for the Paris region, with a rigorous econometric treatment of the endogeneity of 
housing prices. Further, we have integrated UrbanSim with METROPOLIS, providing 
the first experience of connecting dynamic models of land use and traffic. By coupling 
these models we are able to represent the endogeneity of residential location and traffic, 
given a distribution of job locations. In related research, we are developing employment 
location choice models and real estate development models for the Paris region, and will 
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address the endogeneity among these choice processes. We are also developing a 
rigorous theoretical and empirical treatment of the problem of endogenous constraints 
on the availability of alternatives, where demand may exceed the supply of housing 
within popular neighbourhoods. In this field, there is a need to distinguish between 
unconstrained and constrained demand, and traditionally used estimation procedures 
tend to confound these two concepts (for a complete treatment of this topic, we refer the 
reader to de Palma, Picard and Waddell, 2006). 
This research is in progress, and it is likely to evolve substantially as it moves to 
completion and into an operational framework for exploring the potential effects of 
combinations of transportation and land use policies. We hope that this line of research 
provides a valuable future direction for the integrated treatment of land use and 
transportation, and advances the state of the field by better representing these as 
dynamic processes with substantial endogeneity.  
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Abstract 
 
A proposal has been made to build a new tunnel under the Scheldt river near the centre of Antwerp in 
order to relieve traffic congestion on the ring road and in an existing tunnel. The new tunnel is expected 
to cost more than €1 billion, and tolls have been suggested to help finance construction and to manage 
demand. This paper conducts a preliminary cost-benefit analysis of a new tunnel and three alternative 
tolling schemes, and compares them with a do-nothing scenario and an option to toll the existing tunnel 
without building a new one. The two tunnels are treated as imperfect substitutes, and a multi-year 
accounting framework is adopted that accounts for emissions, accidents and noise externalities, road 
damage, revenues accruing to the national and regional governments from existing transport user charges, 
and the salvage value of the new tunnel. With the base-case parameter values it is found that building the 
tunnel is worthwhile with all three tolling regimes and yields a higher benefit than not building the tunnel 
and tolling the old one. Nevertheless, the net benefit from building the tunnel differs appreciably between 
tolling regimes, and it is sensitive to the value assumed for the marginal cost of public funds. 
 
Keywords: Infrastructure investment; Route choice; Congestion; Tolls. 
 
 
Introduction  
Urban traffic congestion is a serious and growing problem in many large cities around 
the world. The traditional response to congestion, building new roads, is now impeded 
or prevented by lack of space, high construction costs and long-lead times, 
environmental concerns and NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) opposition. Emphasis has 
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shifted since the 1980s towards demand-management approaches to controlling use of 
the car, and road pricing has slowly been gaining ground as demonstrated by successful 
urban road pricing schemes in Singapore, Norway, London, Melbourne, Hong Kong, 
North America and elsewhere. However, road pricing in urban areas is still obstructed 
by acceptability and other barriers that led to the rejection by referendum in February, 
2005, of a cordon scheme for Edinburgh. Most transport researchers now argue that a 
package approach of investment and demand-side measures has the best chance of 
meeting both traditional efficiency-based standards for policy appraisal and 
public/political acceptability hurdles. 
Given the large expenditures and potentially high political stakes in building new 
roads and designing tolling schemes, the need for careful cost-benefit and appraisal is 
obvious. This is all the more true for combined investment and tolling projects or 
schemes whose component parts need to be integrated into a consistent whole. For 
example, it is well known that the welfare gains from capacity investments depend on 
what pricing regime is in place (Small et al., 1989; Winston, 1991) and that building 
new infrastructure can have perverse effects (e.g. the Braess Paradox) if congestion and 
other transport externalities are not internalised.  
The purpose of this paper is to conduct an exploratory cost-benefit analysis of 
alternative tunnel investment cum tolling schemes in Antwerp, Belgium. Traffic in 
Antwerp is heavy on weekdays, and congestion is particularly severe on one of the 
tunnels that cross under the Scheldt river near the city centre. A proposal has been made 
to construct a new tunnel to alleviate congestion through the existing tunnel, and to 
offer a shorter route for some of the passenger and freight traffic. Tolls on the existing 
and new tunnels have also been suggested as a way to manage congestion as well as to 
pay for the construction and maintenance costs of the new tunnel. To assess the relative 
merits of these proposals, a recently-developed cost-benefit model is used to evaluate 
one toll-only and three investment cum tolling regimes, and to compare each scheme 
with a do-nothing/business-as-usual scenario. With the base-case parameter values and 
assumptions, constructing the new tunnel is found to be worthwhile for all three tolling 
regimes. Nevertheless, the net benefit from building the tunnel and the impacts on 
passenger and freight user groups vary appreciably across the tolling regimes. 
 
 
1. Tunnel construction and tolling options in Antwerp 
 
Antwerp straddles the Scheldt river as shown in Figure 1. Four tunnels cross the 
Scheldt in the general neighbourhood of the proposed new tunnel: two very small 
tunnels in the city centre (the St. Anna tunnel and the Waasland tunnel), the Kennedy 
tunnel to the south and the Liefkenshoek tunnel far north of the city. Several bridges 
also cross the Scheldt far to the south. Of these tunnels and bridges the two major 
crossings are the Kennedy tunnel and the Liefkenshoek tunnel. The Kennedy tunnel lies 
on the ring road R1 that circles the centre of Antwerp to the east of the Scheldt. The 
Kennedy tunnel conveys a daily two-way flow of about 122,000 vehicles. The 
Liefkenshoek tunnel lies far to the north of the city, and it carries a much smaller daily 
flow of about 11,000 vehicles. 
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A proposal has been made to build an additional tunnel under the Scheldt between the 
Kennedy and Liefkenshoek tunnels. The future tunnel1, known as the “Oosterweel” 
connection, would branch off the ring road R1 and offer a shorter route for traffic 
heading to or from the north of Antwerp. R1 is a crossroad for several motorways, and it 
is heavily used by cars and for national and international/transit freight transport. 
Building a new tunnel would alleviate traffic congestion through the Kennedy tunnel 
and on the ring road generally. 
The new tunnel is expected to cost about €1.2 billion. One option is to fund it 
publicly, and another is to solicit private financing with cost recovery through tolls. The 
Liefkenshoek tunnel is toll-financed, and offers a local precedent for private-sector 
involvement with road construction and operation. However, tolling is politically 
controversial and may be opposed by truckers and other interest groups. It is therefore 
of interest to compare several alternative investment cum tolling regimes. Five 
candidates are: (1) do nothing and continue with business as usual; (2) refrain from 
building the new tunnel, but toll the Kennedy tunnel to alleviate congestion in the tunnel 
and on the ring road; (3) build the new tunnel and let traffic use both tunnels toll-free; 
(4) have the new tunnel built by the private sector and toll it on a cost-recovery basis; 
and (5) build the new tunnel and toll both tunnels to support an optimal overall level and 
division of traffic between the tunnels.2 
Toll collection costs and potential cost savings from harnessing the private sector 
aside, the socially-optimal (i.e. social-surplus maximising) choice would be either 
Option 2 or Option 5 depending on whether or not a new tunnel is warranted. Option 4 
is feasible only if demand to use the new tunnel is sufficient to generate adequate toll 
revenues when the Kennedy tunnel offers a toll-free substitute. And, even if Option 4 is 
viable, an allocative efficiency loss will result if the break-even toll on the new tunnel 
exceeds the second-best optimal toll. 
Comparison of the various alternatives is complicated by the system of road 
administration in Belgium. Belgium is a federal country with three regions (Flanders, 
Wallonia and Brussels). The regions are responsible for road infrastructure, but the 
principal taxes on road use (the excise taxes on fuel) are federal. Decisions at the two 
levels of government are not perfectly coordinated, and current fuel excise taxes differ 
from optimal Pigouvian levels for internalising environmental and other traffic 
externalities. Because the proposed tunnel would add only one short link to the overall 
road network, it is unlikely that building the tunnel would trigger a change in fuel tax 
rates or other user charges. Thus, transport taxes other than for tolls on the two tunnels 
are treated as given in the study. 
From this discussion it should be clear that a model is required to analyse and 
compare the competing tunnel construction and tolling options. The model is described 
in the following section. 
 
                                                 
1 For brevity it is called a tunnel here, but it is actually a combination of a tunnel and a bridge. 
2 Several other regimes could be entertained. One is to compensate the private concessionaire in Option 4 
through shadow tolls; i.e. a payment per vehicle that is funded from the public purse rather than from real 
tolls on users. Another regime is a mixed oligopoly in which the new tunnel is tolled by the 
concessionaire (perhaps under toll cap or rate-of-return regulations rather than strict cost recovery) and 
the Kennedy tunnel is tolled by the public authority. These and other alternatives could be explored in 
future work. 
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Figure 1: The ring road of Antwerp. 
 
2. The model 
 
The model (referred to as “MOLINO”) was recently developed as part of the 
European-Union funded REVENUE project to assess transport pricing, investments and 
regulatory regimes with emphasis on the allocation of revenues from user charges. The 
model is used in the REVENUE project for a variety of case studies that involve several 
modes. Since the model has to be applicable to many diverse problems, it is kept rather 
abstract and general. The present model version still has limited capabilities (in 
particular, it is limited to competition between two alternatives) and this application is 
one of the first tests of the model. The application needs further elaboration with respect 
to data and sensitivity analysis. 
 
 
Structure of the MOLINO model 
 
The MOLINO model is a policy assessment model, not a forecasting model. It is 
calibrated to an exogenous transport baseline that can be developed with any transport 
forecasting model. The time horizon, which can be chosen by the user, typically covers 
10 to 50 years. MOLINO is a partial equilibrium model of the transport market: income 
levels of the private transport users, and production levels of the firms using freight 
services as input, are taken as given. The model includes separate modules for demand, 
supply, equilibrium, and the regulatory framework. In its present form the model 
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contains two transport modes (e.g. two parallel roads, a road and parallel railway, a 
railway and competing air link, etc.).  
The demand module for passenger transport features an aggregate nested CES utility 
function with three levels: choice between transport and consumption of a composite 
commodity, choice between peak and off-peak periods, and choice between the two 
transport alternatives. Elasticities of substitution at each level are parametrically given. 
Passengers can be segmented into classes that differ with respect to their travel 
preferences, incomes and costs of travel time. The demand module for freight transport 
is based on an aggregate CES cost function (production levels are given) and also 
features three levels. The first level encompasses choice between transport and other 
production inputs, and the second and third levels are the same as for passenger 
transport. Freight transport can be segmented into local and transit traffic. 
Transport users pay a generalised cost that contains several components: a resource 
cost (say fuel for a car), taxes levied by central and local governments (say fuel taxes 
and car taxes), a user fee (toll or rail fare) and a time cost. For a given infrastructure, 
travel time is assumed to be a linear function of traffic flows. 
For each transport alternative a distinction can be made between an operator who 
takes care of maintenance and can set tolls or user charges, and an infrastructure 
supplier who decides on capacity extensions and on infrastructure charges. The costs of 
the operator have a linear structure: a fixed cost, constant variable maintenance and 
operation costs that depend on the type of vehicle or load, and finally a payment for 
infrastructure use that can be specified in different ways. The infrastructure provider 
also has a linear cost structure where the main costs are the investment and associated 
financial costs for the infrastructure. Operator and infrastructure suppliers can be private 
or public agents, and the cost level can depend on the contractual form.  
The model includes a local and a central government that can pursue different 
objectives and control different tax and subsidy instruments including fuel taxes, public 
transport subsidies and profit taxes. Given the demand and cost functions, and the 
regulatory framework (see below) that specifies the behaviour of the governments, 
operators and infrastructure suppliers, the equilibrium module computes a fixed-point 
solution in terms of prices and levels of congestion for the two transport alternatives. In 
its present version the model has myopic expectations and is solved year by year.  
It is the exogenous regulatory framework that dictates the rules of the game and the 
ultimate outcome. This exogenous framework specifies for each alternative the 
objective functions of the governments, operators and infrastructure managers (public or 
private objectives), the nature of competition, procurement policies, the cost of capital, 
and the source and use of transport tax revenues. Various market structures can be 
modeled, including no tolls (free access), exogenous tolls, marginal social cost pricing, 
private duopoly and mixed oligopoly. Public decisions can be made either by local or 
central governments that may attach different welfare-distributional weights to agents 
(e.g. low-income vs. high-income passengers, or local vs. transit freight traffic) as well 
as different weights to air pollution and other (non-congestion) external transport costs. 
Primary outputs from MOLINO are equilibrium prices, transport volumes, travel times, 
cost efficiency of operations, toll revenues and financial balances, travellers’ surplus 
and social welfare. 
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Application of the model to the Antwerp tunnels 
The existing version of the model allows only two transport alternatives. Given the 
structure of the road network described in Section 1, these are selected as the Kennedy 
tunnel and the proposed Oosterweel connection. Henceforth they will be referred to 
respectively as the OLD tunnel and the NEW tunnel. The model therefore neglects the 
other tunnels and bridges, as well as the effects of changes in the transport flows 
through the two tunnels on other parts of the network. 3 The elasticity of substitution 
between the OLD and NEW tunnels is assumed to be finite because the model provides 
an aggregate behavioural representation of users with different origins/destinations and 
potential travel time savings from using the NEW tunnel (cf Figure 1). 
A time horizon of 20 years is chosen starting in 2000: the latest year for which 
calibration data are available. If the NEW tunnel is built, it is assumed to become 
available in 2010 and a salvage value for it is computed at the end of the horizon in 
2020. An annual social discount rate of 5% is used to compute present values.4 
 
User groups 
The model features two groups of passenger/car users and two groups of freight users. 
One group of car users is assumed to comprise commuters and travelers on business 
with high values of time; this type of traffic is referred to as work trips. The second 
group of car users have lower values of time and/or more flexibility in the timing of 
their trips, and are referred to as other users. Freight traffic is divided into transit traffic, 
and local traffic. For this preliminary case study the two freight groups are assumed to 
have the same behavioural parameters and are assigned the same weights in the welfare 
function. The two freight groups therefore fare identically in the various investment cum 
toll regimes. Freight vehicles have a Passenger Car Equivalent (PCE) of 2.0. Both 
passenger and freight traffic volumes are assumed to grow at 1% per annum, which is 
the growth rate commonly accepted for Belgian traffic. 
 
Infrastructure costs and operation 
The NEW tunnel is assumed to cost €1.2 billion to complete by Year 10. It is assumed 
to have a lifetime of 100 years, and with the 5% discount rate it has a salvage value of 
€751,055 at the end of Year 20. 
 
Externalities 
Every trip generates congestion externalities as well as air pollution, noise and 
accident externalities. (Values per vehicle-kilometre are specified in the Appendix.) In 
addition, freight vehicles create pavement damage of €0.27/vkm.5 
 
                                                 
3 Adding the small existing tunnels to the analysis would not change the traffic effects very much since 
these alternatives are already taken into account in the substitution patterns (demand functions) for the 
two tunnels considered. The welfare effects would change slightly if one of the other existing tunnels 
were tolled since the toll revenues derived from it would drop when a new tunnel is built. 
4 A five percent annual discount rate is used by the public sector in Belgium for cost benefit analysis. 
5 It could be argued that transit and local traffic should be treated separately since transit trucks tend to be 
heavier. Unfortunately, data limitations precluded a distinction. 
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Tolling costs and procedures 
Differentiating tolls by vehicle size is common on both conventional and electronic 
toll roads around the world. This is the practice on the Liefkenshoek tunnel, and it is 
assumed to be implemented on the OLD and NEW tunnels if they are tolled. However, 
there is no discrimination between automobile travellers on work trips and other trips6 
or between local and transit freight traffic. In the regimes with tolls, trucks are required 
to cover at least their pavement-damage related maintenance costs.7 In this application, 
the installation and operating costs of toll facilities are ignored8 and infrastructure 
management and toll operation are assumed to be vertically integrated. 
The remaining parameter values and data used to calibrate the model are presented in 
the Appendix. 
 
 
3. Simulation results 
 
This section reports the simulation results for the do-nothing and the four investment 
cum tolling regimes. For ease of reference the five regimes are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Alternative investment cum tolling regimes. 
Regime Investment policy Tolling policy 
1 Business as Usual (BAU) No NEW tunnel built OLD tunnel remains toll-free 
2 NEW tunnel not built, 
tolling of OLD tunnel 
″ OLD tunnel is tolled to internalise 
congestion and other transport 
externalities from traffic using the 
OLD tunnel 
3 NEW tunnel built, no tolling NEW tunnel built by 
public sector 
Neither tunnel is tolled 
4 NEW tunnel built & tolled 
to recover costs 
NEW tunnel built by 
private sector  
NEW tunnel is tolled to recover its 
construction costs 
5 NEW tunnel built, both 
tunnels tolled 
NEW tunnel built by 
public sector  
Tolls are levied on both tunnels to 
internalise congestion and other 
transport externalities on the two-
link road network 
                                                 
6 Under first-best conditions the optimal congestion toll depends only on a vehicle’s contribution to 
congestion. Although motorists on work trips typically have higher values of time (and correspondingly 
lower sensitivity to tolls) than do motorists traveling for other reasons, the marginal external congestion 
costs they create are the same. In a second-best world, though, discriminatory pricing has a potential role 
to play in enhancing efficiency (Arnott and Kraus, 1998). Toll discounts for work trips have been 
endorsed on the grounds that work is discouraged by high employment taxes and other labour-market 
distortions. However, price discrimination of this sort is impeded by legal, practicality and acceptability 
barriers. Furthermore, labour-market and other distortions are largely ignored in the application of the 
MOLINO model undertaken here. 
7 EU legislation on heavy vehicle charges is still evolving. Nevertheless, the assumption that trucks are 
charged for their marginal maintenance costs is consistent with the currently accepted principle that tolls 
must be related to construction and maintenance costs and can vary by vehicle type. 
8 Operating costs of existing electronic systems generally run at about 10-20% of toll revenues (Small and 
Gómez-Ibáñez, 1998; Ramjerdi et al., 2004). London’s congestion pricing scheme is a notable exception 
with much higher operating costs because employees are required to aid motorists with some forms of 
payment and to read the license-plate images recorded by the Automatic Number Plate Recognition 
technology. 
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Regime 1: Business as Usual (BAU) 
In the Business as Usual (BAU) regime, no NEW tunnel is built and the OLD tunnel 
remains toll-free. The number of daily PCE trips through the OLD tunnel begins at 
about 117,000 in Year 1, and rises to nearly 128,000 in Year 20. This growth reflects 
the combined effect of an assumed 1% annual growth rate in traffic with congestion 
held constant, and a build-up in congestion that depends on tunnel capacity. Column 1 
of Table 2 reports the present-discounted daily benefits and costs from usage of the 
tunnel over the 20-year horizon at a 5% annual discount rate. Auto travel surplus and 
freight travel costs are recorded as a benchmark to compare with the welfare changes 
that result in the other four regimes. The regional government incurs the maintenance 
costs of the OLD tunnel, and both regional and national governments collect revenue 
from transport taxes. 
 
Table (2): Welfare gains and losses (present-value daily sums in euros over 20 year horizon, 5% discount 
rate). 
Regime 1 (BAU) 2 3 4 5 
 Welfare 
levels Welfare changes 
Construct NEW tunnel? No No Yes Yes Yes 
Tolling of tunnels None OLD, optimal None 
NEW, 
break even 
OLD+NEW, 
optimal 
Auto travellers' surplus      
   Work trips 24.728.541 -694.943 1.604.221 786.603 1.191.196 
   Other trips 12.131.229 -366.582 431.486 57.876 274.971 
Freight users' costs      
   Local traffic 30.328.753 -786.929 807.656 274.446 -16.169 
   Transit traffic 14.938.043 -387.592 397.801 135.175 -7.964 
External costs other 
than congestion 1.367.587 283.525 -163.238 22.407 67.458 
Toll revenues      
   OLD tunnel 0 2.559.706 0 0 1.519.475 
   NEW tunnel 0 0 0 1.035.077 388.803 
Tax revenues      
   Regional government 344.188 -67.027 41.192 -5.088 -6.438 
   Central government 1.809.742 -356.431 216.487 -27.262 -43.593 
Maintenance & 
construct. costs      
   OLD tunnel 1.091.096 283.077 344.651 147.780 541.523 
   NEW tunnel 0 0 -2.491.796 -2.141.006 -2.367.656 
Salvage value: NEW 
tunnel 0 0 751.055 751.055 751.055 
Welfare gain N/A 466.804 1.939.515 1.037.063 2.292.661 
Welfare gain relative to 
Regime 5 0 20% 85% 45% 100% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Positive entries correspond to welfare gains and negative entries to welfare losses. 
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Regime 2: NEW tunnel not built, tolling of OLD tunnel 
In Regime 2 the NEW tunnel is again not built, but a Pigouvian toll is levied on the 
OLD tunnel. To economise on calculation, optimal tolls are computed for two years: 
Year 1 and Year 10. The Year 1 toll is levied from Year 1 to Year 9, and the Year 10 
toll from Year 10 until the end of the horizon in Year 20.9 Optimal toll levels in the two 
intervals are reported in Table 3. As explained in Section 2, the same toll is levied on 
auto trips regardless of trip purpose and the same toll is applied on the two categories of 
freight traffic. Two features of the tolls in each interval may appear odd. First, the ratio 
of peak to off-peak tolls is much higher for autos than for trucks. Second, truck tolls are 
3-7 times larger than auto tolls although trucks have a PCE of 2, and therefore 
contribute only twice as much to congestion apiece as do autos. Both these oddities are 
due to the fact that trucks create substantial pavement damage costs that are not charged 
in the BAU regime, but are included in the tolls. 
Table 4 reports traffic volumes in Regime 2 for each user group for the peak period, 
the off-peak period and all trips as a percentage of volumes in Regime 1 (BAU). Total 
PCE traffic declines by about 20%. Auto volumes decline proportionally more for other 
trips than for work trips because values of travel time are much lower for other trips, 
and the benefits from congestion relief are correspondingly smaller. Freight volumes 
decline rather more than auto trips because of the much higher truck tolls. 
Column 2 of Table 2 reports the present-value changes in daily surpluses. Positive 
values indicate welfare gains, and negative values indicate welfare losses. Before 
accounting for the use of the toll revenues, all four user groups are worse off because 
the monetary values of the travel-time savings are more than offset by the tolls. The 
total losses are relatively evenly spread between passenger and freight traffic. External 
costs of traffic fall10 although the benefits are fairly small compared to users’ losses. 
Regional government is the big gainer since it receives the (sizeable) toll revenues that 
more than offset the increase in maintenance costs and the small loss of other tax 
revenues. The national government sees a modest reduction in fuel tax revenues.  
The overall present-value of the daily welfare gain from tolling the OLD tunnel 
amounts to €466,804. A welfare gain is inevitable given the assumptions that tolls are 
set optimally and tolling is costless.11 However, the gain is only 20% of the gain derived 
from Regime 5 discussed below (see the last row of Table 2). Moreover, all four user 
groups are left worse off, and their aggregate losses of nearly €2.24 million are nearly 
five times the welfare gain. Consequently, nearly 80% of the tax and toll revenues 
received by government would have to be, somehow, transferred to users in order to 
leave them no worse off than in the BAU regime. In principle, compensation could be 
effected either by rebating the toll revenues directly to users in a lump-sum fashion or 
by spending them in ways that benefit users.12 Constructing the NEW tunnel, as in 
                                                 
9 Optimal tolls are evaluated for only two of the 20 years in order to economise on computation time. 
There are no implacable institutional barriers in Belgium to prevent annual changes in tolls. However, 
depending on the toll-road enabling legislation, annual toll increases might have to be approved on an 
individual basis.  
10 The figure of $283,525 denotes the benefits from a reduction in the costs. 
11 Operating costs on existing toll facilities are actually considerable (up to 45% of revenues) but it is 
expected that developments in tolling technology would reduce these costs below 10% of the revenues. 
12 If revenues were distributed to motorists this would raise household incomes and boost passenger travel 
demand. This feedback effect whereby drivers “buy back road space” is typically ignored in modeling 
exercises although it could be accounted for with the MOLINO model. 
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Regimes 3-5, is one way to benefit users. However, none of Regimes 3-5 features a toll 
on the OLD tunnel to fund construction of the NEW tunnel. The cost recovery regime in 
Regime 4 entails tolling the NEW tunnel after it is built. 
 
Table (3): Toll levels (€/vehicle). 
Regime 2 4 5 
Construct 
NEW tunnel? No Yes Yes 
Tolling of 
tunnels OLD only,   optimal NEW only,   break even OLD and NEW,   optimal 
      
Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak Years 1-9 
OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW 
Auto 1,8 0,7 1,8 0,7 
Freight 6,8 
 
5,0 
  
  
6,8 
  
5,0 
  
       
Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak Years 10-20 
OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW 
Auto 2,2 0,9 3,5 3,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Freight 7,1 
  
5,2 
    
11,0 
  
11,0 4,8 4,7 4,1 4,1 
Note: No tolls are levied in Regimes 1 or 3. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table (4): Traffic volumes, Year 20 (BAU=100). 
Regime 2 3 4 5 
Construct NEW tunnel? No Yes Yes Yes 
Tolling of tunnels OLD, optimal None NEW, break even 
OLD+NEW, 
optimal 
Peak trips 
Work 85,3 149,6 107,0 150,3 Auto Other 60,8 124,3 95,5 124,5 
Freight 76,0 143,0 100,3 105,3 
Total 76,4 140,8 102,7 137,9 
Off-peak trips 
Work 90,0 134,7 98,3 135,3 Auto Other 81,2 114,5 90,6 114,6 
Freight 75,7 126,5 93,2 94,7 
Total 81,3 123,2 93,5 116,3 
All trips 
Work 87,5 143,0 103,1 143,6 Auto Other 74,8 117,5 92,1 117,7 
Freight 76,0 129,8 94,6 96,8 
Total 79,6 130,0 96,7 120,6 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Regime 3: NEW tunnel built, no tolling 
In Regime 3 the NEW tunnel is built, and both tunnels are kept toll-free. Since the 20-
year accounting time horizon begins in 2000 and no plan to build the tunnel has yet 
been made, it is assumed that the NEW tunnel goes into operation in Year 10. At the 
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end of the accounting period in Year 20, the NEW tunnel has a discounted salvage value 
of €751,055/day which is tallied in the accounting. 
Building the NEW tunnel greatly reduces congestion delays throughout the 
accounting period, and by Year 20 traffic volumes on the two tunnels combined are 
30% higher than in the BAU regime (cf Table 4). Because the NEW tunnel route is 
shorter than the OLD tunnel route for most users, the NEW tunnel captures over 80% of 
traffic from each user group in both the peak and off-peak periods (cf Table 5).13 
Despite the large cost of building the tunnel and the increase in external transport costs, 
the social surplus gain in Regime 3 is more than four times the gain from tolling the 
OLD tunnel in Regime 2 (cf Table 2) and amounts to 85% of the maximum gain derived 
in Regime 5. 
 
Table (5): Tunnel market shares, Year 20 (percentages). 
Regime 2 3 4 5 
Construct NEW tunnel? No Yes Yes Yes 
Tolling of tunnels OLD, optimal None NEW, break even OLD+NEW, optimal 
    OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW 
Peak trips 
Work 100,0 0,0 17,6 82,4 41,3 58,7 17,7 82,3 Auto Other 100,0 0,0 17,7 82,3 80,1 19,9 17,7 82,3 
Freight 100,0 0,0 17,0 83,0 61,2 38,8 17,0 83,0 
Total 100,0 0,0 17,6 82,4 54,8 45,2 17,6 82,4 
Off-peak trips 
Work 100,0 0,0 17,7 82,3 50,8 49,2 17,7 82,3 Auto Other 100,0 0,0 17,7 82,3 82,5 17,5 17,7 82,3 
Freight 100,0 0,0 17,1 82,9 70,7 29,3 17,2 82,8 
Total 100,0 0,0 17,6 82,4 69,9 30,1 17,6 82,4 
All trips 
Work 100,0 0,0 17,7 82,3 45,3 54,7 17,7 82,3 Auto Other 100,0 0,0 17,7 82,3 81,7 18,3 17,7 82,3 
Freight 100,0 0,0 17,1 82,9 68,7 31,3 17,2 82,8 
Total 100,0 0,0 17,6 82,4 63,7 36,3 17,6 82,4 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Regime 4: NEW tunnel built & tolled to recover costs 
In Regime 4 the NEW tunnel is built by private enterprise and brought into service in 
Year 10. But unlike in Regime 3, the NEW tunnel is tolled to cover the costs of 
maintaining it and to pay back the construction costs by the end of the accounting 
horizon in Year 20.14 Similar to Regime 2, it is assumed that there is no toll 
discrimination between either the two groups of auto users or the two categories of 
freight traffic. But unlike in Regime 2, peak and off-peak tolls are assumed to be the 
                                                 
13 The division of traffic between the tunnels is similar for all user groups because the elasticities of 
substitution are assumed to be the same (cf Table A1 in the Appendix). 
14 Since the tunnel commences operation only in Year 10, cost recovery (except for the salvage value) has 
to be accomplished within 10 years. Alternative recovery periods could be investigated by varying the 
accounting time horizon.  
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same.15 Consequently, only two tolls are levied: an auto toll of €3.50 and a truck toll of 
€11.00 (cf Table 3). These relatively high tolls depress traffic even below the levels 
reached in the BAU regime16, and the NEW tunnel captures a much smaller share since 
the OLD tunnel is left untolled. Passengers on work trips favour the NEW tunnel 
because the value of the travel time savings exceeds the toll. But majorities of the other 
user groups continue to use the OLD tunnel. 
Although it turns out to be feasible to finance the tunnel by charging users, the tolls 
far exceed the external costs of autos and trucks and the auto toll adds to the distortion 
created by the pre-existing taxes. As a consequence, the welfare gain in Regime 4 is 
little more than half the gain from building the NEW tunnel without tolls (Regime 3). 
 
Regime 5: NEW tunnel built, both tunnels tolled 
In the final regime the NEW tunnel is built in Year 10 and both tunnels are tolled 
optimally. During Years 1-9 before the tunnel is built, tolls on the OLD tunnel are the 
same as in Regime 2 (cf Table 3). The auto toll drops to zero when the NEW tunnel 
begins operation because fuel and other user taxes exceed the combined congestion and 
other external costs of auto trips. Trucks are still tolled to cover maintenance costs and 
the small remaining congestion externality, but the toll is lower than in Years 1-9 and 
much lower than the truck tolls in Regimes 2 and 4. 
Regime 5 turns out to be the most efficient of the five regimes (cf Table 2) and 
therefore achieves 100% efficiency. Auto drivers fare less well than without tolling 
(Regime 3) but better than with the break-even toll (Regime 4). Truckers do less well 
than in either Regime 3 or 4 because truck tolls are levied on all capacity throughout the 
accounting period. But reductions in external costs, and savings in maintenance costs, 
are higher than in either of these other regimes. 
 
                                                 
15 An alternative would be to assume that separate peak and off-peak tolls are set for autos and for trucks 
according to Ramsey pricing rules. There has been surprisingly little published research on temporal price 
discrimination by private toll road operators, and it is not obvious whether the peak/off-peak differential 
would be larger or smaller for a private operator than a public operator. Because private operators 
exercise market power by including a toll markup, congestion tends to be lower in the peak period – 
which suggests that the temporal differential will be proportionally smaller than on a public road. 
However, the elasticity of demand also varies by time of day, and this provides another incentive for a 
private operator (but not a public operator) to engage in intertemporal price discrimination. One bit of 
empirical evidence comes from Highway 407: a limited-access electronically-tolled highway in Toronto. 
In 1998 when the highway was publicly operated, separate peak, off-peak and night time/weekend tolls 
were levied with a ratio of 10:7:4 for each vehicle category. The highway was privatised in 1999, and 
since 2002 the maximum temporal toll differential has ranged from nothing to about 7%. While this 
suggests that temporal toll discrimination is less pronounced on private toll roads, there are at least two 
confounding factors. First, traffic volumes have grown very rapidly on Highway 407 since it went into 
operation in 1997, and second, tolls are subject to complicated regulations based on traffic volumes. 
16 Since the NEW tunnel provides a new option for drivers while the OLD tunnel remains as before, one 
might expect traffic levels in Regime 4 to remain above BAU even with very high tolls. The reason that 
traffic drops slightly is that the two tunnels are imperfect substitutes in the model. Introducing the NEW 
tunnel induces some users with strong preferences for the NEW tunnel to discontinue using the OLD 
tunnel, and to economise on their total amount of travel. This effect would weaken as the elasticity of 
substitution between tunnels (currently set at 5) is increased, and in the limit of perfect substitution the 
number of vehicle-kilometres would necessarily increase. 
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Sensitivity analysis 
The simulations described above incorporate assumptions about a large number of 
parameter values that affect both the absolute and relative welfare gains and losses in 
the four investment cum tolling regimes. Both computation time and page constraints 
preclude an exhaustive sensitivity analysis, and attention in this subsection is restricted 
to two parameters of obvious significance: the cost of constructing the NEW tunnel, and 
the marginal cost of public funds. 
 
Construction costs and private contracting 
 
The €1.2 billion construction cost for the NEW tunnel is a conservative figure based 
on the premise that the tunnel is built according to best practice with no delays or cost 
increases due to technological, incentive or other contractual problems. Yet worldwide 
experience with major transport infrastructure projects indicates that substantial cost 
overruns are quite common (Flyvberg et al., 2003) and that construction costs depend 
strongly on the contractual framework. We therefore tested the case where construction 
costs of the tunnel would increase by 20% when it is not built and operated by the 
private sector17. This means that in Cases 3 and 5, construction costs are increased by 
20%, but not in Case 4 where operation and investment are private. 
With the cost increases, the present-value welfare gains decrease by roughly 
€300,000-350,000 per day in Regimes 3 and 5 (cf panel (2) of Table 6). But the ranking 
of the four regimes is unchanged, and constructing the tunnel remains a viable 
proposition.  
 
Table 6: Welfare gains sensitivity analysis (present-value daily sums in euros over 20 year horizon, 5% 
discount rate). 
Regime 1 (BAU) 2 3 4 5 
Construct NEW tunnel? No No Yes Yes Yes 
Tolling of tunnels None OLD, 
optimal 
None NEW, 
break even 
OLD+NEW, 
optimal 
  (1) Base case 
Welfare gain N/A 466.804 1.939.515 1.037.063 2.292.661 
Welfare gain relative to 
Regime 5 
0% 20% 85% 45% 100% 
  (2) Construction costs, maint. costs & salvage value of NEW tunnel 
rise 20% for Cases 3&5 
Welfare gain N/A 466.804 1.591.367 1.037.063 1.971.823 
Welfare gain relative to 
Regime 5 
0% 24% 81% 53% 100% 
  (3) Marginal cost of public funds = 1.5 
Welfare gain N/A 2.300.043 994.783 1.051.452 2.945.536 
Welfare gain relative to 
Regime 5 
0% 78% 34% 36% 100% 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
                                                 
17 Private operation is not a guarantee against cost overruns. It is the nature and the power of the contract 
that are decisive. 
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Marginal cost of public funds 
 
Estimates of the marginal cost of public funds vary widely by jurisdiction and country 
(Kleven and Kreiner, 2003) and they are sensitive to how revenues are collected and 
spent. To assess the sensitivity of the welfare results to the premium on public funds, a 
value of 1.5 for the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) was used in place of the base-
case value of 1. Doing so raises the effective costs of constructing and maintaining the 
tunnel, but it also raises the salvage value of the tunnel as well as the value attached to 
toll and tax revenues.  
Raising the MCPF has a more pronounced effect on the results than does the increase 
in construction costs (cf panel (3) of Table 6). The welfare gain from tolling the OLD 
tunnel without building the NEW tunnel (Regime 2) increases nearly five-fold relative 
to the base case. By contrast, building the NEW tunnel without introducing any tolls 
(Regime 3) drops by nearly 50% in benefits. Not surprisingly, building the tunnel under 
a break-even constraint (Regime 4) yields nearly the same welfare gain as in the base 
case because the premium attached to the toll revenue offsets the excess burden from 
the construction and maintenance costs. Finally, the welfare gain from the social 
optimum (Regime 5) rises moderately because the net increase in toll and tax revenues 
exceeds the construction and maintenance costs of the tunnels net of the salvage value 
of the NEW tunnel. 
As a consequence of these changes, the relative welfare gain from Regime 2 increases 
from 20% to 78% and boosts it from fourth (last) place to second place in the rankings 
of Regimes 2-5, while Regime 3 drops from 85% to 34% in efficiency, and from second 
place to last. Naturally, these results would change with alternative values for the 
MCPF, but they do illustrate the importance of accounting for the public finance side of 
infrastructure projects in the real world of second best. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has conducted a preliminary cost-benefit analysis of a proposed tunnel 
under the Scheldt river in Antwerp, Belgium. The analysis was performed using the 
MOLINO model: a cost-benefit tool for transport pricing, investment and regulation 
schemes that was recently developed as part of the European-Union funded REVENUE 
project. The model features a CES structure in which passengers and freight shippers 
make nested choices. For the Antwerp tunnel case study, three choice levels were 
implemented: (1) whether to travel, (2) to travel during the peak or off-peak period, and 
(3) to travel on one of two alternative links or routes. 
MOLINO was implemented in the case-study area by treating the proposed “NEW” 
tunnel as one alternative and an existing “OLD” tunnel as the other. Four alternative 
investment cum tolling regimes were considered that differ according to whether the 
NEW tunnel is built, and whether tolls are introduced on the NEW and/or the OLD 
tunnels. With the base-case parameter values, building the tunnel is worthwhile in all 
three tolling regimes and yields a higher benefit than not building the tunnel and tolling 
the OLD one. Nevertheless, the net benefit from building the tunnel varies appreciably 
between tolling regimes. Tolling both OLD and NEW tunnels results in the highest 
benefits since tolling costs are ignored and tolling both tunnels supports an optimal level 
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and division of traffic between them. Building the tunnel without introducing any tolls 
compares relatively favourably since the new tunnel adds sufficient capacity to reduce 
congestion on the two-link network to a comparatively low level. By comparison, 
implementing a break-even toll on the NEW tunnel is far less efficient because it 
suppresses traffic through the NEW tunnel well below the optimal level and induces too 
much traffic to take the OLD tunnel. 
Raising the construction and maintenance costs of the NEW tunnel by 20% in the two 
regimes with public operation does not affect the rankings of the regimes or other 
qualitative results. By contrast, setting the marginal cost of public funds at 1.5 pushes 
the two investment regimes with imperfect tolling down in the rankings, and raises the 
regime with no investment and optimal tolling of the OLD tunnel up to second place. 
While the results of the case study provide some interesting insights, the analysis is 
preliminary and should be taken further in at least four respects. One is to extend the 
sensitivity analysis to include such elements as the elasticity of substitution for 
passenger and freight traffic between alternatives, the costs of installing and operating 
the tolling infrastructure, and more procurement issues related to the costs of public vs. 
private construction and how privately operated toll roads and tunnels should be 
regulated. The ramifications of reforming the existing system of transport taxes could 
also be explored. A second extension is to refine the analysis of the alternative 
investment cum tolling regimes by extending the time horizon beyond 20 years, 
optimising tolls in every year, and computing Ramsey-optimal tolls by jointly 
optimising peak and off-peak tolls for passenger and freight traffic. A third extension is 
to consider the other tunnels that cross the Scheldt river as a third alternative and to take 
into account the benefits or costs on the rest of the network. Finally one can study in 
more detail the decision making (investment and tolling the two tunnels) of the regional 
government when it weighs the benefits to transit users and to national government tax 
revenues differently. 
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6. Appendix 
This appendix describes the primary data used to calibrate the MOLINO model and to 
run the simulations. The model was calibrated using two sets of data: first a set of 
simulation results of a transport model with the NEW tunnel, and second the present 
equilibrium without the NEW tunnel. In the simulation with NEW tunnel, 80% of the 
travellers are expected to choose to cross the river using the NEW tunnel. Traffic on the 
OLD tunnel will be significantly reduced so that during the peak period the average 
speed is expected to be 100 km/h for both the OLD and NEW tunnel. During the off-
peak period the average speed will be close to the free-flow speed. The parameters of 
the utility and cost functions were chosen to fit this simulation and at the same time also 
fit the present equilibrium by assuming that at present the tolls on the NEW tunnel are 
infinite.  
 
Traffic volume data used for calibration 
Table A1 records forecasted traffic volumes if a NEW tunnel is built and no tolls are 
levied. In this case 80% of the travellers are expected to choose to cross the river using 
the NEW tunnel. Total demand will rise from 120,000 vehicles per day to nearly 
150,000. Nearly half (47%) of passenger trips are made during the peak period, with 
70% of these trips taken for business or commuting purposes. During the off-peak more 
passenger trips are taken for other purposes than work. By contrast, only 22% of freight 
trips are made during the peak and local firms account for 67% of trips in both the peak 
and off-peak. 
Table A1: Traffic volumes in base case. 
Trip type Peak Off-peak Category 
 NEW OLD NEW OLD 
Total 
Peak 
Total  
Off-
Peak 
Share 
all trips 
Work 33,259 7,191 23,842 5,155 40,450 31,033 56.5% 
Other 14,254 3,082 29,736 6,429 17,336 32,818 43.5% Passengers 
Share pass. trips     47.0% 53.0%  
Local  3,232 669 11,460 2,373 3,901 12,129 67.0% 
Transit  1,592 330 5,644 1,169 1,922 5,974 33.0% Freight 
Share freight trips     22.0% 78.0%  
Source: expert judgment on basis of Federal Department of Transport data (2001). 
 
Parameters of utility functions 
Passenger transport is described by a three-level decision tree with the following 
nested choices: 
1. to cross the river or spend income on other goods 
2. to cross the river in the peak or in the off-peak period 
3. to take the OLD tunnel or the NEW tunnel 
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For freight transport the top-level choice is between transporting goods across the 
river and delivering the product or service to consumers using other inputs. The other 
two choice levels are the same as for passenger transport. Table A2 lists the elasticities 
of substitution at each choice level for passenger and freight transport.  
Table A2: Elasticities of substitution. 
Category Trip type Transport & 
other goods 
Peak & off-
peak 
OLD & NEW 
during peak 
OLD & NEW 
during off-peak 
Work 1.2 0.8 5 5 
Passengers Other 1.2 1.5 5 5 
Local  1.2 0.9 5 5 
Freight Transit  1.2 0.9 5 5 
Source: De Borger and Proost (2001).  
 
Travel time-flow 
The travel time-flow function for each tunnel is assumed to be linear in traffic flow. 
To calibrate the function for the OLD tunnel, current speed and traffic flow counts on 
the ring road were used. The function for the NEW tunnel was calibrated using the 
forecasted results.  
 
Speed data  
The average distance traveled on the ring road for vehicles using the OLD (Kennedy) 
tunnel or NEW tunnel is 14 km. Average speed is assumed to be 60 km/h in peak, and 
85 km/h during the off peak. If the NEW tunnel is built, average speed during the peak 
is expected to be 100 km/h for both the OLD and NEW tunnel routes and off-peak 
speeds are expected to be close to free-flow speeds (120 km/h). 
 
Value of time 
Values of travel time are reported in Table A3; they are assumed to be the same 
during the peak and the off-peak. 
Table A3: Values of time (€/h). 
Category Trip type Value of time 
Work 21.6 
Passengers Other   4.3 
Local  46.2 
Freight Transit  46.2 
Source: UNITE (Nelthrop e.a., 2001). 
 
Infrastructure costs and external costs of traffic 
The cost of building the NEW tunnel (“Oosterweel” connection) is estimated to be 
€1.2 billion (http://www.werkenantwerpen.be/BAM/corporate.aspx). To calculate the 
salvage value of capacity in 2020 we used a simple annuity technique in which the 
present value in 2020 is equal to the discounted sum of a constant annuity for the 
remaining years of the technical lifetime. 
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Variable operating, maintenance and external costs of the NEW tunnel are listed in 
Table A4. 
Table A4: Operator and infrastructure manager costs & external costs. 
Source: External costs: G. De Ceuster, (2004),. Maintenance costs: ECMT (2003). 
 
Users costs and existing taxes 
Table A5 reports the resource costs (fuel, vehicle depreciation and insurance costs) 
and tax costs incurred by users per vehicle kilometre. 
Table A5: Monetary costs borne by users. 
Passenger vehicles Freight vehicles  
Work Other Local Transit 
NEW 0.134 0.134 0.285 0.285 
Resource cost [€/vkm] OLD 0.134 0.134 0.285 0.285 
NEW 0.073 0.073 0.107 0.107 
National tax [€/vkm] OLD 0.073 0.073 0.107 0.107 
NEW 0.014 0.014 0.018 0.018 
Regional tax [€/vkm] 
OLD 0.014 0.014 0.018 0.018 
Source: G. De Ceuster (2003). 
 
 
Other parameters 
The marginal cost of public funds is set equal to 1 so that no premium is attached in 
the welfare calculations to revenues collected by government from tolls and other user 
charges. In Regime 4, where the NEW tunnel is operated and managed by a private 
operator, the national government taxes profits at a rate of 35%. Profits are assumed to 
be allocated to the various user groups in proportion to the numbers of trips taken. 
To calibrate the nested CES functions, the share of household income devoted to 
passenger transport was set at 20%, and the share of transport expenditures in total 
production costs was set at 10%. 
Peak Off-peak  
NEW  OLD  NEW OLD 
Pass. veh 0 0 0 0 
Variable operating cost [€/veh] Freight veh 0 0 0 0 
Pass. veh 0 0 0 0 
Variable infrastructure charge [€/veh] Freight veh 0 0 0 0 
Pass. veh 0 0 0 0 
Maintenance [€/veh] Freight veh 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Pass. veh 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 
External cost [€/vkm] 
Freight veh 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.124 
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Abstract 
 
This paper presents the results from a questionnaire among Dutch car owners. We have analysed the 
behavioural responses to three different, policy relevant, road pricing measures. Depending on the type of 
measure and type of trip affected, we find reductions in the number of car trips of, on average, 11%. A flat 
kilometre charge affects social trips considerably more than commuting trips. However, when policy 
makers want to affect peak time (commuting) traffic, a time differentiated measure is more appropriate. 
Slow traffic and trip suppression are most popular alternatives for non-commuting trips. Departure time 
changes become very attractive for all purposes when the proposed measure varies over time. 
 
Keywords: Road pricing; Behavioural response; Traffic reduction. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
People’s responses to transport pricing are not straightforward. Price increases may not 
necessarily lead to trip suppression, it may also induce travellers to change their modal 
use or change their departure time, depending on the type of measure. A wide variety of 
transport pricing measures exists, having different consequences for travel behaviour. 
Price measures are considered as one of the major tools for policy-makers to influence 
transport development. The design of measures will generally depend on the objectives 
set by the government. It is therefore important for authorities to have clear insight into 
                                                 
• This research was carried out within the NWO/Connekt VEV project on “A Multidisciplinary Study of 
Pricing Policies in Transport”; nr. 014-34-351. Financial support is gratefully acknowledged. 
∗ Corresponding author: Barry Ubbels (bubbels@feweb.vu.nl) 
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the responses induced by transport pricing. This response will to a considerable extent 
depend on the exact design of the pricing scheme (e.g. a yearly tax on car ownership can 
be expected to affect kilometrage of a given vehicle relatively weakly, compared to a 
kilometre charge). Equally important, however, is the price sensitivity (often expressed as 
elasticities by economists) of transport users for the various relevant types of behaviour 
that together define transport behaviour. People have various possibilities to change 
transport behaviour, and can be expected to react differently to different pricing schemes.  
This paper presents the empirical results from a survey among Dutch car owners towards 
the behavioural effects of various, policy relevant (at least for the Dutch situation), road 
pricing measures. Three different type of measures have been evaluated by the 
respondents. We will analyse the short term behavioural responses in terms of sensitivity 
and type of change for three different trip purposes.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses possible behavioural responses 
to transport pricing and it gives a brief overview of previous literature results. Section 3 
explains the structure of the questionnaire and the type of price measures that have been 
evaluated by the respondents. Section 4 presents the effectiveness outcomes in terms of 
car trips that will be replaced by the respondents (including how these trips will be 
changed). Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Road transport pricing and behavioural responses 
 
Governments have many different options to intervene in the transport market. Road 
pricing is one of the possibilities. Current widely implemented price measures in road 
transport include a tax on vehicle ownership (either at purchase or on an annual basis), 
parking fees and fuel taxes. Alternative pricing measures include distance related taxes 
(e.g. a kilometre charge) or particular emission based charges. Also the opposite of 
charging, viz. subsidising, is a price instrument. Public transport subsidies are for 
instance often seen as a useful second-best policy in cases where private road transport 
for some reason cannot be, or is not priced.  
Transport users will respond differently to various pricing policies. The possible 
outcomes (in terms of behavioural responses) of pricing can be the following: 
 
• trip suppression (travel frequency choice); 
• departure time choice (and scheduling of daily activities); 
• different route choice; 
• changes in modal split; 
• changes in vehicle occupancy; 
• spatial choices related to re-location; 
• change in driving style (e.g. speed choice); 
• vehicle ownership;  
• technology choice; 
• changes in destination choice; 
• class choice (for public transport). 
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Depending on the desired aim, policy makers may now decide to make use of a 
particular price instrument that is likely to steer travel behaviour in a more desired 
direction. However, it should not be forgotten that the real effect of a price change 
depends on various factors which makes the effect predictability of a certain measure 
rather difficult. Factors affecting price sensitivity include among others (VTPI, 2002): 
 
• Type of price change: the different types of pricing measures can have different 
impacts on travel behaviour.  
• Type of trip and traveller: commute trips tend to be less elastic than shopping or 
recreational trips.  
• Quality and price of alternative routes, modes and destinations: price sensitivity tends 
to increase if alternative routes, modes and destinations are of good quality and 
affordable. For example, road users tend to be more price sensitive if there is a 
parallel untolled roadway.  
• Time period: transportation elasticities tend to increase over time as consumers have 
more opportunities to take prices into effect when making long-term decisions (Oum 
et al., 1997). Dargay and Gately (1997) conclude that about 30% of the response to a 
price change takes place within 1 year, and that virtually all takes place within 13 
years.  
• Large and cumulative price changes: extra care should be used when calculating the 
impacts of large price changes, or when summing the effects of multiple changes, 
because each subsequent change impacts a different base.  
 
In the next subsection we will briefly discuss some results from the transport economic 
literature on the behavioural responses to transport pricing (this draws on previous work 
carried out within the MD-PIT project, see Ubbels and Verhoef, 2003). We pay specific 
attention to work that analysed the effects of variabilisation in the Netherlands, because 
we will evaluate similar types of measures for the same country. Variabilisation refers to 
the situation where present car taxation(independent of car use) is replaced by a kilometre 
charge. 
 
 
2.1 Previous literature 
 
A substantial body of empirical economic literature analyses the effects of pricing 
measures on particular types of behaviour and reports elasticities (a measure of 
responsiveness of demand to a change in price)1. But not only own demand 
responsiveness can be captured by elasticities, also the use of other modes by changing a 
particular price can be measured (i.e. cross-price elasticities). Although it is possible to 
derive elasticities from empirical data (e.g., a before-and-after study of an infrastructure 
project), normally models are used to derive elasticities. Different types of empirical data 
are used to derive elasticities. Stated preference data give the reactions as stated by the 
respondents (e.g. travellers), when confronted with hypothetical alternatives. Revealed 
preference is based on choices actually made appearing from observed behaviour.  
                                                 
1 The price elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in the quantity demanded divided by 
the percentage change in price (Stiglitz and Driffill, 2000). 
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A wide variety of estimates of price elasticities have appeared in economic literature. 
Among the most widely studied elasticies in transport is the fuel price elasticity. Most 
estimates of the price elasticity of gasoline consumption are in the range between -0.27 
(short run) and -0.71 (long run) (see for an overview Oum and others, 1997 and 
Goodwin, 1992). Elasticities with respect to vehicle kilometre charges, interesting in the 
context of this study, are less often reported. There are only a few recent studies which 
consider the impact of kilometre charges on car use. The European Commission has 
carried out a major survey on road pricing elasticities (European Commission, 1996). The 
estimated elasticities consider the effect of road pricing on car use, modal split and route 
choice. The effects on car use depend on the purpose of the trip: shopping and social trips 
have the highest, commuter trips the lowest elasticities. The cross-price elasticities range 
from 0.05 to 0.4 and depend on the transport mode considered (rail or metro) and on the 
level of charge applied. Geurs and Van Wee (1997) report the results of a variable costs 
elasticity by using the FACTS model. The effects on car use of a kilometre charge have 
been simulated by increasing the variable maintenance costs with €cent 5 per kilometre 
(on a default of €cent 0.5 to 1.5). This results in an elasticity of around –0.20.  
Empirical results have been analysed to derive revealed effects and behavioural 
responses to road pricing in practice (of which effects can also be expressed in 
elasticities). Despite the fact that road pricing is only rarely implemented, the experiences 
so far show interesting results. Singapore and Orange County, for instance, are interesting 
and valuable examples of situations where road pricing is actually implemented. It 
appears that the effects depend very much on local situations (e.g. public transport 
availability) and the charging scheme at hand. Road pricing in Singapore, aimed at 
reducing peak period congestion, was first implemented in 1975 in the form of the Area 
Licensing Scheme (ALS) and upgraded in 1998 to Electronic Road Pricing (ERP). A 
method of shoulder pricing is used, which involves increasing the rate in steps every half 
an hour before the peak and decreasing it after the peak (with charges depending on 
vehicle type). It appears that traffic is quite sensitive to the road pricing system even 
though the charges are relatively low, the maximum rate for cars on expressways and to 
enter the restricted zone is comparable to a 1-hour parking fee in the city (about €1.50) 
(Olszewiski and Xie, 2005). The elasticity values shown in Table 1 indicate that time of 
driving will change with time dependent charges. Evening peak traffic flows show the 
highest demand sensitivity, with an elasticity of -0.32 for cars. The low figures for the 
morning peak can be explained by arrival time restrictions for commuters, whereas trips 
to home in the evening can be postponed to avoid the high peak charge.  
 
Table 1: Elasticity of traffic entering the restricted zone by time interval. 
Time period Cars Other vehicles (motorcycles, 
taxis, LGV’s, HGV’s, buses) 
All vehicles 
7:30-9:30 
9:30-15:00 
15:30-17:30 
17:30-19:00 
7:30-19:00 
-0.106 
-0.082 
-0.123 
-0.324 
-0.123 
-0.019 
-0.080 
-0.151 
-0.189 
-0.106 
-0.069 
-0.083 
-0.143 
-0.265 
-0.118 
Source: Olszewski and Xie (2005). 
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The toll charge levied by Orange County depends on the vehicle occupancy and on the 
level of congestion on the free lanes next to the toll lane. It appeared that the traveller’s 
decision to use the toll lanes is very closely related to hour-by-hour variations in traffic 
conditions. Results show that a marginal increase in the peak period tariff on the toll 
facility has only little effect on (increased) travel demand in shoulder peak periods, only 
very large price changes would induce considerable effects. Moreover, only a few drivers 
decide to car-pool. 
 
 
2.1.1 Variabilisation studies in the Netherlands 
 
Since we study the effects of different types of kilometre charges (including measures 
where revenues are used to compensate for abolition of fixed car taxes), it is interesting to 
discuss results from so-called variabilisation studies. A few studies have been completed 
on this issue in the Netherlands, initiated by the increasing policy interest for a kilometre 
charge.  
One of the first studies towards the mobility effects of variabilisation was conducted by 
MuConsult in 1998 (MuConsult, 1998). A model was used to study the effects of 
different kilometre charges with the restriction that the revenues for the government 
remain constant (fixed car taxation was lowered accordingly or abolished). They show 
that, depending on the level of the charge, implementation may lead to a considerable 
reduction in total kilometres driven. A kilometre charge of 7 €ct, for instance, leads to a 
total reduction of 19%. Business traffic is least affected in this scenario (7%), whereas 
social traffic (23%) and commuting traffic (19%) are most sensitive. Most of these car 
kilometres is replaced by bicycle use and car-pooling. Effects are less strong when the 
charge is lower. A charge of 3 €ct is estimated to decrease commuting traffic with 5% 
and social traffic with 8%. A remarkable prediction of this study is the decrease in car 
ownership for all scenarios considered; apparently the effect of the increase in the 
variable charge dominates the effect of lower ownership costs.  
A stated preference survey among car owners as well as non-car owners reported in 
MuConsult (2002) has also analysed the behavioral responses to different types of a 
kilometre charge with abolition of fixed taxes. We will here discuss their predicted 
effects of the replacement of the Dutch car ownership tax (the so-called MRB) only, and 
both the MRB and the tax on car purchase (the so-called BPM). The charges were 
differentiated according to fuel type, the MRB-only scenario included a charge of 2.4 €ct 
per kilometre for petrol using cars (with slightly higher charges for cars running on diesel 
and gas), whereas the MRB+BPM scenario contained a charge of 4.9 €ct (equal levels for 
other fuel types). In contrast to the earlier MuConsult study, this study predicts an 
increase in car ownership levels for all alternatives considered. The car stock is assumed 
to show a stronger growth under the MRB-only scenario compared to the MRB+BPM 
scenario (2.8% vs. 1.2%). The higher charges in this latter scenario induce relatively 
more car owners (4.6% vs. 1.3%) to sell their car. The effect on the second-hand market 
where prices may go down on the car stock has not been included. The results in terms of 
kilometres indicate a small reduction for the MRB-only scenario of about 0.9% and a 
somewhat larger effect of 3.4% for the other scenario. These effects include a decrease in 
kilometres by car owners and an increase of kilometres driven by respondents that 
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indicate to purchase a new car (estimated around 2% for both scenarios). Especially 
social, shopping and recreational trips will be adjusted, whereas business traffic and 
kilometres driven for school or educational purposes remain almost unchanged. 
Commuting trips will be adjusted (about 30%), but less often than the social and 
shopping trips. 
Recently (initiated by a request from the Dutch Minister to search for a new, widely 
approved, pricing regime), the traffic effects of various road pricing alternatives have 
once more been investigated using the LMS (Landelijk Model Systeem, a network model 
developed to forecast traffic flows for the Netherlands) model (Adviesdienst Verkeer en 
Vervoer, 2005). Among the ten different alternatives that have been evaluated, there were 
four variabilisation measures. When all fixed taxes (MRB and BPM) are replaced by a 
kilometre charge (with budget neutrality for the government), the model predicts a 
decrease in car use (in terms of kilometres) of 11% (compared with the reference 
situation in 2020). The average charge per kilometre causing these effects was about 5.7 
€ct, and depended on fuel type and weight of the car. The level of congestion in 2020 is 
assumed to be reduced with 40% (in terms of vehicle hours lost). People will change 
mode (use of train, bus/metro and slow transport increases in terms of kilometres with 
about 6%) and especially social traffic (29%, in terms of car driven kilometres) and, to a 
lesser extent, commuting (9%) will be reduced. 
Another considered alternative included variabilisation of all car ownership taxes and 
one quarter of the car purchase taxes. The average kilometre charge is consequently 
lower (3.4 €ct) than the previous measure, but an additional charge of 0.11 €ct was levied 
on locations and times with severe congestion. The LMS model outcomes suggest that 
growth of congestion will be reduced with about 45%. Trip distances will decrease. This 
effect is limited for commuting trips but larger for social trips. Business traffic (6%) and 
freight traffic (1%) is predicted to increase, but total traffic demand will decrease (with 
10%) due to considerably less commuting (16%) and social kilometres (25%).  
The modelling studies predict larger effects on car use than the stated preference study 
of MuConsult (2002). However, comparing these studies is not straightforward due to 
differences in the types of measures (e.g. differentiation according to weight versus fuel 
type) that have been evaluated and underlying assumptions (e.g. the LMS model does not 
include car ownership effects). Charge levels in the modelling studies have been on 
average somewhat higher than in the MuConsult 2002 stated preference study, which 
may be one explanation for the larger effects.    
 
 
3. Data collection and survey description 
 
3.1 Data collection 
 
The data have been obtained through an (interactive) internet survey among Dutch car 
owners. The total sample consists of 562 respondents, half of which are car commuters 
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facing congestion on a regular basis, investigated in an earlier questionnaire.2 These 
respondents were confronted with three different road pricing measures, and we asked 
them if and how they expect to change their behaviour when facing these measures. The 
focus is on the short term responses: the more long term decision of car ownership and 
car change have been included in the survey, but these will not be discussed in this 
contribution. The actual data collection was carried out by a specialised firm (NIPO), 
which has a panel of over 50.000 respondents. The data were collected during three 
weeks in February 2005.  
 
 
3.2 Survey 
 
Three different pricing measures will be considered, each in multiple variants. Table 2 
shows the various measures that have been developed: 6 different alternatives for 
measure 1, 2 alternatives for measure 2, and again 6 alternatives of the third measure (a 
more detailed description of these measures can be found in Appendix 2). The 
alternatives were divided randomly over the respondents, and each respondent evaluated 
one alternative of each measure (so three in total). As a result, we obtained at least 88 
observations for each alternative of measure 1 (see also Table 4), 282 for measure 2A and 
280 for measure 2B, and again about 95 for each alternative of measure 3 (see also Table 
8 in Section 4.3).  
 
Table 2: Short description of the road pricing measures presented to the respondents. 
Measure Variant 
1: Flat kilometre charge 
with different charge 
levels and different 
revenue use 
A: 3 €cent, abolition of car ownership taxes 
B: 6 €cent, abolition of existing car taxation (purchase and ownership) 
C: 12 €cent, abolition of existing car taxation and investment in new roads 
D: 3 €cent, revenues used to lower income taxes 
E: 6 €cent, revenues used to lower income taxes 
F: 12 €cent, revenues used to lower income taxes 
2: Differentiated 
kilometre charge with 
different charge levels 
and different revenue 
use 
A: 2 €cent with multistep (morning and evening) peak time toll on bottlenecks, revenues 
   used to abolish car ownership taxes 
B: differentiated according to weight of the car, revenues used to abolish existing car 
     taxation 
3: Crude peak/off-peak 
kilometre charge with 
different charge levels 
and different revenue 
use 
A: 2 €cent outside peak times and 6 €cent in peak, abolition of car ownership taxes 
B: 4 €cent outside peak times and 12 €cent in peak, abolition of existing car taxation 
C: 8 €cent outside peak times and 24 €cent in peak, abolition of existing car taxation and 
          new roads 
D: 2 €cent outside peak times and 6 €cent in peak, revenues used to lower income taxes 
E: 4 €cent outside peak times and 12 €cent in peak, revenues used to lower income taxes 
F: 8 €cent outside peak times and 24 €cent in peak, revenues used to lower income taxes 
 
All descriptions of the measures, as shown to respondents, consisted of two major 
components: we explain both the structure and level of the charge, and the allocation of 
the revenues. Furthermore, we provided each respondent individually with an estimation 
                                                 
2 These respondents have been selected from the first MD-PIT questionnaire of which the results are 
presented in earlier work (Ubbels and Verhoef, 2005). Note that this first survey was ‘over sampled’ in the 
lower income groups so as to obtain a sufficient number of observations. 
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of the financial consequences of the implementation of the proposed measure (on the 
basis of self-reported current travel behaviour and car ownership for unchanged 
behaviour). This estimation depends on the charge level (costs) and on the type of 
revenue use (benefits). Information on the annual number of kilometres driven, and for 
some measures also on the type of vehicle (measure 2B) and time of driving (measures 
2A and 3) is the input for the cost estimation based on present behaviour. The financial 
benefits shown to the respondent depend on the type of revenue use. Because it was 
impossible to give respondents a personal estimation of the financial benefits involved 
with a recycling via lower income taxation, we only presented the savings for those 
measures where existing car taxes are abolished3. We explained also some practical 
issues that were meant to prevent various practical considerations from affecting the 
response: the privacy of car users is guaranteed, electronic equipment registers the toll 
and the driver can choose freely the payment method (e.g. credit card, bank transfer etc.). 
Concerning the representativeness of our sample, we make the following remarks. All 
respondents own a car, which is used for different trip purposes. This is not necessarily 
commuting because not all respondents have a job (17.6% is not employed). The 
educational level of our sample seems relatively high. About 29% of the Dutch car 
owners has a bachelor or masters degree (based on own calculations of CBS data for 
2003), this share is considerably higher in our survey (40%). CBS statistical data also 
suggests that car ownership increases with income. About 20% of the car owners in this 
sample has an income below €28,500 (with 9% having no income). Younger people seem 
to be overrepresented in our survey. About 30% of the car owners in the Netherlands is 
older than 55, while this share is only 16% in this survey. Most of the respondents are 
located in the Randstad area (rest west and large cities), the northern part of the 
Netherlands is only modest represented with 6.4%.  
After a concise description of each measure, the respondents were asked whether they 
would change the number of car trips for three different trip purposes (only in those cases 
that the respondent indicates that he/she actually makes this type of trip):  
 
− commuting trips (made at least sometimes by 70.7% of the respondents); 
− trips to visit people (made at least sometimes by 80.8% of the respondents); 
− other type of trips (e.g. shopping, sports activities etc., made at least sometimes by 
92.7% of the respondents). 
 
Commuting trips are only made by 70% of the respondents, but the intensity of these 
trips during a week is relatively higher. 
If respondents indicate that they indeed expect to adjust their travel behaviour4, they 
were next asked to indicate the share of trips that will be changed, and also how these 
will be changed. Depending on the type of measure (it makes little sense to ask whether 
                                                 
3 The benefits from paying less car taxation depend on the type of car the respondents own (i.e., on fuel 
type and weight). We have estimated averages for nine categories (a combination of three fuel types and 
three weight categories), for an abolition of annual car ownership taxes (MRB) only and an abolition of all 
existing car taxation, namely MRB and the fixed purchase tax (BPM). 
4 It is possible that people indicate to make more car trips, in that case we only asked how many extra trips 
this person would make. 
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respondents will change departure time when a flat kilometre charge is presented), 
various possibilities were presented: 
 
− public transport; 
− slow transport (walking, bicycle); 
− motorised private transport (motorbike, motor); 
− carpool (only asked for commuting trips); 
− work at home (only asked for commuting trips);  
− travel at other times (only when measure is time dependent)5;  
− give up the trip. 
 
In order to analyse the behavioural responses to the proposed pricing measure in a 
quantitative way, we asked the respondents to indicate for each purpose how many trips 
they make in a normal week. Because some type of trips are only made once a week, we 
have asked the respondents to indicate how many trips they will change in a period of 4 
weeks (with presenting their total number of trips made for each purpose (4 times the 
number of trips in a week)). Hence, a respondent indicating that he/she makes 5 
commuting trips a week can change 20 trips at most. Next it was asked how these trips 
will be changed. Respondents could not continue with the survey when the total number 
of trips to be changed was unequal to the sum of numbers allocated to different 
alternatives.  
Stated preference studies like this one may suffer from various biases, e.g. due to the 
hypothetical nature of the questions or due to strategic answering. By asking people to 
indicate very precisely how a certain expected change in total trips was to be 
accomplished, we hope to have minimised the hypothetical bias as much as reasonable 
possible. The strategic bias may result in people understating their willingness to change 
trips, when hoping that ineffectiveness may reduce the chance of the policy to be 
implemented. Because road pricing was not under public debate at the moment the 
questionnaire was held, we have good hopes that the strategic bias is not too large.  
 
 
4. Effectiveness of different pricing regimes 
 
The aim of this survey is to analyse the behavioural responses to realistic and policy 
relevant road pricing measures6. This section focuses on the sensitivity and type of effect 
of the short term responses to three different road pricing measures presented to the 
respondents for three different trip purposes (i.e. commuting, social traffic (visits) and 
other (e.g. shopping)). We have information on the behavioural responses in terms of 
number of trips that an individual will adjust, and how these will be adjusted. Since we 
also have an individual estimation of the yearly number of kilometres driven for each trip 
                                                 
5 Departure time changes have been extensively analysed in an earlier phase of MD-PIT (results obtained 
from a stated choice experiment). 
6 At this moment policy makers in the Netherlands are seriously considering the implementation of a 
kilometre charge that replaces current car taxation.  
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purpose, it is also possible to express changes in terms of kilometres. Information on both 
outcomes will be presented below.  
 
 
4.1 Measure 1: kilometre charge (3, 6 and 12 €ct) and different revenue use 
 
The numbers of respondents that indicated they would adjust their car trips when 
measure 1 becomes reality were 42 (11% of the total number of respondents that makes 
commuting trips) for commuting, 111 (27%) for visits and 111 (23%) for other trip 
purposes. After weighting these adjustments by numbers of trips made and by the length 
of these trips, we can transform these figures into changes in numbers of trips and 
kilometres. Table 3 shows the aggregated outcomes for all alternatives together; 
Appendix 2 gives the detailed results for each measure separately.  
The numbers vary considerably over the various trip purposes. The proposed kilometre 
charge is relatively most effective for trips made to visit people, and least effective for 
commuting trips. This may be explained by the fact that a trip suppression is no serious 
alternative for commuting trips (only 0.5% of trips to be adjusted will not be made 
anymore), whereas for other reasons people seriously consider the alternative of not 
making the trip. Popular alternatives (for all purposes) for car trips include slow transport 
and public transport. Cycling and walking are in particular an alternative for visits and 
other trips, apparently these trips are often of short distance. The effectiveness in terms of 
adjusted number of kilometres is smaller than for numbers of trips, probably people 
driving relatively less adjust their behaviour.  
 
Table 3: Aggregated outcomes of behavioural responses to measure 1: flat kilometre charge. 
 Commuting Visits Other 
Total number of trips (driven in 4 weeks) 6800 3620 7780 
Number of trips adjusted 
Of which: 
Public transport 
Slow traffic 
Motorised 
Carpool 
Working at home 
Not making trip 
400 (5.9%) 
 
31.8% 
32.2% 
9.5% 
19.5% 
6.5% 
0.5% 
513 (14.2%) 
 
17.8% 
44.6% 
8.9% 
not relevant 
not relevant 
28.6% 
846 (10.9%) 
 
13.3% 
64.9% 
1.8% 
not relevant 
not relevant 
19.9% 
Number of kilometres adjusted 3.9% 11.6% 9.2% 
 
It is also interesting to consider the relative effectiveness of the various alternatives of 
measure 1. As expected, a kilometre charge of 12 €ct tends to have more effect than a 
similar measure with lower charges. Table 4 shows the impact of each alternative for the 
various purposes. Some results are different than expected: a measure with a higher 
charge is not always more effective. For instance, measure 1D (with a charge of 3 €ct) 
seems slightly more effective than measure 1E (6 €ct) for particular trip purposes. 
Measure 1F induces the strongest trip changes. Alternatives A, B, and C are 
variabilisation measures, these seem to be less effective than the measures where 
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revenues are used to lower income taxes. The data do not allow us to identify the reason 
for this difference, but we can speculate. One possible explanation is that we could not 
inform the respondents on how much they would receive due to the lowered labour tax, 
while we could make an estimate for the vehicle taxes. If respondents were pessimistic on 
the net benefit from reduced labour taxes, a perceived stronger income effect might 
explain the stronger effectiveness. But respondents might also have been less rational. 
Perhaps they work, implicitly, with predetermined budget allocations over broader groups 
of consumer products. If so, they may not have realised that they could allocate all 
benefits from reduced labour taxes to the mobility budget. This is not a very satisfactory 
explanation, but we can simply not exclude the possibility of irrational responses from at 
least some of our respondents. As stated, we can only hypothesise about the true reason 
for this surprising result. 
 
 
Table 4: Effectiveness related to the alternatives of measure 1. 
% of total trips adjusted  
Measure Number of 
respondents 
Commuting Visits Other 
1A (3 €ct/MRB) 
1B (6 €ct/MRB+BPM) 
1C (12 €ct/MRB+BPM+new roads) 
1D (3 €ct/income taxes) 
1E (6 €ct/income taxes) 
1F (12 €ct/income taxes) 
96 
94 
88 
101 
91 
92 
0 
5.0 
11.3 
25.0 
19.7 
39.0 
9.5 
9.4 
20.3 
15.0 
20.5 
25.3 
13.6 
9.5 
17.6 
21.2 
16.7 
21.5 
 
 
4.2 Measure 2: kilometre charge with multistep bottleneck toll (2A) and kilometre charge 
differentiated according to weight of the vehicle (2B) 
 
The second measure consists of two (very) different alternatives that have in common 
that the charge is strongly differentiated. The first alternative is a peak period charge 
combined with a flat kilometre fee, while the measure 2B is differentiated according to 
weight of the vehicle.  
Table 5 shows the behavioural responses for both alternatives separately. Compared to 
measure 1, we see that one type of response has been added: travel at other times. 
Because only measure 2A is differentiated according to time, this type of behavioural 
response is only relevant for that alternative. Changing travel time is very attractive for 
all trip purposes; people prefer car use at other times over public transport and slow 
traffic, especially for commuting trips. The respondents will try to avoid the bottlenecks 
at certain times and are less inclined to give up trips for social or other purposes 
(relatively to alternative 2B). Note that this alternative has a fine differentiation compared 
with measure 3, and only applies to certain (bottleneck) locations. Measure 2B seems 
relatively less effective for commuting trips, only 4% of the total number of commuting 
trips will be changed. Table 6 confirms this. It shows that measure 2A is responsible for 
almost three quarter of the adjusted commuting trips. Finally, it appears that slow traffic 
is an attractive alternative especially for social purposes. These trips probably often have 
nearby destinations.   
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Table 5: Behavioural responses to measure 2. 
Measure Measure 2A Measure 2B 
Trip purpose Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other 
Total number of trips 
(driven in 4 weeks) 3188 1824 3892 3612 1796 3888 
Trips adjusted (% total) 
Of which: 
Public transport 
Slow traffic 
Motorised 
Car pooling 
Travel at other times 
Working at home 
Not making the trip 
358 (11.2%) 
 
22.3% 
8.9% 
2.5% 
10.6% 
51.1% 
4.2% 
0.3% 
166 (9.1%) 
 
16.9% 
29.5% 
1.4% 
NR 
42.2% 
NR 
10.2% 
359 (9.2%) 
 
13.1% 
38.7% 
1.7% 
NR 
38.2% 
NR 
8.3% 
145 (4.0%) 
 
13.8% 
26.2% 
38.6% 
12.4% 
NR 
6.9% 
2.1% 
150 (8.4%) 
 
14.0% 
46.7% 
8.7% 
NR 
NR 
NR 
30.7% 
308 (7.9%) 
 
9.7% 
66.6% 
1.0% 
NR 
NR 
NR 
22.7% 
Number of kilometres 
adjusted 11.3% 10.3% 8.2% 2.5% 6.7% 7.4% 
NR = not relevant, measure may not be differentiated according to time (2B) or alternative is not relevant 
for trip purpose. 
 
Table 6: Effectiveness related to the alternatives of measure 2. 
% of total trips adjusted   
Number of 
respondents Commuting Visits Other 
2A: multistep bottleneck toll 
2B: km charge weight vehicle 
282  
280 
71.2 
28.8 
52.5 
47.5 
53.8 
46.2 
 
 
4.3 Measure 3: peak and off peak kilometre charge with different revenue use 
 
The third measure is a kilometre charge differentiated crudely according to time (peak 
and off peak only) with different revenue use allocations. Compared to the previous 
measures, this measure is, in terms of total number adjusted trips (for all purposes), most 
effective (14,1% versus 9,7% (measure 1) and 7,6% (measure 2). This measure has 
relatively more impact on commuting trips. The number of trips commuting changed is 
1004 (about 15% of the total trips made for commuting reasons), considerably more than 
400 (measure 1) and 503 (measure 2). Almost half of the trips that will be adjusted, will 
be replaced by trips made off-peak (see Table 7, and Appendix 2 for the disaggregated 
results). Slow traffic is also an attractive alternative, but again only for the non-
commuting purposes. The motor or motorbike is not a serious alternative for the 
respondents, the same holds for carpooling.   
The pattern shown in Table 8 is somewhat different from what could be expected. This 
measure combines different charge levels with different types of revenue use. Alternative 
C and F have the highest charges, considerably higher than A and D. The estimated 
benefits of revenue use for alternatives A to C have been presented to the respondents, 
this has not been done for the alternatives where revenues are used to lower income taxes 
(D to F). Since higher charges tend to have more effect, alternative C and F may be 
expected to have more effect than the other alternatives, and B and E again more than A 
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and D. This is not entirely true. Measure 3B, for instance, is considerably less effective 
than measure 3A for all purposes. The amount of compensation is larger for measure 3B 
(not only MRB, but also BPM is abolished), but we explained that for both measures the 
government does not obtain extra revenues (revenue neutrality). A similar pattern is 
found for measure 3E (compared with 3D), but in this case allocation of revenues was 
unchanged. Most remarkable is that alternatives with the lowest charge levels (A and D) 
are even more effective than alternative C and F for certain purposes. The findings for the 
impact of revenue use (abolition of car taxation vs. income tax reductions) are for most 
trip purposes equal to the results for measure 1: variabilisation is said to be less effective. 
Only the outcomes found for measure 3C (visits) and 3A (other purposes) are different in 
this context, revenues hypothecated to reduce car taxation dominates income tax 
compensation in terms of effectiveness.  
 
Table 7: Aggregated outcomes of behavioural responses to measure 3: peak and off peak kilometre charge. 
 Commuting Visits Other 
Total number of trips (driven in 4 weeks) 6800 3620 7780 
Number of trips adjusted 
Of which: 
Public transport 
Slow traffic 
Motorised 
Carpool 
Travel at other times 
Working at home 
Not making trip 
930 (15%) 
 
17.6% 
12.7% 
8.8% 
4.5% 
47.7% 
7.9% 
0.6% 
529 (14.6%) 
 
13.6% 
28% 
1.7% 
not relevant 
47.8% 
not relevant 
8.9% 
1028 (13.2%) 
 
14.1% 
28.9% 
1.5% 
not relevant 
47.3% 
not relevant 
8.3% 
Number of kilometers adjusted 14.6% 13.2% 11.2% 
 
When we look at the effects of the measure for trip purposes, it seems that measure 3C 
has more effect on social visiting trips than for the other purposes. The reverse holds for 
the same purpose for measure 3F. Measure 3D tends to be less effective for other trips, 
while on the other hand measure 3A seems most effective for this type of trips. There 
seems not much of a difference over trip purposes for the other measures. 
 
Table 8: Effectiveness related to the alternatives of measure 3. 
% of total trips adjusted Measure 
Number of 
respondents Commuting Visits Other 
3A: 2/6 €cent (off-peak/peak), MRB 
3B: 4/12 €cent, MRB+BPM  
3C: 8/24 €cent, car taxation and new roads 
3D: 2/6 €cent, income taxes 
3E: 4/12 €cent, income taxes 
3F: 8/24 €cent, income taxes 
96 
91 
97 
96 
94 
88 
16.0 
13.8 
15.8 
19.0 
13.9 
21.3 
14.2 
10.0 
25.9 
18.9 
14.4 
16.6 
21.6 
12.1 
13.1 
14.4 
15.7 
23.2 
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5. Concluding remarks 
The results indicate that road pricing may have considerable effects, much depends on 
the design of the measure. In terms of trips adjusted, the effectiveness of the measures is 
in the range of 6% to 15% for all purposes. The effect in terms of kilometres is somewhat 
smaller. It is often difficult to compare these results with previous literature because of 
differences in the measures analysed and the research methods applied (modelling vs. 
stated preference). The work discussed here probably comes closest to the research by 
MuConsult (2002), although that study included also respondents not owning a car. The 
outcomes in terms of kilometres for measure 1A and 1B may be comparable to the results 
of the MuConsult study. Our results then show stronger effects, which cannot entirely be 
explained by the fact that we have not included non-car owners.  
There are considerable differences between trip purposes, with commuting generally 
being least sensitive when the charge is time independent. Measures 1 and 2 seem to have 
less effect on commuting trips, which is a rather usual result (e.g. see previous literature 
results on elasticities and modelling outcomes). In contrast, measures 3 and 2A have a 
stronger effect on commuting trips. A common characteristic of both measures is the 
differentiation according to time. Measure 3 seems to be most effective overall, 
especially for commuting trips.  
Slow transport is a popular alternative for trips to visit people or shopping trips, 
especially when it concerns a flat kilometre charge. This suggests that people often take 
the car for short trips that can be easily replaced by walking or cycling. Driving at other 
times is also a popular alternative, especially for the (car dependent) commuting trips. 
Commuting trips are hard to suppress (working at home or not making the trip are no 
serious options for most of the respondents), but there seems to be some flexibility 
allowing the rescheduling of trips. This is confirmed by the empirical results from 
Singapore (see Olszewski and Xie, 2005).  
The impact of the type of measure is not straightforward. Previous research and 
common sense suggest that higher kilometre charges have more impact. Our results are 
somewhat mixed on this issue and are difficult to explain. The effect of revenue use is 
obvious in most cases, the measures with revenues allocated to lower income taxes have 
generally more effect. Although not very satisfactory, this may be explained by the 
perceived financial disincentive. Income reduction may be effective, it may not be very 
acceptable. Ubbels and Verhoef (2005), for instance, show that income reductions might 
not be very acceptable, whereas abolition of car taxation is. This suggests a possible 
trade-off between acceptance and effectiveness, which is relevant to keep in mind. 
The decision whether or not to implement a price measure remains a political decision, 
but one should be aware that the effects depend very much on the type of measure. This 
work shows that when policy makers want to affect peak time (commuting) traffic a time-
differentiated measure seems most appropriate. The kilometre charge with additional 
peak charge is most effective overall, especially for commuting trips. Governments 
should be aware that implementation of these (time-dependent) charges most probably 
lead to driving at other times, especially for commuting trips.  
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Appendix 1: Description of measures 
 
Measure Alternatives 
1: Flat kilometre charge with 
different revenue allocations 
A: 3 €cent, revenues used to abolish car ownership taxes (MRB) 
B: 6 €cent, revenues used to abolish existing car taxation (purchase  
    (BPM) and ownership (MRB)) 
C: 12 €cent, revenues used to abolish existing car taxation and construct  
    new roads 
D: 3 €cent, revenues used to lower income taxes 
E: 6 €cent, revenues used to lower income taxes 
F: 12 €cent, revenues used to lower income taxes 
2: Flat kilometre charge with 
additional bottleneck charge 
(2A) or differentiated 
according to weight of the 
car (2B)  
A: 2 €cent, additional multistep toll during peak times (morning and  
    evening) on working days at daily bottlenecks: 6:00-7:00 € 0,50, 7:00- 
    7:30 € 1,00, 7:30-8:00 € 1,75, 8:00-8:30 € 2,50, 8:30-9:00 € 1,75,  
    9:00-9:30 € 1,00, 9:30-10:00 € 0,50. The same structure for the  
    evening peak (16.00-20.00). Revenues used to abolish car ownership  
    taxes (MRB) 
B: Light cars pay 4 €cent per kilometre; middle weight cars pay 6 €cent  
    per kilometre; heavy cars pay 8 €cent per kilometre, revenues used to  
    abolish existing car taxation (MRB and BPM) 
3: Peak and off peak 
kilometre charge and 
different revenue allocations 
A: 2 €cent outside peak times and 6 €cent in peak on working days  
    (7.00-9.00 and 17.00-19.00), abolition of car ownership taxes 
B: 4 €cent outside peak times and 12 €cent in peak on working days  
    (7.00-9.00 and 17.00-19.00), abolition of existing car taxation 
C: 8 €cent outside peak times and 24 €cent in peak on working days  
    (7.00-9.00 and 17.00-19.00), abolition of existing car taxation and  
    new roads 
D: 2 €cent outside peak times and 6 €cent in peak on working days  
    (7.00-9.00 and 17.00-19.00), revenues used to lower income taxes 
E: 4 €cent outside peak times and 12 €cent in peak on working days  
    (7.00-9.00 and 17.00-19.00), revenues to lower income taxes 
F: 8 €cent outside peak times and 24 €cent in peak on working days  
    (7.00-9.00 and 17.00-19.00), revenues used to lower income taxes 
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Appendix 2: Behavioural responses to each alternative of measure 1 and 3 
 
 
Measure Measure 1A Measure 1B Measure 1C 
Trip purpose Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other 
Total number of trips 
(driven in 4 weeks) 
1104 556 1468 1176 652 1176 1084 628 1160 
Trips adjusted (% total) 
Of which (%): 
Public transport 
Non-motorised  
Motorised 
Car pooling 
Working at home 
Not making the trip 
0 (0%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 (8.8%) 
 
30.6% 
38.8% 
0% 
NR 
NR 
30.6% 
115 (7.8%) 
 
15.6% 
64.3% 
0% 
NR 
NR 
20% 
20 (1.7%) 
 
20% 
10% 
0% 
60% 
10% 
0% 
48 (7.4%) 
 
10.4% 
56.3% 
8.3% 
NR 
NR 
25.0% 
80 (6.8%) 
 
6.3% 
77.5% 
2.5% 
NR 
NR 
17.8% 
45 (4.1%) 
 
51.1% 
22.2% 
6.7% 
0% 
20% 
0% 
104 (16.6%) 
 
10.6% 
44.2% 
18.3% 
NR 
NR 
26.9% 
149 (12.8%) 
 
14.1% 
60.4% 
6.0% 
NR 
NR 
19.5% 
 
Measure Measure 1D Measure 1E Measure 1F 
Trip purpose Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other 
Total number of trips 
(driven in 4 weeks) 
1212 592 1408 1176 592 1332 1048 600 1236 
Trips adjusted (% total) 
Of which (%): 
Public transport 
Non-motorised 
Motorised 
Car pooling 
Working at home 
Not making the trip 
100 (8.3%) 
 
12.0% 
55.0% 
14.0% 
11.0% 
7.0% 
1.0% 
77 (13%) 
 
27.3% 
53.2% 
0% 
NR 
NR 
19.5% 
179 (12.7%) 
 
14.0% 
63.7% 
0% 
NR 
NR 
22.3% 
79 (6.7%) 
 
39.2% 
30.4% 
1.3% 
24% 
5.1% 
0% 
105 (17.7%) 
 
12.4% 
39.0% 
11.4% 
NR 
NR 
37.1% 
141 (10.6%) 
 
9.2% 
68.8% 
0.7% 
NR 
NR 
21.3% 
156 (14.9%) 
 
36.5% 
24.4% 
12.8% 
23.1% 
2.6% 
0.6% 
130 (21.7%) 
 
20.9% 
41.1% 
8.8% 
NR 
NR 
29.0% 
182 (14.7%) 
 
17.0% 
61.5% 
1.6% 
NR 
NR 
19.8% 
NR = not relevant, alternative is not related to trip purpose. 
 
Measure Measure 3A Measure 3B Measure 3C 
Trip purpose Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other 
Total number of trips 
(driven in 4 weeks) 
1256 636 1572 1096 500 1160 1168 708 1200 
Trips adjusted (% total) 
Of which: 
Public transport 
Non-motorised 
Motorised 
Car pooling 
Travel at other times 
Working at home 
Not making the trip 
161 (12.8%) 
 
2.5% 
0% 
13% 
0% 
71.4% 
13.0% 
0% 
75 (11.8%) 
 
34.7% 
10.7% 
0% 
NR 
45.3% 
NR 
9.3% 
222 (14.1%) 
 
16.2% 
23.4% 
0% 
NR 
56.3% 
NR 
4.0% 
139 (12.7%) 
 
21.6% 
20.1% 
6.5% 
0% 
43.9% 
7.9% 
0% 
53 (10.6%) 
 
13.2% 
20.8% 
0% 
NR 
60.4% 
NR 
5.7% 
124 (10.7%) 
 
25.8% 
23.4% 
0.8% 
NR 
46% 
NR 
4.0% 
159 (13.6%) 
 
28.9% 
30.2% 
8.8% 
3.8% 
20.1% 
8.2% 
0% 
137 (19.3%) 
 
8.7% 
30.6% 
2.9% 
NR 
43.8% 
NR 
13.9% 
135 (11.3%) 
 
3.7% 
29.6% 
1.5% 
NR 
46.7% 
NR 
18.5% 
NR = not relevant, measure may not be differentiated according to time or variant is not related to trip purpose.  
 
Measure Measure 3D Measure 3E Measure 3F 
Trip purpose Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other 
Total number of trips 
(driven in 4 weeks) 
1136 640 1256 1112 524 1224 1032 612 1388 
Trips adjusted (% total) 
Of which: 
Public transport 
Non-motorised 
Motorised 
Car pooling 
Travel at other times 
Working at home 
Not making the trip 
191 (16.8%) 
 
23.0% 
7.8% 
0% 
8.4% 
57.1% 
3.1% 
0.5% 
100 (15.6%) 
 
4% 
38% 
2% 
NR 
52% 
NR 
4% 
148 (11.9%) 
 
3.4% 
43.9% 
2.6% 
NR 
46.6% 
NR 
4% 
140 (12.6%) 
 
10% 
15.7% 
0% 
12.8% 
55% 
5.7% 
0.7% 
76 (13.9%) 
 
3.9% 
25% 
3.9% 
NR 
53.9% 
NR 
13.1% 
161 (13.2%) 
 
8.7% 
32.9% 
0% 
NR 
50.3% 
NR 
8% 
214 (20.7%) 
 
18.2% 
7.% 
21% 
2.3% 
39.7% 
9.8% 
1.9% 
88 (14.4%) 
 
22.7% 
34.1% 
0% 
NR 
38.6% 
NR 
4.5% 
238 (17.2%) 
 
22.2% 
24.4% 
3.8% 
NR 
38.2% 
NR 
11.3% 
NR = not relevant, measure may not be differentiated according to time or alternative is not related to trip purpose. 
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Abstract 
 
After many delays, technological problems, and renegotiations between the government and the system 
operator Germany has successfully introduced a satellite based tolling system for heavy goods vehicles 
(HGVs) in January 2005. Since then the system is running smoothly. Currently the toll applies only to 
state motorways (the so called Autobahnen) but there are plans to extend it to the secondary level of 
federal long-distance roads (the Bundesfernstraßen).  
This paper describes the political and economic background of the introduction of the HGV-toll in 
Germany. The paper sketches the history of the implementation process, describes the major structural 
elements of the toll, and discusses current problems and possible future developments. Finally some 
policy conclusions are drawn. 
 
Keywords: Road Pricing; Road Transport; HGV-toll 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In January 2005 Germany has introduced a toll for heavy goods vehicles (HGVs). The 
toll system started with a delay of two years due to many technological, managerial and 
political problems which were covered by the media at great length (sometimes 
scathingly). But since the starting date the system is running smoothly. The only major 
area of discussion today seems to be the problem of toll avoidance traffic, that is, traffic 
deviating from the motorways to secondary roads in order to avoid paying the toll. 
Currently the toll applies only to state motorways (the so called Autobahnen) but due to 
avoidance traffic there is discussion to extend it to the secondary level of federal roads 
(the Bundesfernstraßen). Unfortunately official data on avoidance traffic are not 
publicly available yet (although they are known to exist). Estimates of avoidance traffic 
therefore have to rely on anecdotal evidence and on simulation exercises.  
This paper sketches the political and economic background of the introduction of the 
HGV-toll in Germany (section 2), describes the history of the implementation process 
(section 3), presents the structure of the toll (section 4), presents the results of a 
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simulation study done at Dresden Technical University concerning avoidance traffic 
(section 5) and draws some policy conclusions (section 6).  
 
2. The background 
 
Due to substantial budgetary deficits on all federal levels Germany is currently facing 
severe problems with the financing of the country’s infrastructure. These problems exist 
with respect to maintenance as well as with respect to new investment. The need to 
spend more on maintenance is illustrated by looking at the so-called “degree of 
modernity”1 of the German road network over time. This measure has decreased from 
around 80% in the 70s to around 70% in 2002. In accordance with this statistical 
evidence road-users in Germany are facing a substantial amount of congestion due to 
frequent road-works and the bad technical condition of the road network in general.  
But apart from maintenance new investment is urgently required. First, there is the 
neeed to remove “old” bottlenecks, some of which have now existed for quite a while. 
Second, “new” bottlenecks have arisen due to German reunification and the 
enlargement of the European Union. After EU enlargement Germany has become the 
main transit country for freight transport in Europe. Dramatic increases in freight 
transport are forecast. According to official forecasts published by the Federal Ministry 
of Transport and Housing HGV traffic will grow by 70%-83% in the period from 1997 
to 2015.2 As part of this development the traffic volume between Germany and the new 
member states in the east (CEECs) will almost treble.3 Already today 35% of HGV-
transport (in ton-km) on the German motorway system is operated by foreign trucks. 
The German government reconized these financing problems already during the 90s. 
In the summer of 1999 a High Commission for Financing the Federal Transport 
Infrastructure was established to examine these problems and to develop policy 
proposals to remedy the situation. The Commission (called the Pällmann-Commission, 
after its chairman Wilhelm Pällmann) came up with the proposal to convert the system 
of infrastructure financing from a tax-based regime to a regime of usage based 
charging.4 To this end the commission advocated to set up a special highway funding 
company (Fernstrassenfinanzierungsgesellschaft) that should act largely independent 
from the state. The commission proposed that the proceeds from the toll should be 
earmarked for road-building only. There was to be no cross-subsidizing between road-
                                                 
1  The degree of modernity is defined as the ratio of net assets to gross assets. 
2 See Bundesverkehrsministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Wohnungswesen (BMVBW), Verkehrsbericht, 
Kurzfassung, Bonn: BMVBW. See also: Verkehrsprognose 2015, in: Internationales Verkehrswesen (53) 
12/2001, p.591. 
3 There have been some doubts about these forecasts. It has been argued, for example, that there were 
association agreements between Germany and the CEECs already before the official membership of these 
countries, so that trade was already liberalized before EU enlargement. It has also been argued that in 
modern economies the service sector is more important than manufacturing. Nevertheless, the substantial 
growth that is currently underway in the new member countries is probably the dominant factor. In 
addition, and relatedly, it remains the case that the low labour costs in these countries stimulate relocation 
of manufacturing activities into the east generating a substantial increase of transportation of the 
manufactured goods back to the west. A special aspect of low labor costs are the low cost for HGV 
operators in the new member countries who increasingly operate in Germany from their own home base. 
This contributes to the growth of international HGV traffic on German roads.  
4 Kommission Verkehrsinfrastrukturfinanzierung (2000).  
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 31 (2005): 118-128 
 120
infrastructure and other modes of transportation. In the end, however, the German 
government chose not to follow this advice (see below). It decided that 50% of the 
revenues are to be used to finance infrastructure investments of railways and inland-
waterways.  
Apart from remedying financing needs the toll is intended to serve other policy goals 
as well.  
German road hauliers have complained for a long time that foreign truckers do not 
pay a fair share of Germany’s road infrastructure cost. Given the fact that the German 
road infrastructure is largely payed out of the proceeds of the gasoline tax and given the 
large capacity of modern HGV tanks foreign trucks can avoid paying infrastrucure costs 
simply by not refuelling within Germany.5 Therefore the introduction of a usage 
dependant HGV-toll was seen as a major tool to generate equal competitive conditions 
for the national trucking industry.  
A further goal that was to be served by the introduction of the HGV-toll was to 
influence the current modal split in freight transport in favour of rail and inland-
waterways and to create “fair” competion between road and rail. Currently rail transport 
in Germany has a share of around 14% of all ton-kilometers, inland-waterways a share 
of around 13% and road transport of around 70% (measured in ton-kilometres).6 By 
making road-transport more expensive it was thought that the two other modes would 
become more attractive to shippers. However, in a study predating the introduction of 
the toll (Doll and Rothengatter 2002 predicted only very limited modal shift effects at 
the current level of the toll. According to their calculations notable substitution effects 
would only occur at a toll level of 40 cents per kilometer provided the German railroads 
would be able to meet the increased demand with offers of sufficient quality and logistic 
sophistication.  
Likewise the government saw the toll as a means to further environmental goals. The 
toll contains some differentiation according to emission classes. But the main effect on 
the environment was expected from the incentives of the toll on route optimization, fleet 
management and a shift towards rail and inland waterways.  
Finally, there was a strong element of industrial policy in chosing a satellite based 
tolling system and sticking to it, notwithstanding the substantial technological problems 
that emerged during the implementation process.  
Roughly the German system works as follows: The onboard unit is equipped with a 
GPS receiver for satellite signals and a microwave transmitter. Based on the GPS 
satellite signals the onboard units is able to locate the truck’s position and to compare it 
continously with a map which is stored in the onboard unit. The onboard unit calculates 
the corresponding amount of the toll and sends these data via microwave technology to 
the system’s central data processing unit which does the billing.  
The German technology can be extended to other types of vehicle (provided 
corresponding onboard units can be installed at reasonable costs) and it can be extended 
to the secondary road network without major difficulty. The system can easily be 
extended to the territory of other European countries and it can be exported to Non-
European countries as well. The German system is certainly the technologically most 
ambitious system in Europe. It should be noted, however, that this advantage is bought 
at a cost. It is reported that currently 16-20% of the toll-revenues (approximately 0,6 
                                                 
5 The capacity of modern tanks allows a truck to travel 2500-3000 km without refueling.  
6 Bundesminister für Verkehr, Bau- und Wohnungswesen: Verkehr in Zahlen 2003/4, Hamburg, p. 239. 
Verkehr in Zahlen is the standard reference for transport statistics in Germany.  
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billion € p.a.) go to the system operator Toll Collect. Probably not all of the proceeds 
are used to cover operating costs but at least this figure gives some indication of the 
systems cost.  
A further technological advantage of the German system consists in the fact that it 
provides the technological basis for a host of value-added services that can be offered 
“piggy-back” to the system, like navigation systems, tracking and tracing, generation of 
consumer patterns, etc. There is concern (also on the part of the EU Commission) that 
the operator of the German tolling system, Toll Collect, might acquire a monopoly over 
these services, and that suitable access provisions should be legislated. Some of these 
value added services may also cause problems of data protection. It cannot be denied, 
however, that with this system the political aim to establish Germany among the world’s 
technology leaders with respect to tolling-technology has been reached. It has to be 
mentioned in this context that the European Commission is strongly in favour of 
satellite based tolling systems.7 
 
3. History of the implementation process 
 
The current HGV toll in Germany has replaced the Eurovignette system which was 
introduced in 1995 in tandem with the Benelux countries and Denmark. Sweden joined 
the Eurovignette group in 1998. The Eurovignette applied for HGVs with a weight over 
12t. It was time based and was sold in variable time chunks (1 year, 1 month, 1 week or 
1 day.) Introducing the Eurovignette was a fist attempt to reduce the fiscal imbalances 
that existed in the European trucking sector. In tandem with the introduction of the 
Eurovignette gasoline and vehicle taxes were harmonized although some inequalities 
remained. These remaining differences together with the possibilities of foreign trucks 
to avoid the German gasoline tax by not refuelling in Germany caused sympathies on 
the part of the German truckers for the government’s plans to change from tax financed 
system of highway financing to a usage based system.  
In 1999 the High Commission for Financing the Federal Infrastructure was 
established which recommended this change to be made. It advocated the founding of a 
Highway Funding Company. This company was to be a joint-stock company whose 
shares, however, were to be held exclusively by the federal government (with the option 
to sell part of the shares later). The company was to finanance its investments partly out 
of the revenues of a distance based toll and partly out of raising debt on the capital 
markets. The proceeds of the toll were exclusively to be earmarked for motorways. No 
cross-subsidies to other modes of transport were to be possible.  
This company was in fact established in October 2003, however, with several 
important changes to the commission’s recommendations. First, it was legislated that 
cross-subsidies to rail and inland-waterways were to be possible. This change shows up 
already in the name of the company which was changed from Highway Funding 
Company (Fernstraßenfinanzierungsgesellschaft) into Infrastructure Funding Company 
(Verkehrsinfrastrukturfinanzierungsgesellschaft, VIFG). 50% of the toll revenues are 
now earmarked for investments into the infrastructure of these two competing modes. 
                                                 
7 See for example T. Howes: Developing an interoperable European road charging framework. 
Presentation given to the EU Road User Charging 2004, 30 November 2004, London, particularly the 
remarks on EU-Directive 2004/52. 
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(Rail is to obtain a share of 38%, inland-waterways a share of 12%.) Second, it was 
legislated that the toll revenues should not flow to the company directly but first to the 
federal government which then would distribute the revenues to the company.8 In this 
way the High Commission’s important postulate that the company’s budget should be 
totally independent from the state budget seems to be in question. This is important 
because the German government had always argued that the toll would not just be 
“another tax”.  
In the fall of 2001 after public tender the system operator Toll Collect was selected. 
Toll Collect is a consortium of Deutsche Telekom (the dominant telecommunications 
operator in Germany), Daimler Chrysler, and Cofiroute (the French operator, which 
holds a share of 10%). The choice of Toll Collect was contended by the competitors but 
was upheld by the courts so that Toll Collect was finally awarded the official licence in 
2002. (The licence has a duration of 12 years.) In April of the same year the necessary 
legislation for raising a HGV toll in Germany (Autobahnmautgesetz, ABMG for short) 
went into effect.  
It was expected that Toll Collect’s proposed system would be operative in August 
2003. Instead a series of technological problems lead to two postponements of the 
starting date. The main difficulties related to the on-board units which interfered with 
other board electronics of the vehicle and which exhibited compatibility problems with 
radio antennae. In addition, the software did not work properly. After extremely critical 
reporting in the press and after several rounds of renegotiations between the Federal 
Ministry of Transport and Housing and Toll Collect in February 2004 there was a 
cancellation of Toll Collect’s contract followed, however, by a withdrawal of the 
cancellation shortly after under the condition that Toll Collect would be restructured. 
The situation was even more strange given the fact that the government had 
prematurely abolished the Eurovignette in August 2003. This entailed that domestic 
hauliers paid neither vignette nor toll until January 2005. As a consequence the 
government suffered substantial financial losses which are now the subject of a law suit 
concerning penalties for Toll Collect. 
Finally it was agreed that the toll would be introduced in two steps. A preliminary 
version was to be installed in January 2005 and the “full version” by January 2006. The 
preliminary version still exhibits a limited functionality of the onboard unit. The 
improved version of the onboard unit (“OBU II”) will contain better software which, in 
particular, will make it possible to include secondary federal motorways 
(Bundesfernstraßen) into the tolling system. This fact is important, given the current 
discussion about deviation or avoidance traffic from the primary motorways to the 
secondary motorways.  
 
4. Main elements of the German toll 
 
The Pällmann commission (see above) had proposed a basic average toll level of 15 
Cents per kilometer. This figure was based on a study by IWW Karlsruhe which relies 
                                                 
8 At present an amount of approximately the same volume as the revenues from the former Eurovignette 
is subtracted in order to compensate the Ministry of Finance for the income loss. In addition, the system’s 
operating costs are subtracted. 
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on a fully distributed cost methodology.9 In order to compensateGerman truckers for 
still remaining competitive fiscal disadvantages in comparison to foreign trucks the final 
level was set slightly lower at 12,4 Cents per kilometer. This reduction corresponds to a 
volume of 600 Mio € for the German trucking industry as a whole and is to be phased 
out over the next years. In addition, the German government legislated several other 
compensation measures to make the toll more palatable to German hauliers. It was 
decided to lower the vehicle tax to the absolute minimum compatible with EU directive 
1999/62. In addition, truckers are allowed to subtract the gasoline tax from the toll. This 
applies to foreign HGVs as well as to domestic HGVs but is considered a temporary 
measure. Finally, there is a state financed programme of subsidies for the acqusition of 
new HGVs with a better emission performance.  
The current level of 12,4 Cents per kilometer is only the basic average level of the 
toll. The toll is differentiated according to emission standards and number of axles. 
There is no differentiation, however, according to time or place. The toll currently 
applies only to HGVs over 12 tons and only on federal motorways (the Autobahnen) 
which in total have a length of approximately 12 000 kilometers. Interestingly, busses 
are not included. Substitute roads are not covered by the toll although there are plans to 
include at least some of the secondary motorways. 
There are two ways of payment: First, the user can pay manually by using a terminal 
at a gasoline station or via the Internet. Second, the user can be billed automatically via 
his onboard-unit. The second option requires prior installation of the onboard-unit, of 
course. The onboard-unit is supplied free of charge by Toll Collect. The truck owner 
only has to pay for the technical installation of the unit. At the time of this writing 
approximately 400 000-500 000 units are installed. The total number of liable trucks is 
around 800 000. Enforcement occurs by video cameras installed on gantries or via 
mobile control vehicles, which move within the traffic flow. At present the violation 
rate is below 2% (out of a total volume of 8,5 million vehicles that were checked).  
It is expected that in its first year (2005) the toll will have generated revenues of 2,867 
billion € of which 0,6 billion € will go to the system operator Toll Collect. The 
Eurovignette, for comparison, only generated around 450-460 million € per annum. 
Moving to the toll system therefore has generated a substantial increase in revenues for 
the German state.  
It has to be remarked that apart from the just mentioned temporary possibility to 
subtract the gasoline tax from the toll the German government has no plans to lower the 
gasoline tax permanently as a compensation for the toll (as was recommended by the 
Pällmann commission). This fact is interesting because attempts of economists to 
allocate infrastructure costs according to vehicle type have shown that currently the 
gasoline tax payments by HGVs in Germany exceed the cost share of trucks 
considerably (DIW 2000). These calculations depend on the fully distributed cost 
methodology and are therefore to some extent arbitrary. Nevertheless the government 
has depended on these calculations in setting the level of the toll. Thus, in principle a 
                                                 
9 Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsforschung (IWW) (2000): Berechnung 
wegekostenorientierter Benutzungsentgelte für die Bundesfernstrassen und Abschätzung der 
wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen, In: Kommission Verkehrsinfrastrukturfinanzierung (2000), Appendix 2. 
With some slight modifications this study, in turn, relied on the methodology developped by the 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtchaftsforschung (German Institute for Economic Research). For a description 
of this approach see: H. Link et al.: The Costs of Road Infrastructure and Congestion in Europe, Berlin, 
Heidelberg, New York, 1999, Chapter 3. 
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lowering of the gasoline tax would have been possible and consistent with the whole 
policy approach of changing from a tax financed to a usage financed system.  
The government bases its denial to lower gasoline taxes on a budgetary principle 
taken from the German public finance literature, the so-called “Non-
Affektationsprinzip”. This principle states that taxes (as opposed to user charges) by 
definition cannot be earmarked but have the purpose to cover all types of state 
expenses, not specific ones. This view is open to discussion. In fact, past German 
governments have already departed from the non-affectation principle and earmarked at 
least increases in the gasoline tax for the purpose of road building. Even today a part of 
the gasoline tax is earmarked for infrastructure investments in public transport. 
Some experts have argued that the current level of the gasoline tax for trucks is 
justified because the margin of the tax level over allocated costs can be viewed as an 
implicit environmental tax imposed on HGVs. It may be true that such an environmental 
tax might be desirable nevertheless the principles of taxation require that the existence 
of such a tax should be made explicit and be decided upon in the political process. To 
the knowledge of this author this has never occurred.  
There are plans to extend the toll to HGVs under 12 tons but over 3,5 tons and there 
are also plans to extend the toll to 15 substitute long distance roads which suffer 
particularly from traffic seeking to avoid the toll on the primary motorways. In addition, 
some of the federal states of Germany recently have brought forward the proposal to 
introduce a toll for private cars within their territory as well. Technically speaking it 
would be possible to extend the HGV tolling system in this way. Doing this would 
require, however, that in Germany 45 million private cars would have to be equipped 
with onboard units. At present the corresponding investment costs seem far too high 
(although economies of scale and technological progress may change this in the near 
future). Likewise, operating and enforcement cost are considered to be prohibitive. 
Moreover, there are two different jurisdictions involved. The current tolling system is 
operated under the authority of the federal ministry of Transport which is responsible 
for the motorways (the “Autobahnen”) and the long distance federal roads. The federal 
states are responsible for the road network within their own territory. Decisions to 
extend the HGV toll nationwide would require cooperation between the federal states 
and the federal government. 
 
5. First results and the problem of avoidance traffic 
 
At the time of writing this paper official data on the effects of the toll are still scarce. 
Nevertheless, the Minister of Transport and Housing in a recent interview10 indicated 
that there have been significant modal-shifts from road to rail. This statement is 
contradicted, however, by the Federal Agency for Road Transport (Bundesamt für 
Güterverkehr, BAG) which claims that there is no shift in general but only a small shift 
in favour of intermodal transport. According to the minister inland transport of 
containers terminals has increased by 7%. Likewise the amount of inefficient no-load 
trips has decreased by 15%.  
Some federal states and communities have reported a substantial increase in HGV 
traffic since introduction of the toll. Unfortunately up to now there is only casual 
                                                 
10 “Maut-Einnahmen auf Rekord Niveau“. In: Die Welt, Sunday, October 8, 2005, p.4. 
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evidence available although the government had promised systematic and official data 
for autumn 2005.11 Two examples therefore must suffice to illustrate the problem.  
The small wine-growing village of Oppenheim located on federal route B9 with 7000 
inhabitants has seen an increase of 1600 trucks per day. This means an increase by a 
factor of three and implies a density of more than 1 truck per minute. 
On federal road B1 the number of HGVs has risen from 338 to 771 vehicles per day 
which corresponds to an increase of 128%.  
The federal states and the communities have reacted to these developments by 
prohibiting or rationing through-traffic and by imposing detours or drastic speed-limits. 
Wheras in April 2005 the federal government still denied the existence of serious 
avoidance traffic it has admitted lately that there are problems at some regional focal 
points. The Minister of Transport and Housing announced that up to 15 secondary roads 
might have to be included in the tolling system to remedy the overload of trucks at these 
focal points.  
Some experts doubt that these measures will work. Casual evidence seems to show 
that a large share of the HGVs on German roads is based in the new member states, in 
particular Slowakia, Hungary, and Poland. Labor costs in these countries are so low that 
detours have no high opportunity costs. The sceptics therefore assert that if the German 
toll is extended to secondary roads HGV operators from these countries will simply 
incur even greater detours to avoid the toll.  
In a study conducted at Dresden Technical University Henninger (2005) has used the 
VISUM traffic simulation software to simulate the effects of the HGV toll for the 
federal state of Bavaria. Bavaria was chosen for two reasons. First, Bavaria has the 
longest road network in Germany. Second the motorway (Autobahn) network is not too 
dense (unlike, for instance, the motorway network of Northrhine-Westfalia). Thus in 
Bavaria deviating to secondary federal roads is really an economic option. The network 
of Bavaria is modelled in the so-called VALIDATE network that was developed by the 
consulting firm ptv AG in cooperation with Kessel and Partner who implemented in 
VALIDATE a special model for simulating freight traffic.  
Henninger performed two sets of simulations based on two different route choice 
models. The first route choice model is the TRIBUT model developped by INRETS 
especially to model the effects of tolls and the second is the so called Multilernverfahren 
(“Multilearning Procedure”) developped by Lohse (Schnabel, Lohse 1997 and ptv 2004) 
. Both methods use value of time (VoT) to estimate the opportunity costs of possible 
route alternatives. The latter model allows for dynamic adjustment processes of route 
choice. In contrast to the Multilernverfahren methodology TRIBUT uses the VoT in a 
variable way to reflect existing differences between individuals in a better way.  
To calculate the avoidance effects Henninger differentiates between long-distance 
traffic (>150 km), regional traffic (51-150 km), local traffic (<50 km), and between 
trucks and cars. She assumes a value of time of 34,59 €/h for long distance traffic which 
corresponds to the values assumed in the German federal infrastructure planning 
procedure. Not surprisingly higher values of time would lead to less avoidance traffic in 
the simulation.  
                                                 
11 The government has commissioned two studies concerning the effects of the toll. These studies are 
completed but not publicly available at the moment because they serve as input into the decision 
processes of the federal states of Germany (the Länder) concerning the question of which of the 
secondary roads should be included in the tolling system. The Länder have been asked by the Federal 
Ministry of Transport and Housing to develop a position on this question. 
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Both types of route choice modelling identify the same Bavarian roads as candidates 
for avoidance traffic. The average substitution volumes in both models are as follows:  
 
Table 1: Average changes of traffic volumes on motorways according to TRIBUT. 
Vehicle Type/Type of Traffic Average Change 
Cars +4,46% 
HGVs under 12t +16,55% 
HGVs over 12t  
   Long distance traffic -1,3% 
   Regional Traffic -21% 
   Local traffic -7% 
Source: Henninger 2005, p.65. 
 
The increase in cars reflects the time savings of private car owners due to less 
congestion by HGVs. 
 
Table 2: Average changes of traffic volumes on motorways according to Multilearningprocedure. 
Vehicle Type/Type of Traffic Average Change 
Cars +7,12% 
HGVs under 12t +4,33% 
HGVs over 12t  
   Long distance traffic -21,09% 
   Regional Traffic -27,80% 
   Local traffic -32,03% 
Source: Henninger 2005, p.63. 
 
It can be seen from the two tables that although the precise values differ somewhat the 
effects are nevertheless substantial. It will be interesting to compare these numbers with 
the official data when these become finally available. 
 
6. Policy conclusions  
 
It comes as a surprise that the German toll was accepted without much discussion and 
without much resistance. The major reason seems to have been that there was a “grand 
coalition” of actors who supported the toll. Politicians advocated it because of the hoped 
for gains to the federal budget and the hoped for position of Germany as a worldwide 
technology leader in tolling systems. Truckers favoured it because they saw it as a 
major step towards establishing a level playing field in the competition with foreign 
hauliers. The environmental groups and the green party advocated it because they 
generally believe that transport is “too cheap”, because they saw the toll as a first step 
towards traffic-management by pricing and as a means to influence the modal split in 
favour of the more environmental friendly transport by road and inland-waterways. The 
public at large, in particular the car owners, saw the toll as a means to reduce the 
substantial amount of HGV traffic on German motorways and to decrease the 
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corresponding congestion. (The sympathies of private car users for a tolling will 
probably change when a toll for private cars will be brought on the political agenda.) 
Another important factor for acceptance of the toll was that the media concentrated 
their reporting about the toll mainly on the technical and management problems of Toll 
Collect and the politicians, not on the economic and social issues. After a while the 
public seemed to believe that it had become a matter of national honour to get the toll 
working. Economic and social questions increasingly began to play a secondary role.  
On the level of economic theory the German example seems to confirm the mounting 
evidence that large infrastructure projects involving private firms must be dealt with 
from the perspective of the theory of incomplete contracts (see Hart (1995) and Hart, 
Shleifer,Vishny (1997)). Apparantly major mistakes were made when the government 
set up the contract with Toll Collect. It seems to be a worthy object of future research 
therefore to inquire in how far the theory of incomplete contracts can inform policy 
making in the area of implementing tolling systems. 
Finally, the German example shows the necessity to find binding political 
mechanisms with respect to the use of the revenues of the toll. It is known from the 
economic theory of second best that allocating these revenues to road building must not 
necessarily be the optimal option. On the other hand acceptance may increase if the 
citizen can be convinced that the toll is not “just another tax.” No matter how this 
question is decided, politicians must find ways to clarify from the outset how the toll 
revenues are to be used and ways to commit themselves credibly to these uses.  
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Abstract 
 
Venice is worldwide known as one of the most intriguing places, hosting an average of 15 million 
tourists per year. This paper describes the causes of the economical inefficiency of the freight 
transportation system in Venice, and analyses the problems caused by the damages done by the waves. A 
properly modified form of road pricing, aiming at improving the efficiency of the traffic chains by 
introducing the pressure of competition between the freight operators, is thereby conceived and the 
possible deriving scenarios are described. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A “peculiar” city of Arts has “peculiar” traffic problems and requires thereby a 
“peculiar” approach. In Venice, the increasing amount of freight boats causes an 
unsustainable wave motion which jeopardizes the survival of the foundations of the old 
buildings by the sides of some canals.  
After reviewing the past attempts to reduce the problem of the wave motion, this 
paper considers hereby the movement of the boats as a mere kinetic phenomenon, 
considering the effects of congestion and pollution ultimately not much relevant. 
Taking these preliminary remarks into account, a new traffic tool is conceived and 
thoroughly explained. The possible scenarios deriving from the effectiveness of the tool, 
and their consequences on the freight delivery system are analysed, leading to the 
conclusion that the intervention proposed in this paper should be possible, even in a 
such complex, “peculiar” background. 
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1.1 Short notes on the city  
 
An incessant, slow, physical metamorphosis has characterized Venice from its 
foundation till the present days, due both to the erosion produced by the sea and to the 
deposits carried by the rivers (Caniato et al., 1999). 
This evolution has led to several interventions, accomplished especially by the Venice 
Republic in the 18th century, meant to keep under control on the rivers of the region, to 
open new canals, to create the so-called “bocche di porto” (i.e. the openings that 
connect the sea and the lagoon), and other interventions to protect the seafront of the 
lagoon. 
The city changed along its history especially with the establishment of the railway 
bridge which connects the islands and the mainland (1846) and with the road bridge 
(1932): San Marco lost then its role of city headquarters becoming a tourist hotspot; the 
Arsenal and Salute dismissed their respective docking and duty roles. Unlikely, Rialto 
always kept its ancient role, having always been the commercial centre of Venice with 
markets and banks. The terminal of Piazzale Roma and the Tronchetto Island were also 
created as the new access gates for Venice, both for freight and for passengers. This 
area (Tronchetto, Piazzale Roma and the Rail Station, see figure 1) receives the 100.000 
people arriving daily in Venice, switching them to the public boat service. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Plan of the city of Venice. 
 
 
The transport network of the city is made from a central axis (Gran Canal) starting in 
Piazzale Roma and crossing the whole city up to San Marco, and a set of smaller canals 
which connect the Gran Canal with an external ring of greater canals surrounding the 
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whole city (Giudecca and Fondamenta Nove, figure 1). This network has never 
changed, despite the creation of Rio Novo (1933, in order to link more directly San 
Marco and Piazzale Roma) and the burial of some canals during the Austrian and 
French occupancy along the 19th century. 
 
 
1.2 Transportation issues in Venice 
 
The appearance of different kinds of motor boats in the lagoon is quite recent: the first 
motor boat for public transport appeared in 1881 and remained for a long period the 
only motorized typology allowed. The first private motor boats appeared later (1960s). 
They were mainly used for freight transport, and suddenly took control over the canals.  
Nowadays, several typologies (both for passengers and freight) are sharing the available 
water space. The boats for passengers are: 
 
- Public transport service, provided by the firm ACTV (Venice Transport Public 
Company), serving the stops spread in the city, whose allowed speed along the main 
canals (Gran Canal, Giudecca canal, Fondamenta Nove) is 11 km per hour. 
- Taxis, which are allowed to run at 20 km per hour on the external canals and 5-7 km 
per hour in the inner ones. These boats are smaller than the ACTV ones and are able 
to run along the smaller canals of the city. 
- Gondolas, divided in two categories: traghetti, used especially by Venetians, which 
link continuously the two banks of the Gran Canal, and the gondolas providing 
tourist sightseeing trips. There are no official estimations about the number of 
gondolas in use but they can roughly be considered around 500 units.  
- Private boats, used by hotels and cruise organizers collecting people at Tronchetto. 
 
The mobility network of Venice (both for passengers and freight) can not be 
compared with those of other cities (considering canals as roads), given the poor 
employment of boats for individual mobility and the very high ratio of foot-traffic.  
Besides, pollution and congestion are not to be seen as the main issues in the Lagoon 
of Venice: the boat traffic is not the main pollutant factor for Venice, as the pollution 
produced both from the chemical industries of Marghera and the vehicular traffic of 
Mestre (both on the mainland of Venice) is carried by the wind. On the other hand, 
congestion affects just the main canals in the rush hours.  
Unlike other cities, vehicles are then to be considered not as a pollutant, but as a 
kinetic concern. The boat traffic causes damages through the formation of waves, whose 
height depends on the speed and the tonnage of the boat, and on the section and the 
depth of the canals. The flow of boats produces mainly two forces on the banks: the first 
is caused by the waves directly generated by a boat itself (this is typical of smaller 
ships) and the second by the whirlpool of the seabed water (dominant for bigger boats). 
The waves cause a faster process of erosion, augmenting the porosity of the stones and 
the bricks that constitute the banks.  
The small amount of boats for passenger mobility and the review of some previous 
analyses (see also section 2.2) suggest to focus on the freight. 
The delivery of freight within the city is carried out by an oligarchy of carriers: a 
small percentage of this oligarchy uses private boats for transporting their own freights, 
while the greatest amount of the deliveries are carried out by transporters operating for 
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third party clients. Presently, there are about 400 licensed boats, but a large amount of 
unlicensed carriers is present in the city (almost 200 boats) 
This fleet is composed of boats different in terms of size and materials. These 
characteristics define the load capacity of the boats (defined for each ship at the 
registration). The most common boat for freight transport is the so-called “mototopo” 
(6-14 meters long, with a minimum 3.5 tonnage). 
Half of the fleet is equipped with peculiar features like freezers, safe-deposit boxes 
etc., while the other ships are often used for general freight transport and pony express 
deliveries (figure 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A typical Venetian boat used for freight transport. 
 
 
The logistic chain of Venice has its centre in San Giuliano, on the mainland, in the 
Tronchetto Island (the switching point with the road network) and in the Fondamenta 
Nove (figure 1). 
The shipments are mainly concentrated early in the morning and, leaving from the 
collecting points described above, concern the city centre, through the Gran Canal and 
the smaller canals. Different paths are followed according to the final destination: ships 
directed in the city centre from the railway station follow the Gran Canal up to Rialto. 
The ones directed in the areas between Rialto and San Marco follow the Rio Novo. The 
Rio Novo is one of the busiest canals, counting up to 1800 passages per day of freight 
boats (60% of the overall boats passing through the Rio Novo - Coses, 2003).  
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Nearby Piazzale Roma, the railway bridge represents a hot spot for the ring 
navigation. This is due to its height, which does not allow the transit of big boats, and 
force them to transit in the Gran Canal in front of the rail station (2100 passages per 
day, Coses, 2003), extending significantly the length of each trip (Coses 2002a, 2002b, 
and 2003). The latest surveys showed an increase of 40% of the boat passages between 
2001 and 2002 (Coses 2002a, 2002b, and 2003). 
A very weak competition among the shipment companies, which apply flat rates 
reflecting a standard fare for all the operators, comes out from this picture. An external 
tax, evaluated according to the principles described further in the paper (with the free-
of-charge tolls given to the shippers and the possibility of selling them back to the 
public administration) would cause a change in the actual non-competitive stuck 
situation. 
 
 
1.3 Previous attempts to solve the problem of the wave motion 
 
The economical and traffic systems of the city of Venice have already been object of 
numerous studies: a staff of Worcester Polytechnic Institute led by Dr Fabio Carrera 
promoted a study within the UNESCO project “Venice inner canals” to evaluate how to 
reduce the damages for the shopkeepers caused by the closing of the canals for their 
extraordinary maintenance.  
The proposal of Carrera, developed in three different publications (Carrera, 1999a, 
1999b & 2005), assigned to a public corporation (which was later identified with the 
municipality of Venice) the coordination of the contracts for the deliveries, which were 
to be granted to the lowest bidder. This would have caused a zone-oriented (instead of 
the present product-oriented) distribution, reducing the amount of circulating boats and 
thereby the wave motion.  
The increase in the number of landing places in the islands and a different 
management of the warehouses would have allowed to reschedule the deliveries with 
less on-board and more ashore workers.  
The researches of Coses (2002a, 2002b, and 2003), and Insula (2002) offered the 
numerical surveying, upon them several strategies for solving the problems related to 
the mobility (such as speed limits, traffic restricted areas, specific hours of accessibility, 
one-way canals and so on). Most of them failed because they were not negotiated with 
the subjects involved. 
The authorities dealing with boat traffic have been recently unified in the so called 
“Governor’s supervisor for Wave Motion”, aimed at “facing the emergency occurred in 
the City of Venice, in its lagoon and in the sea canals”. 
The Governor’s supervisor identified the new proposals for interventions defined by 
the Traffic Restricted Zones regulation (17 June 2005): according to the greater or 
smaller section of the canals and the weakness of the environments, the supervisor for 
the traffic within the Venetian Lagoon has defined the new speed limit along the canals 
(figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Speed limits in the Lagoon after the decision of the Government’s supervisor for the traffic. 
 
In spite of this rule, the problem of the wave motion does not seem to be solved: only 
the smaller canals gained advantage from the limitation to the passage of motorboats. 
The new rule has not changed much the traffic in the other canals, mostly due to the 
deficiency of a concrete policy in the freight movements. 
 
 
2. Description of the pricing tool and its effects on the lagoon 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The pricing tool considered in this section is part of a wider plan, containing several 
proposals meant to solve the problematic transportation system within the Lagoon of 
Venice, and meant to reduce the impact of the waves. 
In order to keep control on the mileage covered by boats, a direct equivalence 
between mileage and money is proposed. A credit is defined as the right to cover a 
length unit, identified as a canal between two check points. 
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2.2 Choice of the freight boat as target 
 
The 35-40% of the total distances daily covered within the canals is run by freight 
ships (Coses 2002a, 2002b, and 2003). As a consequence, the attention has to be 
focused on the freight boats: their number and their size makes them chiefly responsible 
for the formation of waves. 
Previous studies (Carrera 1999a, 1999b, and 2005) and the analysis of the current 
state have underlined a wide margin of optimization for both the delivery paths and the 
load ratios of the ships, since the actual ratio is lower than the 60% of the maximal 
tonnage.  
The total mileage of the paths followed by freight boats could be cut down at the 20% 
of the distances currently covered (Carrera, 2005). This inefficiency is due to several 
reasons: 
- a “product-oriented” delivery principle: each kind of good required by a store is 
delivered by a different shipper (e.g.: a brand of beer is distributed by one boat at 
several bars in Venice, while a second boat ships other kinds of beverages at the same 
bars, a third one ships food, and so on); 
- A large amount of empty trips: the incomes of shippers are much higher than the 
fuel price and thereby they are not encouraged to improve the paths of their deliveries; 
- A society based on close personal relations: shippers use every day the same bar and 
the same restaurant for their lunch, no matter in which part of the city they are at lunch 
time. 
A “natural” suggestion for the pricing tool would then drive towards an increase of 
load ratios and a different choice of the paths of the freight boats.  
 
 
2.3 Proposal for an innovative road pricing tool 
 
This particular road pricing system implies the application of road pricing on the 
network of canals that constitute the road system of Venice (figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4: Canal network in Venice and location of the check points (in red). 
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Differently from other cases, in which the check points are located along the 
perimeter of the city, in this pricing system the check-points are extended along the 
whole net of canals with a hot spot distribution having increased density along the most 
sensitive banks (meant to preserve them from the destroying effects of the waves).  
The solution proposed is meant to keep control over the rates applied to each 
shipment; this is a particular deal within Venice as far as the high costs of transport are 
declared to be the reason of the high prices applied in the city compared with the same 
products sold in the mainland.  
With the aim of avoiding an immediate rise of the fares, the procedure gives any 
shipper an amount of free-of-charge tolls, the amount of which is calculated with the 
procedure described in section 2.5. This amount can be increased by buying permits 
from the government/system administrator, whenever needed.  
The innovative aspect of this proposal is the possibility of either selling back each 
year the unused tolls to the administration, or keeping them for a future use. The income 
gained aims at promoting an optimization of the paths travelled, in order to save as 
many credits as possible. 
Better delivery trips, a higher load ratio, and, above all, an effort for a different 
delivery procedure, would change the present product-oriented (“one good – one 
shipper”) shipment in a destination-based one (see section 2.2).  
The only subject allowed to buy back someone’s unused credits is the public 
administration: this avoids speculations (e.g. people forced by someone to sell them 
their unused credit at an excessively low price), which would make the pricing tool 
ineffective.  
The free tolls must be distributed by the public administration, considering an existing 
division within the carriers: the pricing tool will affect only the ones who convey freight 
mainly within the City Centre, avoiding those running through external canals.  
A period of 20 years is considered suitable for reaching the goals proposed from this 
tool. Considering the difficulty of improving the supply chain within a shipping 
enterprise, a function is required to establish an appropriate schedule in the distribution 
of the free tolls (see following section 2.4). This function is represented by a concave 
curve. Since the first years have a higher improvement margin, the optimization rate is 
set at 15% for the first two years and then is decreased progressively every 5 years. The 
limit of this curve is set at the value corresponding to the 20% of the distances covered 
nowadays. This value is increased by 2,5% each year according to the increasing tax of 
freight transportation in Italy (Cappelli et al., 2005). 
 
 
2.4 Description of the procedure adopted to assign the free of charge tolls 
 
In this section the schedule of application of the pricing tool will be described, 
focussing onto the method used to calculate the free tolls distributed each year. 
The first year of application (year 0) will be used for placing the check-point gates 
and for providing the shippers with the equipment to be installed on the boats. Other 
important tasks carried out in year 0 are awakening the shippers and collecting the data 
required for calculating the amount of free tolls to distribute the following year. The 
distances covered during year 0 are computed by analyzing the receipts compiled by the 
shippers for each delivery, which will contain the exact list of the canals used. The 
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mileage covered corresponds to the amount of credits that the shipper would have used 
if the pricing tool had already been applied.  
According to this basic value, on year 1, which is the first year of real application of 
the pricing tool, the function adopted provides a total amount of credits that corresponds 
to the 110% of the distances covered on year 0. 
The increase provided is meant to avoid a limit in the companies’ commercial growth 
by the tax eventually caused. The efficiency of the pricing tool for year 1 is measured 
through the effort of the shippers in saving the greater amount of free tolls, which, if 
sold back to the public administration, would produce an additional income in the 
company’s financial balance. 
The next year (year 2) the amount of free tolls distributed to each operator is lowered 
of 15% (93,5% of the distances covered during year 0). The constructive part of the 
pricing tool begins here: the shippers, aiming at keeping their commercial share, are 
forced to improve their logistic efficiency, in order to avoid the payment of the 
additional mileage covered. The improvement, which implies the reduction of 6,5% of 
the distances run compared with year 0, could be achieved just avoiding the unpaid trips 
(the ones covered for leisure or for a private use). The unused tolls are sold back as 
well. 
 
 
2.5 Possible scenarios: success, failure and expected results 
 
The total expense for the public administration (besides the costs for the equipment 
and its maintenance) is given by the success or failure of the pricing experience.  
The following formula explains the economical sustainability of the tool proposed 
here by expressing the income (or the costs) for the public administration: 
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       (1) 
where: 
 
F:  income or costs for the public administration; 
N:  amount of years taken into account; 
ti:  amount of tolls used in year i; 
tgi:  amount of free tolls distributed in year i; 
pi:  price of a free toll in year i; 
K:  fixed payments (equipment, maintenance etc.) 
r:  current interest rate 
 
The case of a total inefficiency of the procedure (the shippers keep on travelling the 
canals without any logistic improvement, making the final customers pay for the 
additional tolls bought) is considered in figure 5: in this case, the income for the public 
administration would be given by formula (1), considering a rising in the mileage 
covered according to the general increasing in freight transport. 
This result can also be drawn from figure 5, considering the quantity (ti – tgi) as the 
difference between a black and a white column at a given year i.  
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Figure 5: Description of the worst result of the tool. 
 
Formula (1) can describe the opposite outcome as well. A perfect response of the 
operators (figure 6) would mean that the actually covered mileage reaches immediately 
the minimum possible value, which, according to previous studies (Carrera, 2005), can 
be estimated as the 20% of the current one. The public administration will face in this 
case a total cost given by the purchase of the free tolls distributed and not used, being tgi 
(white columns) lower than ti (black columns). 
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Figure 6: Description of the optimal result of the tool in the best desired scenario. 
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Figures 5 and 6 represent two polar, opposite situations, but at the same time show 
clearly that the main issues of the pricing tool proposed here are the price paid by the 
shippers for an extra toll and the one paid by the administration for buying the unused 
tolls back.  
In case of an excessively low price for the extra tolls, compared with the delivery 
fares adopted, the tendency would probably be similar to the first described scenario. It 
would mean no improvement in the supply chain: the shippers would keep on with the 
present delivering procedures.  
On the contrary, an excessive price would cause the paradox of a complete stop of all 
the delivery operations, due to the fact that the shippers would consider more 
remunerative to stop their boats and sell all the credits back to the public administration 
(with the obvious consequences for the city). 
A moderate toll price would produce the desired intermediate scenario: a substantial 
and progressive increasing of the logistic chain, in which the most of the operators 
would be located around the toll-refund line. Some of them would optimize their 
deliveries optimizing the load ratio of the ships and taking advantage by the final return 
of the unused tolls. Other transporters would instead be forced to buy a few more tolls, 
being unable to optimize their supply chain (figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Representation of the realistic outcome of the tool. 
 
The red line in figure 7 represents the same function of distribution of free credits, as 
the one expressed from the white column in the figures 5 and 6. The blue lines try to 
predict the behaviour of the shippers, who are expected to be closer and closer to the red 
tendency, as the pricing tool becomes established. 
This gap in the final income (effective income plus refunding of the unused tolls or 
effective income minus price paid for buying additional tolls) will improve the 
competition within the sector, which is almost nonexistent nowadays. The ones who 
spare miles will be able to lower their rates in order to attract new users, as far as they 
can have benefits by selling their unused tolls back. The others, unable to save tolls, will 
on the contrary face additional costs given by the extra credits bought; as a 
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consequence, they will increase their fares running out of market, which will force them 
to improve their logistics for the next year.  
The analysis of figures 5 and 6 has not to be considered in mere economical terms: 
also environmental aspects play a role in the overall consideration of the effects. Venice 
would gain from the tool in any case: in the polar, worst case (figure 5) the inefficiency 
of the tool would be rewarded by some extra money, which the municipality could 
invest in a more frequent maintenance of the banks. In the opposite, best case (figure 6), 
the tool would effectively reduce the mileage covered by the boats and then directly the 
erosion of the banks. In the more realistic, intermediate scenarios described in figure 7, 
the total expenses for the public administration would be the maintenance of the 
equipment, as the tolls refunded would be almost equal to the additional tolls sold. 
The optimal distribution of the check points must be evaluated carefully, in order not 
to worsen the accessibility of some inner areas of the city, but for avoiding the crossing 
of those areas for the delivery of small amounts of goods.  
For this reason, a maintenance of the free access in the external canals (Giudecca 
Island and Fondamenta Nove – see figure 1) is proposed, aiming at moving the trips 
connecting the opposites parts of Venice to the less vulnerable areas. This is to be 
achieved through: 
- The creation of a logistic centre located on Tronchetto Island; 
- A stronger policy of controls and penalties; 
- An educational program for improving both the load ratio of boats and the logistics. 
The cause of the present disorganization is not to be found only within the 
transporters, although they are responsible for a general lack in the observation of rules 
and technical progress. The public administration is guilty as well, since it was not able 
to find an alternative, suitable location for the logistic centre of Tronchetto (the first 
projects were developed in 1980 – TransCare, 2003) and has not arranged financial aids 
for the renewal of the fleets (the most of the boats are from the seventies and many of 
the others even from the sixties).  
Also some shop holders share a portion of responsibility, as they swapped large social 
external costs for small private incomes. 
 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
This paper sums up different measures of intervention on the urban mobility system, 
belonging in the literature to the two main topics of "Road Pricing" and "City 
Logistics". 
Particular originality and complexity are imposed by the area of application, i.e. the 
city of Venice, in which the mobility through water canals determines externality and 
needs therefore more complex control systems. 
The pricing tool described here has the objective of modifying the status quo of the 
organization of the freight movement in the lagoon, with the aim of introducing the 
pressure of competition between the operators, who nowadays operate in a sheltered 
market system with low efficiency. 
Because of the weakness of the ecological system and the strong rootedness of 
oligopolistic customs, the developed system needs to be tested (in its first year of 
application, always referred to as "year zero" in the previous sections), in order to 
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calibrate the elasticity of demand, the yearly percentage of optimization of the mobility 
(i.e. the obtained reduction of the traffic flows) and the final objective of its total 
reduction (i.e. the level of reachable efficiency). 
The conditions of feasibility of the intervention are in any case comparable with those 
of similar initiatives, with the only complication of dealing with a segment of market 
rather closed to external measures of rationalization, and which has been accustomed in 
the years "to take advantage" of the particular economical and urban conditions of the 
lagoon of Venice. 
The analysis of the possible scenarios, however, leads to the conclusion that the 
margin of action of this pricing tool has to be estimated as significant, and by all means 
greater than the ones present in comparable situations in the traditional city areas, being 
the current state of freight transport demand far away from efficiency. This 
consideration leads to the conclusion that this intervention should be feasible even in a 
complex background such as Venice. 
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